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FROM "SANCTITY" TO "FAIRNESS": AN
UNEASY TRANSITION IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS?'
K.M. Sharma **
1. THE CLASSICAL LAW OF CONTRACT AND
THE PARADIGM OF "FREEDOM OF CONTRACT":
AN INTRODUCTION
The moral force behind contract as promise is autonomy: the parties are
bound to their contract because they have chosen to be.I
A. Sanctity of Contract: Pacta Sunt Servanda
Although contract law is one of the basic and ineludable institutions of
our society' (and its domain has been incredibly vast, complex, and
* This Article, though not in the nature of a conventional book review, owes much for
its inspiration-and exploration of relevant themes-to the excellent study of Dr. Nagla
Nassar on the subject. See note 68, infra.
** B.A., M.A., LL.B., LL.M. (Rajasthan); LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard); Faculty of Law,
University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.
1. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
57 (1981). For Fried, the basis of contractual obligation rests, first, on the
impermissibility of violating another's autonomy by abusing a trust one has invited by
promising and, second, on the duty to respect the autonomy of the promisor by enforcing
obligations one has voluntarily assumed. Id. at 14, 16-17. An early example of such a
normative approach was provided by Lord Mansfield who, "with his flair for
rationalisation," consistently espoused the notion of moral obligation as the test of
enforceability of promises. SIR DAVID HUGHES PARRY, THE SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS IN
ENGLISH LAW 9 (1959).
2. E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract,
69 COLUM. L. REV. 576, 578-82 (1969); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle
and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REV. 741, 741 (1982) (the "institution of contract is central
to our social and legal systems, both as reality and as metaphor"); Dietrich A. Loeber,
Plan and Contract Performance in Soviet Law, in LAW IN THE SOVIET SOCIETY 128-29
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diverse3), in recent years, it has undergone some significant changes.4 At
the heart of these manifold changes has been the much-vaunted sanctity of
individual autonomy in contracting, an offshoot of the liberal notion of
freedom of contract, which was the ideological backbone for the
(Wayne R. LaFave ed., 1965) (the attempt by the Soviet Union to administer the economy
without the institution of contract failed); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & VIKTOR P.
MOZOLIN, CONTRACT LAW IN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY AND
GENERAL CONCEPT 53-54, 56-86 (1987) (the unsuccessful Soviet experience of functioning
without contract is fully explained).
3. As an illustration, see GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 1 (Ronald K.L.
Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995), which advanced the provocative view that "contract ... is dead"
and created a storm of controversy and inspired a large volume of scholarship questioning
the historical, analytical and philosophical bases of the rise and fall of classical contract
law. For a sampling of these, see, e.g., Richard Danzig, The Death of Contract and the
Life of the Profession: Observations on the Intellectual State of Legal Academia, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 1125 (1977); Gary L. Milhollin, More on the Death of Contract, 24 CATH. U. L.
REV. 29 (1974) (book review); Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and
Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1975) (book review); James R.
Gordley, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 452 (1975); Morton J. Horwitz, Book Review,
42 U. CHI. L. REV. 787 (1975); Arthur T. von Mehren, Book Review, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1404 (1975); Anthony J. Waters, Book Review, 36 MD. L. REv. 270 (1976). But
see Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract Rises from the Ashes of the
Bad Faith Tort, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 483 (1994) (discussing the decline of the cause of
action for tortious breach of the implied covenant of "good faith and fair dealing" in
contracts); Ellen A. Peters, Grant Gilmore and the Illusion of Certainty, 92 YALE L.J. 8
(1982) (speech given at the Yale Law School memorial service for Gilmore). The various
contributions in Symposium, Reconsidering Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1995), evinces that scholarly discussion continues apace and reveals
the critical importance of the concept of contract in society. For further bibliographical
references, see GILMORE, supra, at 167-69, added by the editor of the second edition,
Professor Ronald K.L. Collins.
4. Contract law is rapidly changing. In particular, the enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) by forty-nine states in America, plus the District of Columbia,
the Virgin Islands, and Louisiana (partly) has caused a major change of approach in some
of the fundamental doctrines. Because much of the law of contract was also commercial
law, the U.C.C. has become an important distillation of contract law. 1 JAMES J. WHITE
& ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5-6 (4th ed. 1995). As an
example, the term "contract," is in essence defined by the U.C.C. as "the total legal
obligation" created by a bargain. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(11), 1-201(3) (1997). Section 1-
201(11), read in conjunction with section 1-201 (3), has a somewhat different meaning
than it has in transactions not governed by the Code, since the term "bargain" as used in
legal parlance includes transactions in which no promise is made, such as the immediate
sale of property without warranty in exchange for cash. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 3 reporter's note (1979). Moreover, U.C.C. § 2-106(1)(1997) specifically
includes sale of goods within the term "contracts."
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development of the law of contract.' Enshrined in the Biblical injunction of
motzeh sfassecha tishmor or "thou shall keep thy word, "6 and in the age-old
Roman adage of pacta sunt servanda ex fide bona,7 the modern concept of
"freedom of contract" maintains significant roots within the lexicon of
contract law, and signifies that parties to an agreement have the right and
power (autonomy) to construct their own bargains8 and insist upon their
5. A step-by-step evolution of the law of contracts is beyond the scope of this paper,
except to note that as England evolved from a relatively primitive backwater to a
commercial center with a capitalistic ethic, the law changed with it. See generally
Frederick Pollock, Contracts in Early English Law, 6 HARV. L. REV. 389 (1893); A.W.
B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION
OF ASSUMPSIT (1975); P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
(1979).
6. Numbers 30: 2 (King James). When a man makes an oath to obligate himself by a
pledge, he must not break his word but must do everything he said he would. Id. Cf.
Matthew 5: 33-37 (King James) and James 1:19-25 (King James).
7. "An abbreviated form of the rule stated in Justinian's Code 2, 3, 29 [is] an expression
of the principle that undertakings and contracts must be observed and implemented."
DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 912 (1980). For an English
translation of Codex Justinianus (Code of Justinian) 2, 3, 29, see S.P. SCOTT, THE CIVIL
LAW 173-74 (1932). For a historical overview, see Hans Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda,
53 AM. J. INT'L L. 775 (1959); Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: A Meditation, 34
VA. J. INT'L L. 405 (1994).
8. Indeed, the ideology of "freedom of contract" became a rallying cry among
philosophers and politicians during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See Samuel
Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 373-74 (1921); P.S. ATIYAH, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 8 (5th ed. 1995). " [T]he shibboleths 'freedom
of contract' and 'sanctity of contract' became the foundations on which the whole law of
contract was built.... [Jiudges ... thought that it was just to enforce contractual duties
strictly according to the letter." Id.
Even today some theorists would strongly require courts to refrain from tampering
with the terms of the parties' bargains. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 13-14 (1982), but the modern views of freedom of contract recognize that the
concept of "freedom" has limitations. W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE
LATE 20TH-CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 15-16 (1996). The limitations
in the form of certain rules of evidence (for example, the Statute of Frauds and parol
evidence mechanism) or certain substantive rules of law (for example, contractual capacity
and unconscionability) are, however, to be contrasted with limitations, the sole justification
of which is the protection of the individual's own welfare. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE
LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 147-63 (1993). These paternalistic limitations, if not
justifiable on other independent nonpaternalistic considerations, have been found seriously
indefensible as constituting an unwarranted intrusion on one's freedom. See generally
Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L. J. 763 (1983);
Rochelle Spergel, Paternalism and Contract: A Critique of Anthony Kronman, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 593 (1988); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives
1999]
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literal performance. For, since contracts are consensually assumed
obligations, in principle, within the confines set by the precepts of illegality
and immorality, the parties should be able to specify their own distinctive
regime of rules to govern their contractual relationship.
Similar reverence for the ideal of sanctity of agreements (covenants),
designed to provide a secure transactional framework, informs all schools
of Islamic jurisprudence: Al Muslimuin 'inda shurutihim (Muslims are
bound by their stipulations).9 In fact, under traditional Islamic (sharia) law,
there is a much stronger presumption than in most legal systems for leaving
the contractually formalized bargain undisturbed. This is in accordance
with the strong command in the holy Qur'an on obedience to contracts: "0
ye who believe! Fulfill (all) obligations. "'0 The verse (aayat) expresses the
rule of lawpacta sunt servanda; however, in Islam, the exhortation to fulfill
contracts emanates from Allah Himself (and not from a human lawgiver).
Thus, in its Arabic aphorism, Al-Aqud Sharia 'tA1-Muta 'dqdfn, the contract
is the sharia, that is, literally, a sacred law between the parties, and is
in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982).
9. For the principle of freedom of contract in Islamic law, see Louis MILLIOT,
INTRODUCTION A L'f-TUDE DU DROIT MUSULMAN 205 (1953); SAYED HASSAN AMIN,
ISLAMIC LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 45-49 (1985). It has to be borne in mind
that since no contract in "derogation of any Islamic principle" is permissible, to that
extent, the parties' liberty "to choose the forms and the contents of their agreements" is
considerably circumscribed. Id. at 46. See also Nabil Saleh, Origins of the Sanctity of
Contracts in Islamic Law, 13 ARAB. L.Q. 252, 263-64 (1998).
10. Sura A1-Maida 5:1. Chapter (sura) 5 of the Qur'an, sometimes called the Chapter
of Contracts (Surat al-Uqud), begins "with an appeal to fulfil, as sacred, all obligations,
human and divine ...... THE HOLY QUR-AN: ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE MEANINGS
AND COMMENTARY 275 (Ustadh Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans.; the Presidency of Islamic
Researches, Ifta, Call and Guidance rev. & ed., Holy Qur-an Printing Complex, Al-
Madinah AI-Munawarah, 1410 H [1990], under the auspices of the Ministry of Hajj and
Endowment, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). In defining uqad (obligation), the learned
commentator wrote:
[T]he Arabic word implies so many things that a whole chapter of
Commentary can be written on it. First, there are the divine
obligations that arise from our spiritual nature and our relation to
Allah.... But in our own human and material life we undertake mutual
obligations express and implied. We make a promise; we enter into
a commercial or social contract; we enter into a contract of marriage;
we must faithfully fulfil all obligations in all these relationships. Our
group or our State enters into a treaty; every individual in that group
or State is bound to see that as far as lies in his power, such
obligations are faithfully discharged.
THE HOLY QUR-AkN, supra, at 276 n.682.
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binding until the end of its term, even if it were concluded with unbelievers:
"[F]ulfil your engagements [covenants] with them to the end of their term:
for Allah loveth the righteous."1 '
There is abundant authority in the Qur'an, the hadith (personal acts and
sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), and the writings of the jurists, for the
principles that the contract is the law of the parties and that Muslims are
strictly bound by every lawful contract or contracts into which they may
have entered.' 2 Since "[n]early one-fifth people in the world today are
Muslims, and Islamic law is at the very core of their beliefs and social
system,"13 it is pertinent not to overlook what the sharia has to say about
contractual obligations. This is particularly so, because a large number of
transnational transactions (for example, oil and mineral concessions,
production sharing projects, joint ventures, transfer of technology,
construction and operation of public utilities as well as loan and other
financing agreements), on which the economy of the Western world so
vitally depends, have been the subject-matter of many international
commercial disputes and arbitrations. These have in turn involved an
interplay of the notions of fairness with the Islamic veneration of the
stipulations voluntarily inserted by the parties, that is, ufu bil uqud (honor
your contracts). '4
11. Sura At-Tauba 9: 4, 7. See generally sura Al-Nahl 16: 91-94; sura Bani israil 17:
34, 36; sura Al-An'm 6: 151, 153; sura Al-Miiminun 23: 1-8.
12. See generally J.N.D. Anderson & N.J. Coulson, The Muslim Ruler and Contractual
Obligations, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 923-28 (1958); Saba Habachy, Property, Right, and
Contract in Muslim Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 450, 458-72 (1962); DR. S. E. RAYNER, THE
THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 91-100 (1991); FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L.
HAYES, III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK, AND RETURN 67-68, 97-102
(1998); Mahdi Zahraa, Negotiating Contracts in Islamic and Middle Eastern Laws, 13
ARAB L.Q. 265, 274-77 (1998).
13. John Makdisi & Marianne Makdisi, Islamic Law Bibliography: Revised and Updated
List of Secondary Sources, 87 L. LIBR. J. 69, 71 (1995).
14. The invocation of the doctrine of "changed circumstances" in the context of the
Iran-U.S. disputes, and arbitrations involving other Muslim countries, presents a good
example of the interaction of the concept of sanctity with fairness under traditional and
modern Islamic law. See generally RAYNER, supra note 12, at 259-63; AMIN, supra note
9, at 55-60; WAYNE MAPP, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: THE FIRST TEN
YEARS 1981-1991: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL'S JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 134, 139-43 (1993); GEORGE H.
ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 306-20
(1996); JOHN A. WESTBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND CLAIMS INVOLVING
GOVERNMENT PARTIES: CASE LAW OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 157-
85 (1991); Robert B. von Mehren & P. Nicholas Kourides, International Arbitrations
Between States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM.
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This divine mandate of contractual sanctity, unquestionably common
to the laws of all civilized nations in both the common law and Western
European legal systems, and hitherto a lynchpin of the autonomy of the
parties' will (volonte),' 5 has been either gradually replaced or, at least,
supplemented by other competing considerations of justice, paving way for
the emergence of a new contractual morality over a broad spectrum of
human activity. This progressive transition from principles to
J. INT'L L. 476, 513-45 (1981); P. Nicholas Kourides, The Influence of Islamic Law on
Contemporary Middle Eastern Legal Systems: The Formation and Binding Force of
Contracts, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 384, 394-98, 408-409, 420-28, 429, 431-35
(1970); Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117, 162-65 (1963) (popularly
known as the ARAMCO Arbitration); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 20
I.L.M. 1, 47-48, 54-58, 6 Y.B. COM. ARB. 89, 101 (1981) (Mahmassani, Arb.) (popularly
known as the LIAMCO Arbitration); HENRY CATrAN, THE LAW OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 54-58, 120-22 (1967); WALLED EL-MALIK, SHARIA
LAW AND MINERAL INVESTMENT 103, 114 (1993); Walied EI-Malik, State Ownership of
Minerals Under Islamic Law, 14 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 310, 313-24 (1996).
15. The will theory of contracts gained ascendancy in the early nineteenth century, and
the courts simply enforced whatever bargain the parties had made. See, e.g., MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 161-73 (1977); E.
Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 944-51 (1967);
Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, 14 ILL. L. REV. 85, 86-89
(1919). The will theory ironically was replaced by an increasingly objective approach to
the discovery of the parties' contractual intent, see ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 459, though
the victory of the will theory and the advent of the objective approach did not "proceed
at the same pace." GILMORE, supra note 3, at 43-44 (noting persistence of "subjective"
approach into latter part of nineteenth century). See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, The
Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of
Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REv. 293 (1997).
16. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND
CRITIQuE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 1-6 (1997). Unlike the
classical contract doctrine which was more unitary in its broad sweep, applicable to all
types of contractual transactions, the modern doctrine is not so all-encompassing. E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 32-33 (2d rev. ed. 1990). Today various branches of
specific contracts exist and, notwithstanding a common conceptual core linking them, are
oftentimes governed by separate regime of detailed rules, adapted either statutorily or
judicially, to respond to the myriad situations represented by their nature. Sale of goods,
hire purchase, agency, employment, partnership, insurance, franchise, aviation, computer
contracts, government contracts, contracts of international trade, are all examples where
it is necessary to proceed from an understanding of the general law of contract to more
specific rules relevant to the particular context alone. Id. at 33-34.
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pragmatism,' 7 or doctrine to discretion,"8 in the law of contract has of
necessity involved an accommodation with the allegedly Procrustean
intellections of, say, consideration, privity, mistake, duress, etc.-not only
in the countries of common law orbit 9 but also of civil law
lineage 2°-toward producing results that are perceived to be just and fair and
in consonance with commercial commonsense. 2' Accordingly, the judicial
17. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRAGMATISM: CHANGES IN THE
FUNCTION OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AND THE LAW 5, 6-8, 13, 15, 29-32 (1978).
18. See, e.g., G.H. TREITEL, DOCTRINE AND DISCRETION IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
2, 10-11, 19-20 (1981).
19. See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES: CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN
LAW COMPARED 1-5, 197-230 (1980).
20. For example, in Belgium, the "freedom to determine the contents of one's contract
has been radically affected" by statute or by economic circumstances, because of the
realization "that the principle of contractual freedom was not an automatic key to justice
and order in commercial relationship." PROF. JACQUES HERBOTS, CONTRACT LAW IN
BELGIUM 46 (1995). This approach was though not designed to uproot the time-honored
principle of pacta sunt servanda, an essential feature of the Belgian law of contracts, id.
at 130, which, in turn, owed its existence to "a continuation of French law stemming from
the period during which [Belgium] was a part of France .... " Id. at 46.
Interestingly, the sanctity principle was recognized in France, as early as the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries, by the system of royal law developed under the French kings.
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 476 (1983). Unlike the British royal courts, the French bailiffs assumed
jurisdiction over contracts (and not just over sealed covenants), on the canonist moral
principle that contracts must be kept, pacta sunt servanda. Id. (quoting 2 PHILIPPE DE
BEAUMANOIR, COUTUMES DE BEAUVAISIS § 999 (A. Salmon ed., Paris, 1970) all
.contracts must be kept and therefore it is written, 'A contract prevails over a law,' except
those contracts made for bad purposes [as, for example,] if one contracts with another to
kill a man for 100 livres"). Beaumanoir's phrase Convenance vaint loi, according to
Professor Berman, "is a translation of the Latin expression conventio vincit legem, which
was often used throughout Europe at that time and is to be found a century earlier in
Glanvill. The meaning was that the will of the parties superseded those (nonmandatory)
provisions of law which defined contractual obligations 'unless otherwise agreed."' Id.
at 629 n.82.
21. Of late, in refutation of the orthodox view that fairness "should play a very small
role, if any role at all, in contract law," a very spirited argument has been advanced by
Stephen A. Smith, In Defence of Substantive Fairness, 112 L.Q. REV. 138, 138 (1996),
who, apart from attempting "a comprehensive theoretical analysis-and defence-of
substantive fairness and the role that it should play in contract law," id. at 139, advances
the thesis that contracts which "deviate from normal price can and usually do harm
individuals' abilities to plan and thereby to achieve autonomous, fulfilling, lives." Id. at
157. See also James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1587 (1981);
Stephen A. Smith, Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract, 59 MOD. L. REV. 167
(1996); F. H. Buckley, Three Theories of Substantive Fairness, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33
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reluctance to "police the fairness of every commercial contract by reference
to moral principles"22 has of late witnessed a significant transformation and
shift in legal mentalite.
B. A Hurried Perspective of Contract Law:
From Subjectivism to Objectivism
Viewing these developments in some perspective, there had been an
elaborate and sophisticated law of property and of contract, both in the
church and in the mercantile community, for some centuries.23 But as a
separate doctrine, contract law had its origins in the eighteenth century,
when it began to emerge from subordination to property law.24 Indeed, in
his Commentaries on the Laws of England, published between 1765 and
1769, Sir William Blackstone did not consider contract to be a separate
body of law at all, and dispenses it as a whole in a few pages forming a kind
of a small appendage to his treatment of the law of property.25 Because
precapitalist notions of property existed and no extensive markets had been
developed, the system was characterized by a title theory of exchange with
damages calculated under equitable doctrines.26 These doctrines began in
an era which was hardly idyllic and exhibited vastly different social
conditions and modes of interaction to those which have been experienced
in the late twentieth century. Hence these were to be rejected by modem
law in response to cataclysmic social changes-viz., "forced... adapt[ation]
to the appearance of the factory, the rise of the industrial city, and a violent
rupture of group life and feeling that crushed traditional forms of moral and
(1990); Edward A. Harris, Note, Fighting Philosophical Anarchism with Fairness: The
Moral Claims of Law in the Liberal State, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 919, 944-59 (1991).
22. Banque Keyser Ullmann S.A. v. Skandia (UK) Insurance Co. Ltd., [1990] 1 Q.B.
665, 802 (Eng. C.A.) (Slade L.J.).
23. On the canon law of contracts in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see generally
2 WILLIBALD M. PLOCHL, GESCHICHTE DES KIRCHENRECHTS 399 (1955); TIMOTHY
LYNCH, CONTRACTS BETWEEN BISHOPS AND RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS: A HISTORICAL
SYNOPSIS AND A COMMENTARY (1947).
24. Morton J. Horwitz, The Historial Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARv.
L. REv. 917, 920 (1974).
25. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *440-70. Further, in a chapter entitled
"Of Injuries to Personal Property," contract appears for the last time. Id. at 154-66. For
a critical examination of Blackstone's view of contract, see Duncan Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 205, 321-25, 337-42 (1979).
26. Horwitz, supra note 24, at 920.
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community identity" 27-that took place in the early nineteenth century. It
was this experience that forced the development of a more precise legal
doctrine that would better cope with the explosion of contractual agreements
and with the changing perception of the enforceability of promises between
individuals.
The nineteenth century, during which much of the framework of
modern contract law was established in a recognizable form, saw the
development of the contract as the "indispensable instrument of the
enterpriser"" based upon the protection by the law of "reasonable
expectations created by promises." 29 The central premise of what was to
become the classical period of contract law (one Professor Grant Gilmore
would suggest of boring formalism) was "freedom of contract."3" The
27. Peter Gabel & Jay Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW-A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 497,500 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
28. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REV. 629, 629 (1943).
29. Id. "[I]n the eighteenth century promises were often enforced primarily because the
promisee had relied on the promise to her detriment or to the promisor's benefit." Jay M.
Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 679 (1984).
ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 739-93; HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 161-93. However, the
nineteenth century saw the ascendance of bargained-for-consideration which pushed
reliance-based doctrines into the periphery. Feinman, supra, at 679. (This rigid, classical
approach of the nineteenth century to contracts largely accounts for the reemergence of
promissory estoppel today.)
30. Originating in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the expression "freedom
of contract" reflected the natural law philosophy that the contracting parties were to carry
out their agreed-upon obligations. See 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACiS LIBRI
TRES 391-408 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1995). Nineteenth century English
commentators borrowed from the works of French legal theorists, who by 1804 had
succeeded in embodying in the French Civil Code a highly individualist concept of
contract, later adopted by many continental codifications. Earlier, the Prussian Code of
1794 (Allgemeines Landrecht fOr die Preussischen Staaten) had incorporated a similar
philosophy where the parties were regarded as having the power and the unrestricted
freedom to make the law which was to govern their relationship. See, e.g., para. I 3.1 of
the Prussian Code of 1794, "Undertakings can give rise to [enforceable] rights only insofar
as these undertakings are freely given." Para. 1 4.4 deals with a declaration of intention,
and para. I 5.1 reflects the notion of free will. See Dr. Hans Hattenhauer, Introduction
to ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FUR DIE PREUSSISCHEN STAATEN 17-18 (3d rev. ed.,
Neuweid, Kriftel, Berlin: Luchterhand Verlag GmbH 1996).
The French CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] arts. 1108-1112, translated in THE FRENCH CIVIL
CODE AS AMENDED TO 1 JULY 1994 (John H. Crabb trans., 1995), and the German
BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (Civil Code) [BGB] arts. 116, 145, translated in THE
GERMAN CIVIL CODE AS AMENDED TO JANUARY 1, 1992 (Simon L. Goren trans., 1994)
extol the importance of "freedom of will." This will model was expressly developed as
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freedom of autonomous individuals to be able to make bargains as they saw
fit (with as little intervention from the state as possible) squarely placed the
formation of contract ex nihilo in their will.3 ' That freedom of contract, as
evolved in the spirit of laissez-faire, has found repeated expression in extant
case law, and has had an impact on contract law in its tendency to overstress
the importance of the "intention of the parties," that is,jus dispositivum-to
use the phrase of the Romans.32
The emphasis on individual will, whereby contractual obligation could
be "created by a communion of wills, an act of joint, if purely mental
a cornerstone of contract by the German pandektists, particularly by Friedrich Carl von
Savigny and Otto Bdihr. See generally JUHA POYHONEN, SOPIMUSOIKEUDEN JARJESTELMA
JA SOPIMUSTEN SovITTELU 379-88 (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys, Vammala 1988).
This approach, the product of the political liberalism of the eighteenth century, fell in with
the economic liberalism of nineteenth century England to produce an equally individualist
theory of contract law at that time. In this respect, Robert Joseph Pothier (1699-1772) was
in many ways the French Blackstone, whose basic TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS (1761), first
translated into English in 1805, had a pronounced impact on nineteenth-century English
law. His more specialized TRArTE DU CONTRAT DE VENTE (C. Little & J. Brown trans.,
1830) (1765) had an equally great impact, particularly on the concept of freedom of
contract.
31. According to this "classical" view of contract, as parties freely entered into an
agreement as equals, it was not for the law to ensure that a fair bargain had been struck
or to inquire whether the parties had in fact met as equals. This attitude was consistent
with the idea that contracts should be made by the parties (with freedom of choice) and
was also in consonance with a free market economy and the spirit of competition. "[T]wo
of the finest flowers of nineteenth century subjectivism-an attitude which modulates
smoothly into a theory of the untrammeled autonomy of the individual will and thence into
the idea of unrestricted freedom of contract which was surely one of the master concepts
of nineteenth century thought." GILMORE, supra note 3, at 45. Nevertheless, responding
to the new realities, the substantive law was obliged to move away from a purely
individualist or subjective approach to contract and thereby abandon the fiction of
searching for and complying with the will of the parties. This is, however, not to suggest
that classical theory-or its slightly modified version even in the provisions of the first
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932) and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)-is
wholly without relevance. There is no doubt that it shaped the law in a crucial period of
its development, and reflected the use made of planned exchanges in the aggressively free
enterprise society of the nineteenth century. Naturally, it would not be surprising to find
some classical ideas unsatisfactory if the nature of society had itself changed, from out-
and-out free enterprise to mixed economy (where resources are allocated partly through
the decisions of private individuals and corporations, and partly through the decisions of
government-including the courts-and State-owned enterprises).
32. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF
THE CIvILIAN TRADITION 641 n. 12 7 (1990).
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procreation, "" was commonly accepted by the mid-nineteenth century. The
neat and tidy rules of offer and acceptance, consideration and intention were
well adapted to the period when contracts could be called sacrosanct, as in
the famous dictum of Sir George Jessel, M.R.: "[I]f there is one thing
which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and
that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held
sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice."34 In this view, rights
and duties of the parties would come into existence only through promises
and express agreement of individuals who have the free will35 and
independence to commit themselves legally.
The idea that contractual obligations arise from the will of the
individual, determined subjectively, dominated the earlier part of the
nineteenth century and persisted well into the latter part of the century,36
33. ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 407; Roscoe Pound, The Role of the Will in Law, 68
HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1954) (commenting that an English Chancellor explained that he
"looked at the substance, not the form, and that the intention of those who engaged in a
transaction was the substance").
34. Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19 L.R.-Eq. 462, 465 (1875)
(Sir George Jessel). In classical law, "contractual liability was all or nothing: a person
was either subject to contractual obligation (and therefore liable for expectation damages)
because of an agreement supported by consideration, or subject to no contract liability at
all." Feinman, supra note 29, at 681.
35. The "postal rule," or, in its American terminology, the "mailbox rule" that an
acceptance completes the formation of a contract as soon as it is posted is an interesting
example of will theory and of judicial efforts in fashioning a rule, or legal fiction, that
satisfied the requirement that the parties' will concur. See Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T.R. 653,
100 Eng. Rep. 785 (K.B. 1790); Adams v. Lindsell, 1 Barn. & Aid. 681, 106 Eng. Rep.
250 (K.B. 1818); Peter Goodrich, Habermas and the Postal Rule, 17 CARDoZO L. REV.
1457, 1461 (1996).
36. The classic notion of a contract is the metaphor of a voluntary meeting of the minds,
that is, a coincidence of the actual mental process of both parties. The will theory was in
vogue from around 1790 to the mid-nineteenth century, and is largely forgotten today
except for the phrase consensus ad idem ("meeting of the minds"). See Williston, supra
note 15, at 87; Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 575
(1933) ("the classical ... law of contract gives expression to and protects the will of the
parties, for the will is something inherently worthy of respect"). "Was there a consensus
ad idem or a subjective meeting of the minds?" is the question generally asked in many
of these nineteenth-century cases which indicate that the making of a contract depended
upon the actual intention of the parties.
During much of this period, the influence of continental thinkers (particularly Robert
Joseph Pothier and Carl Friedrich von Savigny) was substantial, and RUDOLPH VON
JHERING, DER ZWECK IM RECHT 9-16, 266-67 (1893), had much to say of the "primacy
of the will." See, e.g., WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF
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and has some advocates even today.37 The voluntary will of the contracting
parties was the axis around which nineteenth century contract law was
formulated;38 the general climate-social, economic and legal-favored
freedom of contract and the enforcement of all contractual obligations freely
entered into. This view was consistent with the pervasive individualism of
that time and the general incorporation into law of notions of liberal political
theory.39
Late nineteenth-century thinkers like Oliver Wendell Holmes and
Samuel Williston, however, reasoned that obligations should attach not
according to the subjective intention of the parties, but according to a
reasonable interpretation of the parties' language and conduct. As Holmes
CONTRACT 2 (London, Oxford, 3d ed. 1884). According to THOMAS E. HOLLAND,
ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 114, 253 (10th ed., 1906), the requirement that there be
an agreement of wills and that its expression be in correspondence was of central
importance to Savigny's theory of contract. However, a reading of some of the cases such
as Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Mer. 441, 451, 36 Eng.Rep. 170, 174 (1817) (Lord Eldon, L.C.)
and Browne v. Hare, 3 H. & N. 484, 495, 157 Eng. Rep. 561, 565-66 (1858) (Bramwell,
B.) led one distinguished judge to doubt "that the subjective theory of contract was as
well-established in the nineteenth century as [it was] sometimes made out." Air Great
Lakes Pty. Ltd. v. K.S. Easter (Holdings) Pty. Ltd., [1985] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 309, 335 (Ct.
App. 1985) (Austl.) (McHugh, J.A.).
37. HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 161-73, has argued that the will theory played an
important role in the realm of contract. See also Horwitz, supra note 24, at 920. For
criticism of Horwitz, see A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of
Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 545-46 (1979) (arguing Blackstone's treatment of
contract reflects merely an organizational scheme and not a substantive view of contract).
38. Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 945 n.34.
39. For example, Emanuel Kant's ethical and Jacques Jene Rousseau's political theories
give primary importance to the individual's will and autonomy:
[A]t the end of the eighteenth century the real intention of the parties
had become sacrosanct. It had acquired the dignity of a political and
legal principle which became known as the theory of the autonomy of
will. This meant, in effect, first, that the real intention must prevail
over form, secondly, that the will of the parties is superior to law and,
thirdly, that giving effect to this will is just since ex hypothesi the
parties will not agree to anything harmful to themselves.
A.G. Chloros, Comparative Aspects of the Intention to Create Legal Relations in Contract,
33 TUL. L. REV. 607, 615 (1959) (footnotes omitted). This will, according to 1 BERNARD
WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS § 69 n. la (9th ed. Frankfurt a.M.
1906), must be ascertained in subjective terms. See generally IMMANUEL KANT,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 17, 31 (Lewis W. Beck trans., 6th prtg.
1959); Peter Benson, External Freedom According to Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 560,
578-79 (1987); Arthur von Mehren, A General View of Contract, 7 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA
COMP. L. 17-18 (1982).
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succinctly stated: "The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the
parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and
judge parties by their conduct. "' The doctrinaire denial that individual will
controlled the making or interpretation of contracts led to the ascendancy of
the reasonable observer's interpretation of behavior or words that
determined the contents of the transaction (and not the actual thoughts of the
parties).4'
This approach of objective interpretation 42 narrowed the potential
40. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 309 (Sheldon M. Novick ed.,
unabrid. reprint 1991) (1881). For a valuable judicial analysis of the objective/subjective
dialectic, see Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 460, 464-65 (8th Cir. 1985). Although the
subjective form of the will theory was widely accepted when the French Civil Code was
drafted and the French theorists still incline to that approach, "[in practice, the test
adopted by French law is not very different from the objective test of English law."
Chloros, supra note 39, at 616. However, the German Civil Code is less committed to the
subjective theory than is the French law. See generally Arthur von Mehren, The
Formation of Contracts, 7 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA COMP. L. 30-33 (1993).
41. See Learned Hand's famous, oft-quoted, "twenty bishops" statement to this effect
in Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 201 F. 664
(2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913):
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal,
or individual, intent of the parties.... [If] it were proved by twenty
bishops that either party, when he used the words, intended something
else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon them, he
would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake or
something else of the sort.
Similar expressions appear in Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co. Inc., 239 F.
976, 984-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, J.): "It makes not the least difference whether a
promisor actually intends that meaning which the law will impose upon his words. The
whole House of Bishops might satisfy us that he had intended something else, and it would
make not a particle of difference in his obligations." The older "subjective" or "will"
theory justified contract enforcement if there had been evidence of the "meeting of the
minds" between the parties. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 36, at 575-78. Constant
references to "manifestations" of intent indicate that the objective approach has been
embodied in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1979) ("the formation of
a contract requires ... a manifestation of mutual assent to the bargain"). See also id. §§
18, 19, 24, 27, 29, 33, 38, 53(3), 65 cmt. a, 71 cmt b, 164, 175.
42. The movement "from 'subjective' to 'objective,' from 'internal' to external,' from
'informal' to 'formal,"' GILMORE, supra note 3, at 46, has been a relatively universal
phenomenon. For example, with respect to Australia, the High Court, in Taylor v.
Johnson, 151 C.L.R. 422, 429 (1983), while discussing the law relating to unilateral
mistake, ruled that "[wihile the sounds of conflict have not been completely stilled, the
clear trend in decided cases and academic writings has been to leave the objective theory
in command of the field." Similarly, in English law, the "general principle on
interpretation of contracts was, in the older view, to ascertain the actual intention of the
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grounds of avoiding liability for a bargained-for-exchange by eliminating
the excuse that a party was subjectively mistaken about contract terms, was
otherwise imprudent about the use of language, or had a good reason for
nonperformance. However, even in this objectified form, the will theory
of contract was equated with the absence of state regulation, and reflected
the dominance of free-market values in the late nineteenth century.43 Thus,
freedom of contract attained a uniquely privileged position for practical
reasons as well as moral ones. The new legal principles served an eminent
social function in enabling the mobility of the economic community,
insurance against calculated economic risks (through the award of damages
or specific performance), and the freedom to negotiate a beneficial
bargain.
44
However, since contract was not to be seen as a social institution (but
parties to the contract. The modem view is to ascertain 'what each [party] was reasonably
entitled to conclude from the attitude of the other."' PAUL DOBSON, CHARLESWORTH'S
BUSINESS LAW 213 (16th ed. 1997) (quoting McCutcheon v. David MacBrayne Ltd.,
[1964] 1 W.L.R. 125, 128 (H.L.) (Lord Reid)). Thus, Lord Denning, M.R., in Storer v.
Manchester City Council, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1403, 1408 (Eng. C.A.), extolled the
objectification of modem contract law:
In contracts you do not look into the actual intent in a man's mind.
You look at what he said and did. A contract is formed when there is,
to all outward appearances, a contract. A man cannot get out of a
contract by saying: "I did not intend to contract" if by his words he
has done so. His intention is to be found only in the outward
expression ....
This approach was recently reemphasized by Lord Steyn in the House of Lords:
[O]ur law of construction [of a contract] is based on an objective
theory. The methodology is not to probe the real intentions of the
parties but to ascertain the contextual meaning of the relevant
contractual language. Intention is determined by reference to
expressed rather than actual intention. The question therefore resolves
itself in a search for the meaning of language in its contractual setting.
That does not mean that the purpose of a contractual provision is not
important. The commercial or business object of a provision,
objectively ascertained, may be highly relevant.... But the court must
not try to divine the purpose of the contract by speculating about the
real intention of the parties. It may only be inferred from the language
used by the parties, judged against the objective contextual
background. It is therefore wrong to speculate about the actual
intention of the parties ....
Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v. Burnhope, [19951 1 W. L. R. 1580, 1587 (H.L.) (Lord
Steyn, dissenting).
43. ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 402-403.
44. W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 119 (2d ed. 1972).
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only as an exchange of mutual promises, governed by the will and intention
of the parties, rather than the substantive merit or fairness of what they
agreed to), courts quickly became unwilling to interfere with the contract-
making process beyond interpretation once evidence of assent had been
established.45 This principle of free contract, which was the legal
encapsulation of laissez-faire and the mainstay of industrialization, worked
on the basis that everyone had complete freedom of choice in determining
who they would contract with, on what terms, and that oppressive bargains
could be avoided by simply finding someone else to make the bargain
with.'
The heyday of industrial and imperial Britain, and later America after
the American Revolution, with its laissez-faire economy, was well served
by the classical law of contract, because, once a principle had been
developed, many nineteenth century jurists found it difficult or undesirable
to depart from it whatever the particular circumstances of the case may have
been.47 Therefore, the parties to the contract alone were seen as fit to
determine its adequacy, without the courts seeking to uphold fair relations
between them in a paternalistic way.48 This was thought to be consonant
45. Kessler, supra note 28, at 630; ATIYAH, supra note 8, at 8: "[TJhe law of contract
was designed to provide for the enforcement of the private arrangements which the
contracting parties had agreed upon. In general the law was not concerned with the
fairness or justice of the outcome .... Of course, the promisor was not required to
perform, but only to pay damages for her or his nonperformance. See Oliver W. Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897); "The duty to keep a contract
at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, and
nothing else."
46. However, the assumption that most contracting parties negotiated on an equal
bargaining level was seriously flawed in that the concentration of economic power in a
few, giving rise to monopoly, led the weaker parties to contract only on terms dictated by
those stronger contracting parties who controlled means of production and acquisition in
the market. SLAWSON, supra note 8, at 22-23. There was virtually no choice to escape
from the coercion of the emergent corporate structure to whom law guaranteed property.
See MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 189 (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954,
reprinted 1967); Kessler, supra note 28, at 640.
47. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 1-5, 7
(1991).
48. For example, the Contracts Clause of the U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cf. I that "[njo
State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts" prevents the states
from passing any legislation that would alleviate the commitments of one party to a
contract or make enforcement of the contract unreasonably difficult. Contracts were just
beginning to gain prominence in Anglo-American law as it adapted to a growing market
economy. HOVENKAMP, supra note 47, at 23-24. Many decisions of both the Marshall
Court and the Taney Court, in conjunction with the Contracts Clause, considered under
1999]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 18
with a free-market economy and the spirit of competition, and was the locus
of contractual relationships among independent individuals.49
due process the substantive rationality of restrictions that infringed on the rights to pursue
a trade, make contracts and establish conditions of employment. Id. at 17-35. Marshall
helped expand the notion of contract to the point where contract doctrines "greedily
swallowed up other parts of the law." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 244 (1973). In the case symbolizing these developments, Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 53, 57 (1905), the Court struck down a state law restricting bakers'
hours as an "illegal interference" with "the right of free contract." Id. The Court's
willingness to find laissez-faire economic rights to be the very "substance" of due process
stemmed from a variety of political, legal, and intellectual influences arising in late
nineteenth century America: common law traditions, the legacy of Adam Smith's
economic liberalism, and the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer and William Graham
Sumner. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT (rev. ed. 1955); ROBERT GREEN MCCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN
THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE (1951); LOREN BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION, 1877-1917 (1971); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 464
(1909); ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES
OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (Peter Smith reprint 1976) (1960).
Thus, by the turn of the century, the principle of freedom of contract had been
elevated to the dignity of a fundamental constitutional property right, abridgeable only by
exceptions of "public interest" and "police power." Though the Court vacillated in its
devotion to the doctrine, many post-Lochner and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S.
525 (1923) decisions, including the dissents of Mr. Justice Holmes in both Lochner and
Adkins, provide a fascinating reading in attacking conservative justices' atavistic adherence
to the amoral abstraction of freedom of contract in the face of the social costs. See
generally James L. Kainen, Nineteenth-Century Interpretations of the Federal Contract
Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State, 31 BUFF.
L. REV. 381 (1982). This approach ultimately paved the way for the acceptance of the
permissibility of reasonable legislative regulation of contractual relations, thereby
subordinating liberty of contract to the dictates of social legislation. See generally KEVIN
M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 299-303
(1990); Kirsten L. McCaw, Freedom of Contract Versus the Antidiscrimination Principle:
A Critical Look at the Tension Between Contractual Freedom and Antidiscrimination
Provisions, 7 CONST. L. J. 195 (1996); Kevin M. Teeven, Decline of Freedom of Contract
Since the Emergence of the Modem Business Corporation, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 117
(1992); Walton H. Hamilton, Freedom of Contract, in 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 450, 452-55 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1931). Lochner and
like cases were functionally, if not explicitly, overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See generally Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was
Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process Effective?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1049, 1050 n.3,
1086 n. 197 (1997).
49. Cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 20-22 (1965) (classical contract law, displaying a high degree of
internal consistency, is a reflection of the free economic marketplace); Kronman, supra
note 8, at 797 (contract law "tends to treat the impersonal market transaction as the
paradigm of all exchanges"); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
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C. Nineteenth-Century Contract Law and Its Modern-Day
Adaptations: A Move from "Sanctity" to "Fairness"?
Thus, essentially, the nineteenth century contract doctrine was the
inheritance of the Anglo-American and Anglo-Australian jurisprudence. 50
This doctrine evolved largely through the application of general principles
as molded by the changing social and economic forces of society,
commencing with agrarian feudal England to the more pronounced upsurge
of commerce in an industrializing culture. 51 But as the twentieth century
progressed, particularly since the end of World War II when concepts of
social welfare expanded, it began to be realized that social change was
continuing on apace and that some elements of that doctrine no longer
applied to the society it operated in and on.52
Of course, the law did not remain static, and alterations can be
observed to be in response to social change.53 Social scientists have ceased
to believe that legal principle will act as an incentive or as a disincentive to
human behavior, and the spread of egalitarian ideals has meant that people
are less willing to accept a principle that seems unjust. 54 Thus, since the
social and political upheavals of the early twentieth century, the intellectual
story of the movement has been one of attempts to reconcile, on the one
hand, the pull of established doctrine and of stare decisis, representing the
philosophy of the "sanctity" of contracts,55 and, on the other hand, the
STUDIES MOVEMENT 67 (1986) (a "regime of contract is just another name for a market").
50. FRIEDMAN, supra note 49, at 20-24; CHESIRE & FIFOOT'S LAW OF CONTRACT 857-
59 (N.C. Seddon & M.P. Ellinghaus eds., 7th Austl. ed. 1997); DAVID E. ALLAN & MARY
E. HISCOCK, LAW OF CONTRACT IN AUSTRALIA 10-14, 30-34 (2d ed. 1992).
51. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 124-27 (1990).
52. The contemporary ideas in social sciences dictated that short-term results (the
particular case) were to be seen as a price to be paid for longer-term benefits (the
sustenance of the principle, the consistency of law that is necessary so that it may maintain
its social-conditioning purpose). ATIYAH, supra note 17, at 3, designates the function of
law which "provide[s] incentives and disincentives for various types of behaviour" its
"horatory function" and argues that the nineteenth century particularly favored it as law's
primary function. Id. at 8.
53. See, e.g., KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 189-
210 (1989).
54. Id. at 294-96; MINOW, supra note 51, at 149.
55. Even classical paragon Williston, a conservative thinker, frequently criticized the
formalism of English contract law and the reluctance of English judges to develop more
flexible rules, and, by 1920, recognized that "unlimited freedom of contract, like
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needs for "fairness," reflected in the increasingly judicial and legislative
regulation of contractual relationships. 6
Thus, in the twentieth century the tide has turned away from the
nineteenth-century obsession toward unrestrained freedom and sanctity of
contracts to that of fairness and cooperation. 7 That this has been so, both
through the limitations of mandatory law imposed by legislation (regulating
commercial activity and standardizing contracting procedures) and through
the judicial process of construction of the terms of the contract (designed to
neutralize the abuse of superior bargaining power by the stronger party), is
a phenomenon that needs hardly any extensive documentation.58  The
nineteenth-century view of the freedom of contract as the consensual vehicle
of free choice and individualism for the ordering of private rights scarcely
offers the basis of modem-day contracts. 9  For, in the wake of the
proliferation of one-sided, often unread, and unbargained standard-form
contracts, the assumption that the freedom of contract presupposes that the
unlimited freedom in other directions, does not necessarily lead to public or individual
welfare .... Williston, supra note 8, at 374.
56. von Mehren, supra note 39, at 69:
The emergence of new approaches to the problems of substantive
justice presented by contracts, especially those taking standard forms,
resulting from a process of one-sided ordering reflects tensions that
began to develop in the late nineteenth century within traditional
contract law. Nineteenth-century contract doctrine had abandoned
notions of the objective fairness of the terms of exchange ... in favor
of an approach that scrutinized the contracting process to see if each
party had freely consented to the terms, whatever those terms might
be. In the twentieth century, courts are concerned not only about the
process in which the transaction originated but also increasingly about
its contents. At an accelerating rate, covert tools that police the
substantive justice of standardized justice of standardized contracts
through a fictionalized appeal to the will of the parties or to
interpretation have been abandoned in favor of more direct and frank
methods. At first, this development went on in the courts. More
recently, standards, rules and approaches have been furnished by
legislation. (Footnote omitted.)
57. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 51, at 166; Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and
Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 51 MD. L. REv. 563, 570, 588-90, 631-33 (1982).
58. See, e.g., HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 252-82 (2d ed. 1993).
59. MINOW, supra note 51, at 277-83; HALL, supra note 53, at 296-97: "The scope and
implementation of contract law changed in response to the demands of a legal culture that
placed increasing weight on equitable solutions to disputes rather than strict adherence to
the idea that private parties, left to themselves, could best maximize their interests."
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parties know what is best for themselves and that their decisions in that
regard ought to be given effect has ceased to be a commonplace reality. I
Since people cannot avoid making certain contracts, the chimera of a
freely negotiated contract is totally inappropriate for many of these
transactions. There is no consensual foundation, except illusive
freedom-the freedom not to acquire a business, not to have a fax machine
or computer, not to purchase an airline ticket, not to insure one's life or
property, not to have public utilities (such as gas or electricity), and so on.
In such a situation, freedom of contract is no more than a romantic illusion
especially for parties who lack leverage and are forced to acquiesce into
controlled marketplace transactions (dictated by standard-form contracts of
industrial and commercial monopolies on a take-it-or-leave-it basis) which
they did not have the liberty to bargain for, or, at times, even the capacity
to understand the often incomprehensible terms.6 Moreover, without
genuine economic equality, absolute freedom cannot really exist, since
parties are rarely completely equal in economic or social terms. One's
freedom to contract is thus clearly limited by social, commercial and legally
acceptable norms.
Nevertheless, the formalistic common law construct recognizing the
strict application of traditional contract doctrines, like objective intention,
adequacy of bargained consideration, Statute of Frauds, and the parol
evidence rule, reflected courts' obeisance to freedom of contract and
individualism, notwithstanding the stark reality that the standardized
contracts (weighted in favor of the entrepreneurs) were neither read nor
understood.62 Thus, when faced with written contracts, to avoid jury
favoritism for the consumer on questions of consent and fairness, courts
oftentimes turned the notion of freedom of contract into a question of law
based on form,63 once the external formalities of contract were seen to have
been complied with. Though constrained by positive rules of law,
nevertheless, the imaginative judicial minimalism practiced by the
60. RICHARD LAWSON, EXCLUSION CLAUSES 69-70 (2d ed. 1983); DAVID YATES,
EXCLUSION CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS 1-11 (1982).
61. Cf. Morehead v. N.Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 632 (1937) (Stone, J.,
dissenting): "There is grim irony in speaking of the freedom of contract of those who,
because of their economic necessities, give their services for less than is needful to keep
body and soul together." Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 adopts the
relative bargaining power of the parties as a factor in limiting the enforceability of unfair
terms. See generally Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
62. See supra note 60.
63. See, e.g., ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 732-34.
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nineteenth-century courts within that formalistic structure led to increasing
legislative intrusions. 64  This was in response to the effects of
industrialization and consumerism toward curtailing the abuses of unfairness
generated by the substitution of equality of bargaining with standardized
contracts of adhesion. Thus, "in their efforts to ensure contractual justice
all legal systems have increasingly restricted the freedom of the parties to
fix the terms of their contracts" 65 by considerations of fairness as to the
means and ends of contracting.'
64. YATES, supra note 60, at 73-122.
65. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 22
(Tony Weir trans., 2d rev. ed. 1987). The growing awareness of the desirability of
governmental intrusion in the economy-that is, the transition from "nineteenth century
individualism to the welfare state and beyond"-led to an eventual undermining of the
individualist premises of the classical contract law. GILMORE, supra note 3, at 104.
66. For example, the recent European Community Directive on Unfair Contract Terms,
Council Directive 93/13 EEC, art. 3(1), 1993 O.J. (L95/29)-implemented in the United
Kingdom by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (SI 1994 No. 3159)-is
particularly significant for the European legal profession. Article 3(1) of the Directive,
embodied in § 4.1 of the Regulations, reads: "A contractual term which has not been
individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good
faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations under the
contract." See generally Ewoud Hondius, EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts: Towards a European Law of Contract, 7 J. CONT. L. 34 (1994); Hugh Beale,
Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, in
GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 231 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds.,
1995); LAURENCE KOFFMAN & ELIzABETH MACDONALD, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 198-
211 (2d ed. 1995), which contains a new chapter entitled "The European Community
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts." For a discussion of the problem of
uncertainty, arising in the rapidly increasing area of EC legislation in the context of the
Unfair Contract Terms Directive, see Trevor C. Hartley, Five Forms of Uncertainty in
European Community Law, 55 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 265 (1995).
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II. SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS REVISITED:
LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
[P]acta sunt servanda is not really a rule on its own, but is merely a
reflection of the nature of a contractual obligation. The problem is to
decide when the rule admits of exceptions.67
A. From Classical Theory to Relationalism
A relatively recent study by Dr. Nagla Nassar, a meticulous and
talented comparative lawyer from Egypt (who possesses a commendable
grasp of both civil law and common law doctrine), addresses to some of the
sanctity-and-freedom-of-contract-oriented issues in modern contract law."6
In the introductory chapter, by drawing upon a vast array of sources, the
author has sought to encapsulate, with commendable brevity, the salient
features of contract law through various phases.69 According to her,
contract law, traditionally viewed in all Western legal systems as a body of
basic concepts and doctrines for giving effect to voluntary agreements
according to the intent of the parties, has struggled in the twentieth century
to adapt itself to a wholly new economic situation.7" For the liberal fiction
that all the effects of a contract should be attributed to the will of those who
made it still persists through contract law today even though the
overwhelming majority of contracts are the product of the will of only one
of the contracting parties.7 This has led some theorists to insist that the
mainstays of contract law are radically inappropriate to the late-twentieth
century and that we need to replace them with an ideology that is more in
67. Lord Justice Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five Years, in
LIBER AMICORUM FOR LORD WILBERFORCE 174 n.83 (Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie eds.,
1987).
68. NAGLA NASSAR, SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS REvISITED: A STUDY IN THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS (1995).
69. Id. at 1-29.
70. Id. at 14-15: "The emphasis on the individual, his freedom and his role in society
enhanced individualism in intellectual ideas [and] gave rise to [David] Hume's
utilitarianism and Adam Smith's market economy philosophies. These two schools of
thought have much in common, especially in their conceptualization of contractual
agreements and the role they play in the social mechanism."
71. See supra notes 59-61, and accompanying text.
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tune with current conditions and practices.72
Doubtless, academic criticism of contract law has been harsh, with one
leading critic labeling it "dead" 73 and another calling contract theory "a
mess"74 and suggesting that we need to construct a new theoretical
structure. 75 There has been a proliferation of a whole range of perspectives
(for example, legal realism,76 religious dimension," law and economics
72. For a perceptive critique of these theories, "bring[ing] out the range of views on
contract law and ... identify[ing] a pragmatic middle ground," see HILLMAN, supra note
16, at 1,267-74.
73. GILMORE, supra note 3, at 1, 112 (arguing that promissory estoppel's basis in
reliance indicated that contract and the ever-expanding realm of tort were reuniting,
thereby leading to contract law's death as a separate body of law). Id. at 95-112.
Recently, in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd., [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761, 787 (H.L.),
Lord Goff of Chieveley, deprecating analysis which "involves regarding the law of tort
as supplementary to the law of contract," affirmed the modern trend, saying that "the law
of tort is the general law, out of which the parties can, if they wish, contract." Thus, Lord
Goff acknowledges the superiority of contract. Death-of-contract scholars contend that the
acceptance of the reliance principle has seriously undermined the promissory "bargained
for" exchange basis of classical contract law, thereby reducing the respect for the sanctity
of bare promises "expressed a century ago." ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 655. That both
death-of-contract scholars and promise-focused theorists have overstated their case is
convincingly explored in Phuong N. Pham, The Waning of Promissory Estoppel, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 1263 (1994). But see Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of
Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 45 (1996). In any event, any obituary for
contract turns out to have been monstrously premature.
74. Brian Coote, The Essence of Contract, 1 J. CONT. L. 91, 94 (1988) (citing P.S.
ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM AND THEORY IN ENGLISH LAW 173 (1987)).
75. ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 778; ATIYAH, supra note 8, at 27-35.
76. For an examination of the impact of the legal realism movement, particularly of the
major changes from the classical contract law of Samuel Williston to the realism of Karl
Llewellyn, on contract law and its principal legislative monument (Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code), see generally James J. White, Promise Fulfilled and Principle
Betrayed, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7. See also Cohen, supra note 36, at 575.
Llewellyn's view that the contract of the parties consisted of the bargain-in-fact, tempered
by rules requiring minimum commercial morality, is best incorporated in U.C.C. §1-201
(3) which states that "agreement means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage
of trade or course of performance." See John E. Murray, Jr., The Article 2 Prism: The
Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.
J. 1, 19-20 (1981).
77. See, e.g., Judith A. Shapiro, Note, The Shetar's Effect on English Law-A Law of
the Jews Becomes the Law of Land, 71 GEO. L. J. 1179 (1983); Harold J. Berman, The
Religious Sources of General Contract Law: An Historical Perspective, 4 J. L. & RELIGION
103 (1986); Andrew W. McThenia, Jr., Religion, Story and the Law of Contracts: Reply
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analysis,78 Critical Legal Studies, 79 feminist-or feminine-contract
ideology80), generating a richly divergent cornucopia of competing theories
to Professor Berman, 4 J.L. & RELIGION 125 (1986); Kristin L. Peters Hamlin, The
Impact of Islamic Revivalism on Contract and Usury Law in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt,
22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 351 (1987); Roger Bern, A Biblical Model for Analysis of Issues of Law
and Public Policy: With Illustrative Applications to Contracts, Antitrust, Remedies and
Public Policy Issues, 6 REGENT U. L. REV. 103, 131-52 (1995); VOGEL & HAYES, supra
note 12, at 53-69, 97-128.
78. The influence of the law-and-economics movement, dealing with the application of
economic analysis to contract law, in recent years, has been quite significant. The
movement postulates generally that the ultimate social goal is wealth maximization, also
known as efficiency, a goal whose accomplishment depends on the enforcement of private
contracts. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1-2, at 13-15 (4th
ed. 1992); THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-7 (Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A.
Posner eds., 1979); Ian Ayres, Three Proposals to Harness Private Information in
Contract, 21 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 135 (1997). Significantly, L.L. Fuller & William
R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:], 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936),
anticipated many of the insights of the law-and-economics analysis of contract remedies.
See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). However, this law-and-economics approach
does not seem to have influenced the transnational economic law in any significant way.
But see generally Georg Ress, Ex Ante Safeguards Against Opportunism in International
Treaties/Theory and Practice of International Public Law, 150 INST. & THEORETICAL
ECON. 279 (1994).
79. Critical legal treatments of contract law have questioned the abstract and formal
doctrines, developed by both classical and neoclassical theorists, and have also assessed
many aspects of contemporary alternatives to existing contract doctrines. See generally
Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997
(1985); RICHARD W. BAUMAN, Contract Law, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A GUIDE TO
THE LITERATURE 59, 61-64 (1996); Thomas Wilhelmsson, Questions for a Critical
Contract Law-and a Contradictory Answer: Contract as Social Cooperation, in
PERSPECTIVES OF CRITICAL CONTRACT LAW 9 (Thomas Wilhelmsson ed., 1993).
80. See generally Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a
Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1065 (1985); Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing
Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1029 (1992); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); Martha A.
Fineman, A Legal (and Otherwise) Realist Response to "Sex as Contract": Abortion and
Expanded Choice, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 128 (1994); Gillian K. Hadfield, The
Dilemma of Choice: A Feminist Perspective on [Michael J. Trebilcock's] The Limits of
Freedom of Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 337 (1995); Gillian K. Hadfield, An
Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of
Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235 (1998); Ruthann Robson &
S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63
TEMP. L. REv. 511 (1990); Kellye Y. Testy, An Unlikely Resurrection, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 219, 220 (1995) (identifying "lesbian legal theory's insurrection of contract as a
response to the shortcomings of feminist theory's approach to contract"); Carol Weisbrod,
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and doctrinal analyses, and focusing specifically on the relationship between
contract law and society at a more fundamental level in suggesting that the
ideology of contract has been a vehicle of social control.8' Similarly,
empiricists have pointed out that the operation of contract in society is at
variance with the way it is assumed to operate by theorists and practitioners
alike. 82 The author does not content herself with mere descriptions of the
relevant schools of thought, but highlights links between them as well as
special conditions that may be responsible for the evolution of doctrine and
jurisprudence."
Whilst it is true that modem commercial agreements are generally of
a more complicated nature, extant research indicates that business people
today generally execute contracts without consideration of the legal
principles involved, except in circumstances which dictate the resort to a
carefully drafted instrument. '4 The empirical data found that commercial
The Way We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts and Domestic Arrangements, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 777; Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities:
Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 4 (1996).
81. HILLMAN, supra note 16, at 267-74.
82. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WiS. L. REV.
465,467.
83. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 19-28.
84. See, e.g., Comment, The Statute of Frauds and the Business Community: A Re-
appraisal in Light of Prevailing Practices, 66 YALE L. J. 1038 (1957) (survey of ninety-
two manufacturers revealed Statute often ignored); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963) (sixty-eight
businesses invariably settled cancellations for only expenses without recourse to
contractual remedies); Stewart Macaulay, The Use and Non-Use of Contracts in the
Manufacturing Industry, 9 PRAC. LAW. 13 (1963); Hugh Beale & Tony Dugdale,
Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies, 2 BRIT.
J. L. & Soc'Y 45 (1975) (English study parallels to Macaulay's findings); Stewart
Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract, 11 L.
& SoC'Y REV. 507, 507-509 (1977); Britt-Mari Blegvad, Commercial Relations, Contract,
and Litigation in Denmark: A Discussion of Macaulay 's Theories, 24 L. & SOC'Y REV.
397 (1990); Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIs.
L. REV. 1; James J. White, Contract Law in Modem Commercial Transactions: An
Artifact of Twentieth Century Business Life?, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1982); Janet T.
Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional
Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981) (explaining how the Chinese
middleman groups reduced transaction costs and facilitated bargains in the absence of
contract laws); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (describing the relations
of merchants in the New York's diamond industry toward dispute resolution). See also
Clyde W. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525,
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bargains are commonly struck on the basis of a mutual trust between the
contracting parties, in deference to unwritten laws of fair behavior, to avoid
the inconvenience, expense and added difficulty of composing formal
contracts. 8 5 Because of the air of informality (a mere telephone call or
exchange of letters) many of these agreements were admittedly of dubious
legal validity.86 Nevertheless, nonperformance of contractual obligations
was typically resolved without resort to tribunals or courts due to the
defaulting party's desire to avoid adverse consequences that this would have
on its reputation and future trading relations.
87
Although further studies exploring "more fully the extent to which the
availability of contract law makes possible reliance on arrangements and
negotiations that are not explicitly or formally legal"'8 are needed, even the
existing research is significant in indicating that people do engage in
economic transactions in many situations where they should understand that
contract law could play but little role in reinforcing their obligations. It is
not fanciful to suggest that commercial contracts are not always meant to be
legally enforceable. Businesses live with risks, for trust can rest on many
norms and structure reinforcing commitments other than contract law.
An excellent example is furnished by Professor Stewart Macaulay in
his recent case study of a complex architectural project, involving the
internationally renowned architect, Frank Lloyd Wright, and S.C. Johnson
Son, Inc., where the parties performed their complex commitments
"without formal planning and even implicit threats to use legal sanctions. "89
528 (1969); ROGER COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 32-33,
319 (2d ed. 1992); MAX WEBER, supra note 46, at 307; Peter Vincent-Jones, Contract
and Business Transactions: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 16 J.L. & SOC'Y 166, 169 (1989)
(referring to the work of Max Weber that the mutual expectations of parties can be
ensured both contractually and extra-contractually, particularly through an informal
recognition of self-interest in honorable behavior). Cf. ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 713-15;
Edward L. Rubin, The Nonjudicial Life of Contracts: Beyond the Shadow of the Law, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 107 (1995).
85. Beale & Dugdale, supra note 84, at 47. But see Veronica L. Taylor, Continuing
Transactions and Persistent Myths: Contracts in Contemporary Japan, 19 MELB. U. L.
REV. 352, 352 (1993) (the "paradigmatic view that law is largely irrelevant to Japanese
... business relationship [is] misleading," and that "comparative studies which analyse the
market characteristics of different contract types in Japan are needed").
86. Beale & Dugdale, supra note 84, at 48.
87. Id. at 47-48.
88. AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS R. KEARNS, LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 45 (1993).
89. Stewart Macaulay, Organic Transactions: Contract, Frank Lloyd Wright and the
Johnson Building, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 75, 77.
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If these empirical studies are an accurate reflection of current commercial
trends, as one should believe they are, then, two observations may be made.
First, it is the spirit of trust, rather than the mechanics of agreement, which
has become the inspiring principle behind the majority of commercial
transactions.'9 And, second, in the commercial context, various extra-
contractual devices (cooperation, flexibility, willingness to adjust terms)
operate to reduce the rigid usage of contract law and may often involve the
"entangling strings of friendship, reputation, interdependence, morality,
and altruistic desires. "91 This is perhaps a marked indication of the reduced
importance of the sanctity of contract, that is, adherence to precise
promises, to modern commercial dealings.
This phenomenon has been further reinforced by relational theorists,'
including the author, who have offered interesting insights and opened new
vistas in appreciating the growing obsolescence of the classical contract
thinking in the context of modern business transactions, for example,
franchises, long-term leases, output and requirement contracts, construction
and civil-engineering contracts, investment and joint-venture agreements,
license and know-how agreements, management, marketing and other
collective employment agreements and so on.93 The author has endeavored
to show that this new approach-endorsed by Lord Wilberforce in his
perceptive Foreword 4-fits the reality of many long-term international
90. Stewart Macaulay, The Reliance Interest and the World Outside the Law Schools'
Doors, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 247, 262.
91. Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L.
REV. 589, 595 (1974) [hereinafter Macneil, Presentiation].
92. The summation of the relational approach in the text is directly concerned with the
work of Professor Ian R. Macneil, which is both complex as well as voluminous. See,
e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974) [hereinafter Macneil, Many Futures]; Ian R. Macneil, Relational
Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483; Ian R. Macneil, Values
in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 340 (1983); Ian R. Macneil,
Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical,
and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978) [hereinafter Macneil,
Adjustment]; 1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 511-20 (1995).
For reviews of Macneil's work, see William Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to
Contracts Scholarship, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 545; Takashi Uchida, The New Development
of Contract Law and General Clauses-A Japanese Perspective, 4 J. JAPAN-NETHERLANDS
INST. 120 (1992).
93. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REv. 1089, 1089-91 (1981).
94. Lord Wilberforce, Foreword to NASSAR, supra note 68, at xi.
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contracts and transactions (LTICTs) far better than the classical (or even
neoclassical95) ones which did not readily accommodate transactions
unavoidably lacking definiteness and mutuality.
Inspired by the distinction between "discrete" and "relational"
exchanges, championed by Professor Ian Macneil (the primary relational
theorist) and his allies,96 the author's model offers interesting insights about
the workings of LTICTs. 9 Many simple exchanges, a common feature of
day-to-day life, like the casual purchase of a newspaper from a roadside
vendor, taking a public transport, or getting a haircut, are usually completed
more or less instantaneously or within a short time frame, and there need
be no relevant background of prior or subsequent dealings between the
parties to consider (hence "discrete," one-time transaction).
Traditional contract doctrine takes as its model the discrete
transaction. 9 In contemporary economic life such transactions continue,
95. The body of law, usually associated with Langdell, Holmes, Williston and the first
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932), dominant in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, is referred to as "classical contract law." Later contract law, often referred to
as "neoclassical contract law, " is the product of the partial accommodation of new realities
which "attempts to balance the individualist ideals of classical contract with communal
standards of responsibility to others." Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract
Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283, 1287-88 (1990). Nevertheless, the core remains the
principle of "freedom of contract," wherein "the classical values of liberty, privacy and
efficiency" are weighed "against the values of trust, fairness, and cooperation," id. at
1288, "tempered both within and without [contract's] formal structure by principles such
as reliance and unjust enrichment, that focus on fairness and the interdependence of parties
rather than on parties' actual agreements." Id. at 1288 (quoting Robert A. Hillman, The
Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REv. 103, 104 (1988)). Although the
adaptation of neoclassical contract law through the aegis of the U.C.C. and the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979)-and similar analogues in other common
law and civil law jurisdictions-has successfully responded to some of the glaring
shortcomings of earlier contract law, much remains to be done. Macneil, Adjustment,
supra note 92, at 862-86 (neither formulations-"classical" and "neoclassical"-of contract
law are suited to today's world of relational contracting); see EDWARD J. MURPHY &
RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 89 (4th ed. 1991) ("from roughly 1940
to date" the neoclassical contract law, based on legal realism, has occupied itself with
protecting commercial expectations and fairness of exchanges); Steven R. Salbu, Evolving
Contract as a Device for Flexible Coordination and Control, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 329 n. 1
(1997).
96. The other leading relational pioneer is Professor Stewart Macaulay. See Robert W.
Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law,
1985 WIS. L. REv. 565; Thomas M. Palay, A Contract Does Not a Contract Make, 1985
WIS. L. REv. 561.
97. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 21-24.
98. JOHN ADAMS & ROGER BROWNSWORD, KEY ISSUES IN CONTRACT 80 (1995).
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but it is difficult to accept them as representative of the complex
negotiations typical of substantial transactions which are not so
straightforward.' 9 In the first place, parties may expect to be cooperating
over an extended period of time that it is not feasible for them to specify all
the stipulations at the outset exactly. In other words, intertwined relations
embrace many factors that simply defy any presentiation (that is, the
incorporation of the future into a present agreement); the parties will have
to adjust their relationship as it progressively develops. 00 Or, the
transaction may involve many other people, say, for the long-term supply
of energy, for the construction and development of a shopping center
project, for the friendly takeover of a corporate entity, or the signing of a
franchising agreement. The negotiations in such transactions are a far cry
from the simple bargaining envisioned by the classic rules of contract
formation and often involve, over a considerable period of time, the input
of corporate executives, financiers, engineers, lawyers, and many others,
in a continuum of relations ranging from the discrete to the highly
complex.'01 Projects of this nature, given the massive investment of capital
and technical know-how (not to speak of labor, equipment and materials),
are often unavoidably complex and are intended to have a relatively long
life.
The parties may deal with various complexities either by entering into
long-term contracts (perhaps with several parties), or they may have a series
of piecemeal, and ancillary short-term contracts. In either event, where
persons and businesses are in relationships, the law may have to address
this ongoing contracting-as it becomes more complex, complicated and
prolonged-differently, by allowing flexibility or by recognizing that these
several short-term contracts, constituting one economic project, are merely
components of continuing relations where it is increasingly unrealistic to
employ a discrete model of contract to express legitimate expectations that
necessarily evolve gradually through experience and close association. 102
Hence, the deal may not capture the entire transaction but only establishes
an interrelationship among the contracting parties that is broader than their
contractually-defined obligations. One can think of the succession of short-
term contracts, of which certain terms are renegotiated on each renewal, as
the practical and legal response to the flexibility in a long-term
99. Id. at 80-81.
100. Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 91, at 595-97; Macneil, Adjustment, supra note
92, at 890.
101. Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 92, at 887.
102. Id. at 895-97.
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synallagmatic contract. 103
Whereas under the classical theory, each of the several contracts must
be viewed separately as discrete transactions, the relational model normally
regards the economic and functional link between the contracts as forming
one unit in a juridically relevant manner." Or, to use the picturesque
words, "parties treat their contracts more like marriages than like one-night
stands.... [T]he object of contracting is not primarily to allocate risk, but
to signify a commitment to cooperate."' 5 The general agreement may be
fleshed out incrementally as it proceeds by its overall social matrix: This
includes such matters as (1) custom and mercantile usages to which the
parties are subject (by a course of dealing prior to their agreement, or by
a course of performance after their agreement), (2) cognizance of the social
and economic roles of the parties, (3) general notions of decency and
fairness, (4) basic assumptions shared but unspoken by the parties, and (5)
other factors in the particular and general context in which the parties find
themselves in the governance of their affairs.'I "[Jiust as a mountain
changes shape and color as one approaches it ever closer and shuts out other
vistas, so too the common norms oriented toward discreteness take on new
characteristics as they more and more dominate the contract landscape,"1
0 7
thereby developing a complex web of unspoken norms and tacit assumptions
about many elements of the ongoing relationship that do not require further
negotiation. 108
103. Macneil, Many Futures, supra note 92, at 792-93.
104. While developing a comprehensive social theory of contract that more exchanges
are based upon relations than upon discrete transactions, Macneil also suggests that wealth
maximization is not the only aim of contracting parties, but the preservation of the
relationship, harmonization of conflicts and reciprocity are some of the equally important
additional goals. MACNEIL, supra note 92, at 66-70. However, of late, some law and
economics scholars have dealt with the peculiar problems of relational contracting,
discussing specifically problems of "transaction costs" and "lack of information" that
involve economic appraisal of contract issues. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Conflict and
Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 2005 (1987); Ian Ayers & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard,
and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621
(1993).
105. Gordon, supra note 96, at 569.
106. Id.
107. MACNEIL, supra note 92, at 60.
108. David Campbell, The Relational Constitution of the Discrete Contract, in
CONTRACT AND ECONOMIC ORGANISATION: SOCIO-LEGAL INITIATIVES 41-42, 45-61
(David Campbell & Peter Vincent-Jones eds., 1996).
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In this moving landscape, courts have been increasingly called upon
to accommodate imaginatively the traditional contract doctrines with the
increased variety and complexity of the disputes engendered by the
sophisticated nature of such relational or intertwined transactions. These
transactions are of a more involved structure, and-even if not of long-term
duration-exist frequently over a substantive period. 09 This
accommodation has taken place, for the most part, outside the doctrines of
contract law according to nonlegal norms and obligations developed and
mutually accepted by the parties themselves,"l0 with "equitable discretion
using the contract as a framework and reference point.""' Even without the
principal goal of seeking enforcement through legal intervention, these
nonlegal norms, which are immanent in the context, are invoked by the
contracting parties to set general standards and limits for their conduct in
regulating their complex business transactions." 2
This relational approach' 3-where the parties are more allies than
adversaries and value shared interests more than individual ones and where
goodwill, compromise, trust, reciprocity, and cooperation are privileged
norms-stresses that the law's paradigm of contract (an isolated, discrete
109. Id.
110. Contracting in this context signifies a commitment to cooperate, and relationships
involve "complex entanglements of reputation, interdependence, morality, altruism,
friendship, and self-interest." JAY M. FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF
PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESS TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ECONOMIC Loss § 7.3.1., at 193
(1995). Marianne M. Jennings, The True Meaning of Relational Contracts: We Don't
Care About the Mailbox Rule, Mirror Images, or Consideration Anymore-Are We Safe?,
73 DENV. U. L. REV. 3 (1995), deals with some of these noncontractual norms in the
context of "strategic supplier partnering" (SSP), but, unfortunately, the seriousness of
these persuasive insights is unnecessarily diminished by the adoption of a writing style
which is-perhaps deliberately-both somewhat flippant and unorthodox for serious legal
writing.
111. Queens Office Tower Assocs. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 247, 253 (1983 I); see Hugh Collins, Competing Norms of Contractual Behaviour,
in CONTRACT AND ECONOMIC ORGANISATION: SOCIO-LEGAL INITIATIVES, supra note 108,
at 67, 70-72, 81-82, 93-94.
112. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology 143 J. INST. &
THEORETICAL ECON. 272, 274 (1987).
113. Cf. H.G. BEALE ET AL., CONTRACT-CASES AND MATERIALS 4 (2d ed. 1990):
There is no such thing as a contract in the abstract. Every contract is
made, or is found by the court to exist, in a particular context-a
contract to sell goods to a consumer, a contract to charter the services
of a ship, a contract to look after an elderly relative in exchange for
a share in his property when he dies: the possibilities are almost
endless.
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exchange) has ill-equipped it to grapple with transactional relationships. It
often takes a great deal of ingenuity to see how the implications of the
relational view of contract are worked out in the details of contract law, for,
in these situations, a contract is not only a momentary picture of reality, but
it also covers processes which develop in the future." 4
B. LTICTs: An Intermix of Classicism and Relationalism?
An Emergent Theory of Contractual Undertakings
Against the backdrop of the classical theory of contractual absoluteness
(with its emphasis on formalism, technical rules and predictable precise
solutions), the author welcomes the emergence of modern relational
contextual approach. For such an approach, apart from recognizing that
whenever appropriate fairness norms supplement (or even transcend)
freedom of contract, also permits a revision of the parties' agreement and
thus effect a de facto modification of their contractual undertakings. " 5 That
such an approach has been unqualifiedly discernible in all sorts of contracts,
regardless of their subject-matter and geographical operation, is certainly
not the assertion of the author. For, in the wake of the increasing
globalization of the world economy, many contractual undertakings are no
longer confined to domestic terrains but are increasingly assuming
transnational significance. This phenomenon has spurred issues
surrounding the harmonization of international law and resolution of
transnational commercial disputes to the forefront. 1
16
This is not confined only to financial or monetary arrangements (for
example, loans and bonds) which involve international credit and financial
institutions, governmental or nongovernmental. These undoubtedly require
a specialist treatment in the light of differing policy considerations
informing these transactions (whether these be environmental values or
other human rights issues). Contracts nevertheless these are, but because
of the interplay of conflicting issues of law and policy many of these
transactions oftentimes raise issues which are not easily addressed to by the
purely conventional principles of contractual law alone, either from the
perspective of lenders like the International Bank for Reconstruction and
114. Should, then, contract law itself respond by developing special rules for relational
contracts, say, by relaxing the rules of offer and acceptance so that these contracts are not
enforced on grounds of uncertainty and indefiniteness? Or, say, by broadening the
category of "changed circumstances" to permit nonperformance or adaptation? These
questions do not admit of easy answers.
115. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 80-81.
116. Id. at 1.
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Development or of the innate pragmatism of the borrowers of many third
world countries. As such, Dr. Nassar has wisely refrained from testing the
validity of her thesis on the anvil of this category of commitments which
raise significantly different and "an independent set of principles and policy
"1117considerations ....
Rather, in a very cautious and measured examination of her thesis, Dr.
Nassar has chosen only one category of contracts, that is, LTICTs, which
are' "becoming more the norm than the exception.""' In the realm of
today's burgeoning international trade, LTICTs "are the most appropriate
tool available to meet the demands of an ever-increasing sophistication in
prevailing technological and financial techniques."" 9 One of the major
premises of the author's exploration of the conceptual basis of LTICTs is
that the traditional principles of contract law (for example, direct exchange,
reciprocity of mutual promises, consent, freedom of contract) are no longer
suitable for these complex agreements and that contract law may even be
dead-not necessarily in the Gilmorian sense-for such transactions.
120
Instead, a wholly new regime of law, an intermix of rules and practices,
117. Id. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the banking or financial services
institutions have had relatively little exposure to international arbitration and, in fact, have
shown a marked tendency to avoid arbitration, preferring instead adjudication by national
courts. See, e.g., William W. Park, When the Borrower and the Banker Are at Odds: The
Interaction of Judge and Arbitrator in Trans-Border Finance, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1323
(1991). Whether this reluctance stems from the substantive deficiencies of arbitration or
from the lack of understanding regarding the efficacy of arbitration and other nonjudicial
mechanisms are among the questions which require further study. However, in other
fields, the importance of arbitration for resolving international commercial disputes, with
its ability to render a binding and enforceable award, has remained virtually uncontested,
as evidenced by a phenomenal surge in the number of parties resorting to arbitrations each
year. See, e.g., 1994 Statistical Report, I.C.C. INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., May 1995, at 3;
Materials on International Commercial Arbitration (Feb. 28, 1996) (from Debovise and
Plimpton and Price Waterhouse LLP Seminar on Developments in International
Arbitration) (on file with the author).
118. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 1. The concept of international trade is used to include
not only trade transactions for the supply or exchange of goods or services, but also other
types of economic transactions, such as investment and/or concession agreements,
contracts for professional services, etc. See generally David Goddard, Long-Term
Contracts: A Law and Economics Perspective, 1997 N.Z. L. REV. 423; Veronica L.
Taylor, Contracts with the Lot: Franchises, Good Faith and Contract Regulation, 1997
N.Z. L. REv. 459; Luke Nottage, Planning and Renegotiating Long-Term Contracts in
New Zealand and Japan: An Interim Report on an Empirical Research Project, 1997 N.Z.
L. REV. 482.
119. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 1.
120. Id. at 233-34.
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representing essentially an adaptation (or modification) of contractual
principles, might be occupying the field where, say, LTICTs are not looked
in terms of the parties' reciprocal promises alone but are increasingly
viewed as obligations that "are not only defined by the parties' will, but are
also a product of prevailing rules and practices. "121
Insofar as the larger part of the law of contract is a matter of
construction of the intent of the parties, the author, through a searching
examination of a multitude of arbitral cases, has provided illustrati6ns
therefrom of how a tribunal in a particular situation performed the task of
construction, and, in so doing, has tried to identify a contractual model,
described as the contractual equilibrium theory, which has increasingly
influenced the implementation of LTICTs. 122 Although the author "does not
venture an overall revision of contract theory in international law"
123
generally, her study does painstakingly demonstrate the extent to which the
models and definitions represented by the classical and modern theories of
contract have in practice been either overridden, modified or supplemented
in the case of LTICTs and provides a coherent structure of the theory and
practice thereof. 
24
This is presumably so because the law of the arbitration (lex
arbitrationis, loi de 1'arbitrage) can be determined by the parties, and the
arbitrators are not bound by a particular domestic law if they have been
empowered by the parties to decide ex aequo et bono. 125 But even absent
121. Id. at 2.
122. Id. at 237-43.
123. Id. at 2. Contracting parties usually have the freedom (or autonomy) to choose the
system of law applicable to their undertaking, except for those choices prohibited or
mandated by national law. See generally JEAN-CRISTOPHE POMMIER, PRINCIPE
D 'AUTONOMIE ET LoiS DU CONTRAT EN DROIT PRIVtE CONVENTIONNEL (1992); A. F. M.
Maniruzzaman, International Arbitrator and Mandatory Public Law Rules in the Context
of State Contracts: An Overview, 7 J. INT'L ARB. 53 (1990); Patrick C. Osode, State
Contracts, State Interests and International Commercial Arbitration: A Third World
Perspective, 30 CoMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 37 (1997).
124. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 237-43.
125. See DIG. 1.1 ("Ulpianus, libro primo institutionum: [U]t eleganter Celsus definit,
ius est ars boni et aequi." That is, "Ulpian, Institutes, book 1.1: For, in terms of Celsus'
elegant definition, the law is the art of goodness and fairness." I THE DIGEST OF
JUSTINIAN 1 (Theodor Mommsen & Paul Krueger eds. Latin text, Alan Watson ed. Eng.
trans., 1985)). Many conventions authorize arbitrators to adopt this approach of
"goodness and fairness." See, e.g., Geneva Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration art. VII(2) (1961); UNCITRAL Model Law of International Commercial
Arbitration, U.N. Commission Int'l Trade Law, 18th Sess., Annex 1, art. 28(3), U.N.
Doc. A/40/17 (1985).
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such a specific authorization there is now evident a growing trend to let
arbitrators invoke principles and rules different from those adopted in
national jurisdictions. 126 Furthermore, in practice, contracting parties of
different nationalities oftentimes state, especially, with respect to concession
agreements for the exploitation of natural resources or for transactions for
the construction of industrial works, that any contractual dispute is to be
resolved in conformity with the terms of the contract and "the customs and
usages of international trade," the "general principles universally
recognized by civilized nations," or the lex mercatoria. 127 They thus ensure
126. This tendency has recently been confirmed by the UNCITRAL Model Law, supra
note 125, art. 28(1), which states that the "arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in
accordance with such rules of the law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the
substance of the dispute" and that only "[flailing any designation by the parties, the
arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it
considers applicable" Id. art. 28(2). Similarly, the I.C.C. Rules of Arbitration, art. 17,
I.C.C. Pub. No. 581 (1997), as well as the I.C.C. recommendation to the arbitrators,
allow them to apply general principles of law, international customary rules and trade
usages when the parties have expressed an intention that no national law should apply to
the contract. See generally, Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, in PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE: LECTURES ON
COMPARATIVE LAW 45, 68-72 (Roger Cotterrell ed., 1995); Michael Joachim Bonell, The
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Why? What? How?, 69
TUL. L. REV. 1121, 1144-46 (1995); Harold J. Berman, The Law of International
Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 2 EMORY J. INT'L DIsP. RESOL. 235 (1988).
For arbitral awards directly applying the lex mercatoria as the law to a contractual
relationship, even without a contractual agreement referring to it, see, e.g., I.C.C. Award,
Case No. 2583/76, 104 J. Du DROIT INT'L 950 (1977); I.C.C. Award, Case No. 2291/75,
103 J. DU DRO1T INT'L 189 (1976); I.C.C. Award, Case No. 1641/69, 101 J. DU DROIT
INT'L 888 (1974). See generally PETER F. WEISE, LEX MERCATORIA: MATERIELLES
RECHT VOR DER INTERNATIONAL HANDELSSCHIEDSGERICHTSMBARKEIT (1990); Klaus P.
Berger, Lex mercatori in der Internationalen Wirtschaftsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit: Der Fall
"Compania Valenciana," 1993 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-UND
VERFARENSRECHTS 281.
127. The concept represents an autonomous legal order, without reference to any
specific jurisdiction or the legal system of any given country, which encompasses general
principles of law common to trading nations and the usages of international trade and
commercial transactions "designed to regulate situations that neither domestic nor
international law was intended to cover .... Georges R. Delaume, Comparative Analysis
as a Basis of Law in State Contracts: The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L.REv.
575, 611 (1989). For some examples, see FELIX DASSER, INTERNATIONALE
SCHIEDSGERICHTE UND LEX MERCATORIA, RECHTVERGLEICHENDER BEITRAG ZUR
DISKUSSION UBER EIN NICHSTAALTICHES HANDELSRECHT 159 (1989); Berthold Goldman,
The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law-the Lex Mercatoria, in CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 113 (Dr. Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1986); Jan
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"themselves a theoretically neutral, non-national law to govern their
agreements." 28  In such situations, obviously, acting as amiables
compositeurs, or deciding in equity, arbitrators increasingly rely upon the
most elastic of criteria, rules and principles which are either universally
accepted or considered to be particularly suitable for international
contracts. 2 9 In doing so, they oftentimes tend to infuse these principia
Paulsson, Dispute Resolution, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND
THE LAW 209, 230-32 (Robert Pritchard ed., 1996); Lord Justice Mustill, supra note 67,
at 155:
Although the essence of the lex mercatoria is its detachment from
national legal systems, ... some ... of its rules are to be ascertained by
a process of distilling several national laws. The intellectual
justification for this process ... must ... be found in the idea that rules
of the lex mercatoria exist in gremio legis as a complete, albeit
inexplicit, and evolving whole; that they are received, at least in part,
into individual national laws or are reflected by them; and that by
careful analysis the dross of the rigidities, impracticabilities, and
distinctions imposed by each individual national law can be purged
away, leaving behind the pure gold of the underlying international
legal order.
Dr. Nassar is careful to point out that the term, trade usage, "defined as a set of practices
reflecting a pattern of dealing" should be contrasted from the lex mercatoria, which denote
a set of independent concepts and rules of customary mercantile law that substitute for the
lex contractus. The latter has thus wider implications, whereas trade usage merely
connotes "a recognized method of dealing in a certain trade." Thus, the two concepts
operate only "as parallels, not synonyms" and have been so referred in many awards.
Furthermore, trade usage, unlike custom (which is a binding rule of law), is regarded as
a question of fact to be established by the party invoking it. NASSAR, supra note 68, at
84-85.
128. Note, General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 101
MARV. L. REV. 1816, 1833 (1988). For example, according to some authors, the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
97/18, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980), in force in over forty-seven countries by the end
of 1995, resolves the problems of the elusive and evanescent lex mercatoria in the form
of modern international commercial law treaties with the force of law. See, e.g., Kenneth
C. Randall & John E. Norris, A New Paradigm for International Business Transactions,
71 WASH. U. L.Q. 599 (1993); Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCCArticle 2, Sales
in Light of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 165, 166-67 (1995).
129. See generally Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial
Arbitration, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 747 (1985); Int'l Chamber of Commerce,
INCOTERMS: International Rules for the Interpretation of Trade Terms, I.C.C. Pub. No.
350 (1980); Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits, I.C.C. Pub. No. 400 (1983); Ole Lando, Assessing the Role of the UNIDROIT
Principles in the Harmonization of Arbitration Law, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 129
(1994); Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New Lex Mercatoria and the
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mercatoria with concepts drawn from their own juridical background or
commercial experience. 3 ' Thus, possessed of some degree of resilience,
arbitrators often have commodious leeways to overcome the strictures of
traditional contract law in the context of the performance of long-term
commercial obligations and relationships.
It is also becoming fairly evident that international arbitrations are
increasingly eclipsing litigation in national forums in many parts of the
world, and that more and more business persons-and their lawyers-might
say with William Shakespeare: "The end crowns all; and that old common
arbitrator, time, will one day end it. 'So to him we leave it."""' These
days, civil trial by jury has become mostly uncommon, and virtually
unheard of in commercial disputes, many of which are now submitted to
arbitral processes. In particular, when businesses enter into transnational
transactions for the sale of goods, construction projects, joint ventures, or
franchises, the contract usually provides for arbitration for resolving any
disputes arising out of the contractual arrangement, and for regulation of the
contracts by a body of law acceptable to the parties (particularly the
investor). This has now become increasingly the accepted norm (as it
allows each contracting party to avoid the national courts of the other and
overcome difficulties emanating from their differing juridical status),
prompting one leading practitioner to observe that "in today's world the
dispute resolution mechanism will invariably be arbitration. '" 13 2  The
Harmonization of the Laws of International Commercial Transactions, 2 B.U. INT'L L.J.
317 (1984).
130. Cf. Sigvard Jarvin, The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator's Powers, in
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 127, at 50, 66-
71; Ning Jin, The Status of Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, 7
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 163, 170-71, 193-95, 197 (1996); Tom Carbonneau, The Remaking
of Arbitration: Design and Destiny, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A
DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 23, 34-35 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., rev.
ed. 1998).
131. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND GRESSIDA act 4, sc. 5, 11. 224-26 (1602),
in THE ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE 558, 613 (A.L. Rowse ed., 1984). Hector and Ulysses
suffer misery over the unpredictable outcome of the Trojan war during an interim
suspension of hostilities, when all the gods had shown themselves partial and incompetent
to arbitrate. But Ulysses did not leave it on this basis alone, as he had earlier agreed.
Instead, he devised the Trojan horse, in derogation of all the time-honored rules of dispute
resolution.
132. Gerald Aksen, Arbitration and Other Means of Dispute Settlement, in
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO WORKING WITH FOREIGN
INVESTORS IN THE U.S. 287, 287 (David Goldsweig & Roger Cummings eds., 1990).
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international commercial arbitration is now indeed flourishing, 133 has
become fully capable of dealing with today's complex business transactions
toward providing a wide range of relief, and is playing an increasingly
significant role in maintaining international economic relationships.
Dr. Nassar has attempted to identify a coherent list of general
principles-a sort of modern jus commune-which may be extrapolated
from these recent arbitral awards in respect of LTICTs, showing an
interplay between the principles of sanctity and fairness with the growing
ascendance of the latter. Since the rules of commercial contracts vary
around the globe, the task of deciphering such a pattern may be rendered
particularly difficult. (One has, however, to bear in mind that the awards
analyzed are based on reasons, though, at present, there is no universal rule
that in international arbitrations written reasons must be provided. 134)
C. The Enigmatic "Fairness" of Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus:
Has the Bell Completely Tolled on "Sanctity "?
Nevertheless, the author does not rightly make the brazen assertion
that the considerations of fairness have completely decimated the sanctity
principle in the case of LTICTs. 35 On the contrary, as her comprehensive
treatment of the practical application of clausula rebus sic stantibus (a
concept somewhat analogous to changed circumstances) indicates, the
sanctity principle will probably endure for a long time to come, of course,
within the parameters of the suggested contractual equilibrium theory. 1
36
133. YVEs DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIALARBITRATION AND THECONSTRUCTION OF ATRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
311 (1996).
134. The UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 125, art. 31, London Court of
International Arbitration [LCIA] Rules art. 6, American Arbitration Association (AAA)
International Rules art. 28(2), 1993 WL 498527, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution
Model ADR Procedure rule 14.2, and the British Columbia International Commercial
Arbitration Centre (BCICAC) Rules § 34(4) require reasons, unless the parties have agreed
otherwise. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Court of Arbitration Rules art.
27 (1997), requiring that the award in "draft form" be submitted to the ICC Court of
Arbitration, which may draw the arbitrator's "attention to points of substance," may
arguably-by necessary implication-be seen to require that some reasons be given. See
generally E.D.D. Tavender, Considerations of Fairness in the Context of International
Commercial Arbitrations, 34 ALBERTA L. REv. 509 (1996).
135. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 234.
136. Id. at 205-30.
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1. Rebus Sic Stantibus: A Transnational Amalgamation of National
Approaches?
Some elucidation of clausula rebus sic stantibus, now generally
accepted as a very limited rule applicable to the international law of
treaties, 37 is necessary to appreciate its application to international
contracts. For, apparently, the problem of hardship and adaptation of a
contract to altered circumstances as a legal consequence thereof has hitherto
remained relatively less elaborated and acknowledged, at least on the
international level, than the principle of sanctity. 138 In the experience of
humankind, contingencies often arise with which the contracting parties
have not specifically dealt or have not made adequate provisions ex ante.
If this happens, then, the parties may disagree about their respective rights
and responsibilities ex post. Often, during the performance phase, some
unanticipated events, either caused by the voluntary actions of the parties,
or, beyond the control of the parties (natural disasters-floods, earthquakes,
storms-, wars, strikes, political insurrection, revolution and fire), do
occur, and, absent a specific risk allocation clause, require a procedure for
dispute resolution from an international perspective. 13 9
Throughout history, contracting parties have grappled with the
problem of nonperformance of the contract after its formation (or
"conclusion" in civil law parlance) but before its completion, caused by
unexpected upheavals. 1° Various legal systems have coped with these
situations in different ways, using a variety of approaches. Thus, the
137. See, e.g., Akos Toth, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stautibus in International Law,
19 JURID. REv. (n.s.) 56, 147, 263 (1974). This doctrine, as its name suggests, appears
to derive, according to ZIMMERMANN, supra note 32, at 579-82, from a gloss to Gratian's
Decretum, and to have infiltrated the Roman law tradition by being generalized by the
commentators. On the historical development of the doctrine, which can be traced through
the Middle Ages from the Byzantine glossators right up to Hugo Grotius and Samuel
Pufendorf and beyond, see, e.g., KARL LARENZ, GESCHAFTSGRUNDLAGE UND
VERTRAGSERFOLLUNG (3d ed. 1963). It was later included in the "Codex Maximilianeus
Bavaricus Civilis" of 1756 and in the Prussian General Land Law of 1794. ZWEIGERT &
KoTz, supra note 65, at 557.
138. But see MAPP, supra note 14, at 134, 139-43.
139. See infra notes 141-48 and the accompanying text.
140. The effect of the subsequent disappointing event upon the unperformed contractual
obligations is commendably discussed in the Digest (or Pandects) of the Byzantine
Emperor, Justinian, published in 533 A.D. DIG. 45.1.23, 33, in 4 THE DIGEST OF
JUSTINIAN, supra note 125, at 653-54.
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English common law doctrine of frustration (one of respectable antiquity 4 '),
141. Until the middle of the nineteenth century the English common law had no general
doctrine of excuse of contractual performance. Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 27, 82 Eng.
Rep. 897, 897 (K.B. 1647). In that case a lessee sought to be relieved from paying rent
because a "German prince, by name Prince Rupert, an alien born, enemy to the King and
kingdom," id., ejected him from the land, so that he could not take income from it. This,
though, did not involve impossibility, because he could still have paid the rent. The Court
of King's Bench declared that
when the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon
himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any
accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided
against it by his contract. And therefore if the lessee covenant to
repair a house, though it be burnt by lightning , or thrown down by
enemies, yet he ought to repair it.
Id. The rationale for such a rule was that the parties were free to protect themselves from
unforeseen contingencies by express stipulation; if they chose not to do so, then, they
could not be subsequently heard to complain because events did not transpire as they had
hoped. For the background and impact of Paradine, see David Ibbetson, Absolute
Liability in Contract: The Antecedents of Paradine v. Jayne, in CONSENSUS AD IDEM:
ESSAYS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN HONOUR OF GUENTER TREITEL 1 (F.D. Rose ed.,
1996); John D. Wladis, Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the
Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance in English Contract Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1575
(1987); S. J. STOLJAR, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT AT COMMON LAW 187-99 (1975).
The growth of commercial activity in the nineteenth century, however, made this
rigidity of the doctrine of impossibility both economically and socially unworkable. So the
English courts, recognizing these changed conditions, relaxed the constraints on the
doctrine imposed by the principle of sanctity of contracts as followed since Paradine. See,
e.g., Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B.& S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863). It based such
relaxation on the theory of an implied condition arising without express condition in the
contract itself. Taylor was to have the use of Caldwell's music hall for performance on
four days, in return for payment of £100.00 at the close of each day. When the hall was
accidentally destroyed by fire less than a week before the first performance, Taylor sued
Caldwell for breach of contract, claiming as damages the expenses he had incurred in
preparing for the performances. The Court of King's Bench held, however, that Caldwell
was excused because, "looking at the whole contract ... the parties contracted on the basis
of the continued existence of the Music Hall at the time when the concerts were to be
given; that being essential to their performance." 3 B. & S. at 839, 122 Eng. Rep. at 314.
This case, the fountainhead of the modem law of impossibility, signaled the gradual
evolution of a doctrine which has since mitigated the harshness of the absolute contract
rule. Thus, in Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (Eng. C.A.), one of the celebrated
coronation cases, a party was discharged from paying, because there was frustration of the
purpose of the contract (rooms had been let to view a procession which was postponed due
to the King's sudden illness). The courts have now come to realize that at times some
catastrophic event will occur without the fault of either party which will change or destroy
the basis of a contract, and that in these circumstances relief ought to be granted.
Probably the best statement of the basis of the doctrine of frustration was made by Lord
Radcliffe:
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the American doctrine of commercial impracticabilit) 42 (involving extensive
commentary'43), the German doctrine of wegfall der geschdftsgrundlage,
[F]rustration occurs whenever the law recognizes that without default
of either party, a contractual obligation has become incapable of being
performed because the circumstances in which performance is called
for would render it a thing radically different from that which was
undertaken by the contract. Non haec in foedera veni. It was not this
that I promised to do.
Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council, [1956] App. Cas. 696, 729.
See also id. at 719-21 (Lord Reid). This "radically different" test prevails in English law
today, but its application has been very strict, as the Suez Canal cases demonstrate. See,
e.g., Carapanayoti & Co. Ltd. v. E. T. Green Ltd., [1959] 1 Q. B. 131 (1958),overruled
by Albert D. Gaon & Co. v. Socidt6 Interprofessionelle des Olagineux Fluides
Alimentaires, [1960] 2 Q. B. 334 (1959), aff'd, [1960] 2 Q.B. 348 (Eng. C.A.);
Tsakirogolou v. Noblee and Thorl Gmbh, [1962] App. Cas. 93 (1961). See generally G.
H. TREITEL, FRUSTRATION AND FORCE MAJEURE 178-86 (1994); Robert L. Birmingham,
A Second Look At The Suez Canal Cases: Excuse For Nonperformance Of Contractual
Obligations In The Light of Economic Theory, 20 HASTINGS L.3. 1393 (1969); Andrew
Phang, Frustration in English Law-A Reappraisal, 21 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 278 (1992).
142. Both the U.C.C. § 2-615 (1997) and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 261-272 (1979) contain a broad concept of excusable nonperformance, but make it
clear that the new synthesis is subject to the assumption of greater liability through the
agreement of the parties. The change from the narrow defense of impossibility to the
broader principle of impracticability has enabled the courts to allocate risks that were not
anticipated by the parties. See, e.g., Harper & Assocs. v. Printers, Inc., 46 Wash. App.
417, 730 P. 2d 733 (1986) (narrow defense of impossibility has been subsumed in the
more commercially oriented and broader categories of impracticability); Transatlantic Fin.
Corp. v. United States, 363 F. 2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Skelly Wright, J.) (the new
doctrine of commercial impracticability has been freed from the earlier fictional and
unrealistic strictures of the implied term).
143. The scholarly literature concerning impracticability (and its historic predecessors,
impossibility and frustration) is quite extensive. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH
M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 535-84 (3d ed. 1987); ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS 1088-153 (1952); 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS 497-588 (1990 & Supp. 1998); 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 163-82 (4th ed. 1995); 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS 3279-372 (1920); Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the
Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1982); John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision
of Frustrated Contracts: The United States, 64 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1984); E. Allan
Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 860 (1968);
Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability:
Searching for "the Wisdom of Solomon," 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123 (1987); Robert A.
Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 617
(1983); Marianne M. Jennings, Commercial Impracticability-Does It Really Exist?, 2
WHITTIER L. REV. 241 (1980); Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium
Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977); Andrew Kull, Mistake,
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unmoglichkeit, " the French doctrines offorce majeure4 5 and impr~vision'46
Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1991);
Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Darr, Understanding Commercial Impracticability: Tempering
Efficiency with Community Fairness Norms, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 343 (1966); Richard A.
Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law:
An Economic Analysis, 6 . LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); Richard E. Spiedel, Excusable
Nonperformance in Sales Contracts: Some Thoughts About Risk Management, 32 S.C. L.
REV. 241 (1980); Alan 0. Sykes, The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a
Second-Best World, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1990); George G. Triantis, Contractual
Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability,
42 U. TORONTO L. J. 450 (1992); Michelle J. White, Contract Breach and Contract
Discharge Due to Impossibility: A Unified Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 353 (1988);
Wladis, supra note 141. For an unusually elaborate bibliography, see Leon E. Trakman,
Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial Impracticability, 69 MINN. L. REV.
471, 472-74 nn.4-9 (1985).
144. See generally Henri Lesguillons, Frustration, Force Majeure, Imprdvision,
Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, 5 DROIT ET PRATIQUE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL
507 (1979); A. H. Puelinckx, Frustration, Hardship, Force Majeure, Imprdvision, Wegfall
der Geschaftsgrundlage, Unm6glichkeit, Changed Circumstances: A Comparative Study
in English, French, German and Japanese Law, 3 J. INT'L ARB. 47 (1986); Peter Hay,
Frustration and Its Solution in German Law, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 345 (1961).
145. The doctrine of force majeure (irresistible force), expressed in the French C. CiV.
arts. 1147, 1148, requires three prerequisites for discharge: (1) unforeseeability of a
fortuitous event, (2) absolute impossibility of performance and not mere onerousness, and
(3) no fault on the promisor's part. ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & JAMES R. GORDLEY, THE
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 1047-48 (2d. ed. 1977); see also Rend David, Frustration of Contract
in French Law, 28 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) 11, 11-12 (1946); J. Denson
Smith, Impossibility of Performance as an Excuse in French Law: The Doctrine of Force
Majeure, 45 YALE L.J. 452, 465-66 (1936); BARRY NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF
CONTRACT 200-10 (2d ed. 1992); RENt DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND FRENCH LAW 119-95
(1980). For Belgian interpretations of the doctrine, see HERBOTS, supra note 20, at 181-
87.
146. After the First World War, the doctrine of impr~vision (lack of foresight) was
repeatedly applied by the Conseil d'Etat, the highest administrative court in France, in
government contracts (for public works, for public utilities such as gas, water, and
electricity) toward abrogating or modifying the contractual obligations if the performance
of the contract had subsequently become eccessivamente onerosa (excessively onerous).
This was done in an effort to preserve the public welfare in the continuance of contracts
which were essential to the orderly conduct of public life, "a need which is not usually
found in ordinary commercial contracts and one which in any event a court would hardly
be justified in meeting at the expense of one of the parties." Barry Nicholas, Force
Majeure in French Law, in FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 21, 29
(Ewan McKendrick ed., 2d ed. 1995); VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 145, at 551;
P. Delvolv6, The French Law of Imprdvision in International Contracts, 2 INT'L CONT.
& FIN. REV. 3 (1981). However, the civil courts remained quite inflexible in insisting
upon the very strict conditions of force majeure.
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and the Swiss doctrine of impossibility without fault,'47 applied nationally
and internationally (in latter with appropriate modifications), deal with
changes in the economic, political, technological, legal and business realities
"when unforeseen occurrences, subsequent to the date of the contract,
render performance either legally or physically impossible, or excessively
difficult, impractical or expensive, or destroy the known utility which the
stipulated performance had to either party. "" The limits of these doctrines
are however not easy to define, for the notions of excuse or readjustment
often collide with the bargain expectations of the parties, thereby seriously
impairing the freedom and the sanctity of contracts. But how much of a
modification or dissolution of onerous contractual obligations for fairness,
This rigid attitude led to legislative intervention after both World Wars and also
encouraged French businessmen to incorporate "war- or currency-clauses in long-term
contracts [for] an express allocation of risks, or have recourse to arbitral tribunals which
they absolve from strict adherence to law and empower to adapt the contract to the
changed circumstances in the light of what is fair and reasonable .... ZWEIGERT & KOTz,
supra note 65, at 220; see generally David, supra note 145.
The negative attitude of the French civil court is a natural corollary of a strong
principle of "sanctity" of contract, as enshrined in C. civ. art. 1134: "[Ljes conventions
lgalement formdes tiennent lieu de loi A ceux qui les ont faites." That is: "[A]greements
lawfully made have the force of statute for those who made them .... In the famous Cass.
civ., Mar. 6, 1876, De Galliffet v. Commune de Pilissane [popularly known as Canal de
Craponne], DP 1876, I. 193; S. 1876, I. 161, the Cour de cassation quashed the decision
of the Aix Court of Appeal relying on article 1134. It has consistently ruled that the "law
of the parties," in the words of article 1134, must be respected like the law of Parliament,
and that "it is not for the courts however equitable their decisions may appear, to take
[account] of time and circumstances ... in order to modify the parties' agreement and to
substitute new clauses for those freely accepted by the contracting parties." VON MEHREN
& GORDLEY, supra note 145, at 1051 (quoting De Galiffet, supra).
147. There is no mention of "impossibility" in THE Swiss FEDERAL CODE OF
OBLIGATIONS AS OF JANUARY 1, 1984 arts. 97, 119 & 373 (Simon L. Goren trans., 1987),
but the Swiss courts, including the Bundesgericht, the highest Swiss Federal tribunal, are
certainly aware of kindred problems. They too have adopted a concept of
Geschiftsgrundlage (foundation of the contract) to be read with article 2, section 2 of the
SWISS CIVIL CODE (Ivy William et al. trans., 2d ed. 1987), which requires good faith. See
generally Hans Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 287, 289-96 (1958); lur Peter Gauch, Price Increases or Contract
Termination in the Event of Extraordinary Circumstances: The Frequently Overlooked
Provision of Art. 373, Para. 2 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, 4 INT'L CONSTR. L. REV.
265 (1987).
148. Smit, supra note 147, at 287; see generally Dr. Theo Rauh, Legal Consequences
of Force Majeure Under German, Swiss, English and United States' Law, 25 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 151 (1996). In international contract for the sale of goods, there is a
generally accepted "act of God" defense known as force majeure. United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, supra note 128, art. 79.
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resulting from the occurrence of an unforeseen event, should be permissible
as a just and reasonable solution in the new circumstances? It is only in
relatively recent times that the courts in most common law and civilian
systems have softened their rigid insistence that the strict words of a
contract be religiously adhered to regardless of any changes in
circumstances which were not in the contemplation of the contracting
parties.
Departing from the old English common law rule of impossibility, the
American practice-both in section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) (1997) and section 268(2) of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts (1979)-has adopted a new test of commercial impracticability
toward excusing or partially relieving a party from its contractual
obligations when presupposed conditions or contingencies upon which the
contract was based have not been met. 149
The modem English practice, though less liberal than its American
counterpart, has recognized that if some catastrophic event occurs for which
neither party is responsible and if the result of that event is to destroy the
very basis of the contract, so that the venture to which the parties now find
themselves committed is radically different from that originally envisioned,
then, the contract is forthwith discharged. 50 However, the mere fact the
unexpected turn of events have rendered the contract more onerous or more
costly than originally contemplated by the parties is not enough. ' 51 In other
words, no hardship, no unforeseen hindrance, no difficulty short of absolute
impossibility, will excuse the parties from doing what they have expressly
agreed to do. 112 Rather, there "must be as well such a change in the
significance of the obligation that the thing undertaken would, if performed,
be a different thing from that contracted for." 53
The French and Swiss doctrines of force majeure and impossibility,
based on statutory provisions,"' discharge contractual obligations only in
149. See supra note 142.




153. Id. at 728-29.
154. French law, like many other legal systems, proceeds on the basis that a promise
to do the impossible is null and void (impossibilium nulla obligatio). The principle, though
not expressly stated, appears to be implicit in C. cIV. arts. 1108, 1126-30, 1172, 1302 &
1601, and there are various particular applications in arts. 1722, 1741, 1788, 1790. For
the Swiss position, see generally, supra note 147.
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cases of such impossibility (as opposed to mere hardship), which were
unforeseen, unavoidable (that is, not preventable by the party seeking relief)
and without the fault of either party.' 55 The apparent harshness of these
rules has, however, been alleviated in practice as these provisions are
applied in light of the good faith and equity requirements of both the French
Civil Code (articles 1134 and 1135) and the Swiss Civil Code (article 2). 156
This liberal approach renders the concepts of force majeure and
impossibility virtually analogous to the judicially-created French and
German doctrines of impr~vision and wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage,
respectively, which both allow a contract to be adjusted for the increased
burden of economic hardship in the wake of extraordinary circumstances. 57
155. It should not be overlooked that most civil law countries, unlike their common law
counterparts, follow the principle that there cannot be a contract to do an impossible act.
See, e.g., THE SwIss FEDERAL CODE OF OBLIGATIONS, supra note 147, art. 20; THE
GERMAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 30, art. 306. Such a position, incidentally, also operates
in India. Indian Contract Act, 1872, § 56, in 14 THE AIR MANUAL: UNREPEALED
CENTRAL ACTS 335, 653 (Nagpur, India" All India Reporter Ltd., 5th ed. 1989): "An
agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void." However, these cases of ab initio
antecedent impossibility at the time of contract formation need not detain us here as we
are primarily concerned with supervening or post-formation impossibility typically
associated with an event during the performance stage of the contract.
156. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 197 nn. 17 & 18.
157. Under the influence of Professor Paul Oertmann's doctrine of the "basis of the
transaction" (Geschidftsgrundlage) and by using the well-known sections 157 and 242 BGB
on good faith, the Reichsgericht began, in the aftermath of Wold War I, to allow
readjustment of obligations based on wegfall der geschdftsgrundlage. The revolutionary
events and unparallelled inflation had greatly affected the German economy and upset the
basis of many contracts. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 65, at 214-17; see generally E.J.
Cohn, Frustration of Contract in German Law, 28 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. (3d ser.)
15, 16-24 (1946); NORBERT HORN ET AL., GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 136 (Tony Weir trans., 1982); Werner Lorenz, Contract Modification as
a Result of Change of Circumstances, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW,
supra note 66, at 357, 365-76; John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts:
Germany, 63 B.U. L. REV. 1039 (1983); Joachim Meinecke, Frustration in the West
German Law of Contract, 13 IRISH JURIST 83 (1978); Ingeborg Schwenzer, The Law of
Contracts, in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 173, 181 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W.
Finkin eds., 1996). Incidentally, this model of revision seems to have been adopted by
many recent codes: GREEK CIVIL CODE § 388 (Constantine Taliadoros trans., 1982),
INTRODUCTION TO GREEK LAW 77-78 (Konstantinos D. Kerameus & Phaedon J. Kozyris
eds., 1988), ATHANASIuS TH. IATROU, AN OUTLINE OF THE GREEK CIVIL LAW 114
(1986); THE ALGERIAN CIVIL CODE art 107, in COMMERICAL LAWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST:
ALGERIA 19 (Gamal M. Badr ed., 1988); ITALIAN CODICE CIVILE [C.C.] art. 1467. In
Sweden, Denmark and Norway, the doctrine of economic impossibility has been
developed, but it seems that Swedish courts now favor the direct test of hardship to the
artificial concept of impossibility. S.P. de Cruz, A Comparative Survey of the Doctrine
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The foregoing national approaches, both judicial and legislative,
closely interconnected, have been sought to be amalgamated by the
international arbitral tribunals in the omnibus and synthesized new concept
of rebus sic stantibus or "changed circumstances" to appraise the
implications of varied changes on the performance of contracts. 158 One
should, however, be cautious to note, that although the arbitrators have used
the termsforce majeure, physical impossibility, frustration of purpose and
commercial impracticability, rebus sic stantibus and changed circumstances
rather interchangeably, they do not necessarily carry the same meaning as
those given in national jurisdictions, although the situation conveyed by all
these expressions may be basically the same. 159 Nonetheless, on the
international level, these concepts (their technical differences being not
relevant to the present discussion) have been appropriately adapted to suit
the needs of international trade and possibly a transnational lex mercatoria.
Instruments like the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 196916
and the UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Drawing Up International Contracts
for the Construction of Industrial Works, 6' among many others, have also
played a significant role in that process. 162
In the ultimate analysis, the problem created by a situation of changed
circumstances is whether departure from the stipulations of the contract
should be allowed, by means of the contract's adjustment, postponement or
ex nunc termination, if the parties themselves have not addressed the
of Frustration, 2 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 51, 56 (1982).
158. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 193.
159. Id. at 199.
160. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Reproduced in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
161. UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Drawing Up International Contracts for the
Construction of Industrial Works, CN. 9/SER. B/2, United Nations Publication Sales No.
E. 87. V. 10, ISBN 92-1-133300-8 04200 p (1988). See also Force Majeure and Hardship,
ICC Pub. No. 421 (Paris, 1985); David Yates, Drafting Force Majeure and Related
Clauses, 3 J. CONT. L. 186 (1991); Rainer Geiger, The Unilateral Change of Economic
Development Agreements, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 73 (1974); Michael Furmston, Drafting
of Force Majeure Clauses-Some General Guidelines, in FORCE MAJEURE AND
FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT, supra note 146, at 57; Alan Berg, The Detailed Drafting
of a Force Majeure Clause, in FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT, supra
note 146, at 63; Ole Lando, Renegotiation and Revision of International Contracts: An
Issue in the North/South Dialogue, 23 GERM. Y. B. INT'L L. 37, 52 (1980).
162. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 193.
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disruptive event ex ante. 63 The dilemma can be best understood as a
conflict between the classical theory of freedom of contract, tellingly
epitomized in the maxim pacta sunt servanda, and the suggested need of
attributing a social vision of fairness to private autonomy, thereby extolling
the significance of extra-contractual norms, such as good faith,
reasonableness and practicality. " In this context, one has also to recognize
that the problem of changed circumstances is not new, having known a
considerable historical development in the various legal systems. 65
While the international commercial practice regards rebus sic stantibus
as a general principle of law (albeit "of strict and narrow interpretation""6),
it is treated "as a dangerous exception to the principle of sanctity of
contracts" 167 and is applied only "to cases where compelling reasons justify
it. " 68 Strictly speaking, such an approach, even though very restrictive, is,
in principle, a deviation from the faithful application of the classical
theory. 69 For, under the classical theory, if a transaction conformed to the
needed formalities, the court was obliged to enforce it and desist from
163. For example, a building or engineering contract might specifically provide for
what will happen in the event of a strike. Thus, the parties themselves deal with the
consequences of future events in certain types of agreement which are particularly
susceptible to disruption by unforeseen calamities. For an example involving such a
clause, see Eastern Airlines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F. 2d 957, 962 (5th Cir.
1976).
164. Cf. The Hon. Andrew Rogers, Q.C., Foreword to FORCE MAJEURE AND
FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT, supra note 146, at v-vi.
165. See ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 65, at 211. The classical Islamic law (sharia)
extends its scope of qtiwa qaTfira or qiwat al-qinzn (corresponding to force majeure),
exempting liability for nonperformance, not only to supervening impossibility of
performance, but also to situations where it has been rendered materially different or
unreasonably burdensome from what was originally contracted for. R AYNER, supra note
12, at 260. Modern legislation in Bahrin, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Syria, and United
Arab Amirates (UAE) is, however, slightly more restrictive (and, perhaps, "more
judicious") in that the circumstances must be unforeseen and of a public nature. The
judicial discretion is designed only to alleviate the obligation of the parties rather than to
extinguish it altogether. Id. at 260-63.
166. I.C.C. Award, Case No. 1512/70, Indian Cement Co. v. National Bank of
Pakistan, 1 Y.B. COM. ARB. 128, 129 (1976).
167. Id.
168. Id. See also Hungarian State Enterprise v. Yugoslav Crude Oil Pipeline, 9 Y.B.
COM. ARB. 69, 70 (1999). Furthermore, "force majeure conditions have to be pleaded,
proved, communicated to the other party and narrowly interpreted." NASSAR, supra note
68, at 203.
169. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 203.
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making any normative judgments. 7 0 However, neoclassical theorists have
allowed for some flexibility to let considerations of fairness pervade the
entire spectrum of contract, from formation to cessation. 171 Under the
classical theory unforeseeable (unpredictable) and disruptive events (but not
self-induced), causally rendering performance completely and materially
impossible (whether physical or economic), may justify nonperformance,
thereby letting the loss lie where it falls; otherwise, bargains remain
enforceable according to their original terms.
If the risk of the supervening events is allocated by the contractual
terms, then, such an allocation is unlikely to be judicially (or arbitrally)
interfered with lightly. 72 Similarly, if the parties, while fully aware of the
foreseeable risks, nevertheless choose not to guard against them, then, in
many circumstances, it would often be a factor that suggests that they
assumed the risk of such occurrence. It would then be difficult for them to
satisfy a court or an arbitrator that it is legitimate to relieve a party from
carrying out its bargain (or paying damage in lieu thereof). 173  In this
situation, the normal and prima facie inference (though rebuttable) is that
the parties have voluntarily assumed the risk of foreseen (or readily
foreseeable) events, 74 and that any intrusion on the sanctity of contracts
should be seriously resisted. 75  Thus, though under the contemporary
theory of frustration the foresight of the parties may be of considerable
170. Id.
171. See U.C.C. §§ 1-209 (19), 1-203, 2-103 (1)(b), 2-209 cmt. 2 (1997);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
172. See, e.g., Comptoir Commercial Anversois v. Power Son & Co., [1920] 1 K.B.
868, 895, 901.
173. See, e.g., Walton Harvey, Ltd. v. Walker & Homfrays, Ltd., [1931] 1 Ch. 274,
282 (Eng. C.A.) (Lord Hanworth, M.R.); [1931] 1 Ch. at 285-86 (Romer L.J.); Davis
Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District, [1956] App. Cas. 696, 724 (the delay "was
not caused by any new and unforeseeable factor or event") (Lord Reid); [1956] App. Cas.
at 731 ("the possibility of enough labour and materials not being available was before [the
parties'] eyes") (Lord Radcliffe); Paal Wilson & Co. A/S v. Partenreederei Hannah
Blumenthal, [1983] 1 App. Cas. 854, 909 (for frustration "there must be some outside
event or extraneous change ... not foreseen or provided for by the parties") (Lord Brandon
of Oakbrook). Decisions and dicta which appear to conflict with the general principle that
foreseen or foreseeable events are excluded from the purview of frustration are
convincingly explained away in TREITEL, supra note 141, at 461-7 1.
174. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54, 153 P. 2d 47, 50 (1944) (Traynor,
J.). "If [the risk of the frustrating event] was foreseeable there should have been provision
for it in the contract, and the absence of such a provision gives rise to the inference that
the risk was assumed." Id.
175. TREITEL, supra note 141, at 49-5 1.
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importance (not conclusive) in allowing a just solution to be arrived at, 176
the classical theory does not support an adjustment model, whereby,
depending upon the kind of change of circumstances, contracts could be
adapted, modified, supplemented or even excused. 1
77
2. Gradual Erosion of the Nonadjustment Approach
The nonadjustment approach of the classical theory, with its emphasis
on the sanctity of the promise, has been trenchantly criticized by the author
as it is completely out of tune with the functional realities of the long-term
transactions, where unforeseeability is endemic:
First, in many LTICTs, once the initial investment is made,
it is hard to pull out of the contract since it is difficult to transfer
the invested capital to other uses. In addition, to reap the returns
of one's investment, contractual partners may have to remain in
the relationship for a minimum period of time. Early termination
in such situations would adversely affect not only the contractual
parties, but also those who are involved in, or dependent on, the
project's completion. An adjustment of the contractual
relationship in such cases, besides being more equitable, is also
more desirable from a market efficiency perspective. Also, the
classical model of nonadjustment ironically defeats its own
purposes and encourages opportunistic behavior by permitting
windfall gains.
Second, the classical theory ignores that rationality ... has its
limitations. To what extent are potential contracting parties
prepared to invest in feasibility studies and other information-
generating activities to ensure that they have provided for every
possible eventuality? In addition, in some cases, revealing the
potential disruptive effect of some future eventuality is beyond
the state of art and available technology. Extensive geological
surveys can be carried out to identify possible oil reserves or the
condition of land in a construction site. Yet, upon the
commencement of drilling or construction, a contractor may
discover dry wells or swamps beneath hard earth surfaces. In
such cases, even from a cost/benefit analysis, it is easier, cheaper
176. See, e.g., Opera Co. v. Wolf Trap Found, 817 F. 2d 1094, 1102-1103 (4th Cir.
1987).
177. Rogers, supra note 164, at v.
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and more equitable to adjust the parties' contractual relationship.
To accommodate these criticisms, the classical model was revised
to allow for remedial measures in some limited situations.
Otherwise, however, the classical model still applies the old rule
that lets the loss lie where it falls. 1
78
Although the harshness of the rule that lets the loss lie where it falls has
been mitigated by apportioning the loss in the arbitral tribunal's equitable
discretion and the question of changed circumstances has been examined
and answered differently in relation to each specific contractual obligation,
in practice, the "obvious rigidity and unfairness of the classical model has
undermined [the] effectiveness"179 of such efforts. For, in the sixty-five
cases, in which rebus sic stantibus had been pleaded (excluding cases
relating to the effects of changed circumstances on forum selection clauses),
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal exercised its discretion in only five of them,
thereby indicating the very minimal extent to which it was prepared "to
sacrifice contractual clauses for the benefit of fairness. "180 In most of these
situations, even the most sibylline drafter would not have anticipated the
turn of events and envisage all the contingencies that the future may bring
at the time of contracting.
It is however only now that in contradistinction to the nonadjustment
model of the classical theory of rebus sic stantibus the contract drafting has
focused its attention toward dispute resolution through adjustment of
contractual relationship, rather than termination or suspension, following
changed circumstances.' 8' Increasingly, these explicit mechanisms of
178. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 206-207. Examples can be multiplied to demonstrate
that particularly troublesome problems are encountered by the impact of technological
breakthroughs and, not unsurprisingly, the risk of unforeseen and unforeseeable
developments grows as the lifetime of the contract increases.
179. Id. at 215.
180. Id. The author's conclusion contrasts with the American approach to overcome
the harshness of classical contracts' "all-or-nothing" approach. See Robert W. Reeder III,
Court-Imposed Modifications: Supplementing the All-or-Nothing Approach to Discharge
Cases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079 (1983): "[C]ourts have developed an array of doctrines ....
[Tihese doctrines assist courts in defining 'a shifting line of compromise between the
impulse to uphold the sanctity of business agreements and the desire to avoid imposing
obligations that are ... unduly burdensome."' Id. at 1080 (quoting L.L. Fuller & William
R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 379
(1937)).
181. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 218. See generally Erich Schanze, Failure of Long-
Term Contracts and the Duty to Re-negotiate, in FAILURE OF CONTRACTS: CONTRACTUAL,
RESTITUTIONARY AND PROPRIETARY CONSEQUENCES 155-65 (Francis Rose ed., 1997).
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contractual allocation of risk, often characterized as adaptation or
renegotiation clauses, are of sufficient generality to accommodate even such
hardships where supervening circumstances of any kind (including a change
in government policy) have rendered contractual performance not only
excessively burdensome but also financially less remunerative."8 That this
drafting strategy, apparently designed to neutralize the delimiting constraints
of unforeseeability and unavoidability in the traditional concept of rebus sic
stantibus for relational transactions (which at times might be found suitable
for discrete contracts), 183 is preferable to the classical model of excused
performance for the special nature of LTICTs is convincingly
demonstrated. 1 84
In the first place, as discussed earlier, the very nature of relational
contracts presupposes a continuing adjustment of the parties' obligations in
the light of gradually unfolding and unanticipated changed circumstances,
not in sight, when the contract was formed, or, human prescience being
limited, the parties could not have settled all the terms exhaustively in
advance.18 5  For, despite careful and dexterous planning, best-laid
arrangements may often go awry long before their contemplated date of
execution. Sudden events like stringent foreign exchange controls,
devaluation, currency fluctuations, nationalization or compulsory
appropriation of physical assets (plant and equipment) and intellectual
property (patents, trademarks, copyrights), etc., may seriously overturn the
inceptive apportionment of risk upon which the contract was initially based.
Thus, notwithstanding lawyerly ingenuity (and aspiration) to regulate in
extreme detail, depth, and scope the behavior of the contracting parties, it
is only a benign illusion that the draftsperson can always successfully tame
away the shrew of all the uncertainties and vagaries of the future. In the
telling words of Lord Denning, we "no longer credit a party with the
182. WOLFGANG PETER, ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 154 (1986); Karl-Heinz B6ckstiegel, Hardship, Force Majeure
and Special Risk Clauses in International Contracts, in 3 ADAPTATION AND
RENEGOTIATION OF CONTRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 159 (Norbert
Horn ed., 1985); P.J.M. Declercq, Modern Analysis of the Legal Effect of Force Majeure
Clauses in Situations of Commercial Impracticability, 15 J. L. & COM. 213 (1995).
Incompetence, inattention, oversight, or haste in omitting such clauses has no longer a
defensible place in the drafter's repertoire.
183. PETER, supra note 182, at 148-66; NASSAR, supra note 68, at 216-18.
184. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 219.
185. Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 91, at 596-97, 608-10; Nagla Nassar,
Internationalization of State Contracts: ICSID, The Last Citadel, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 185,
192-93 (1997).
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foresight of a prophet or his lawyer with the draftsmanship of a [Mackenzie]
Chalmers. "I6 Rather, most of the LTICTs fall in the category of relational
transactions as they share the elements of trust, cooperation and
interdependency. -8 7
Secondly, an increasingly large number of LTICTs involve massive
and high-risk investments which, being specific to the particular enterprise,
are not readily transferable and yield dividends only after a period of
time." Much of this investment will be lost if the venture is terminated,
for it could be hard to switch to a different type of business. It is thus
economically more sensible to adjust parties' obligations in such complex
undertakings (and conserve resources) than to terminate their business
relationship altogether. The consequences of termination are very
expensive and time-consuming in themselves and such a choice in most
cases is not an enviable option for either of the parties."8 9 Therefore,
compelled by economic circumstances, parties remain anxious to consider
the continuation rather than the dissolution of their contractual relations, in
spite of the changed circumstances.
Thirdly, contractual adjustment discourages opportunistic behavior,
including unjust enrichment or impoverishment, by disallowing windfall
gains and losses. 1  Since both the parties were equally devoid of any
foresight of the potential change of circumstances, it is inappropriate to
protect or penalize only one or the other. The absolutist-rigid formalism of
the all-or-nothing approach of the classical model, bringing in its train
automatic discharge, which lets losses lie where they fall, should therefore
be replaced by the adjustment model of loss-sharing of the relationist
theorists. For such a rule of adjustment "will encourage the pursuit of
successful adaptations of contractual relationships [and the] party refusing
modification will not only risk being charged with breach of contract, but
186. British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas Ltd., [1951] 1 K.B.
190, 202 (Eng. C.A.) (Lord Denning), rev'd on other grounds, [1952] App. Cas. 166.
187. ADAMS & BROWNSWORD, supra note 98, at 80, 87.
188. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 206.
189. Id. at 206-207.
190. At times, termination may be a preferred alternative to enable the parties to
negotiate their relationship afresh, if they so wish, without any constraints of
"opportunism" in a situation of "bilateral monopoly" where the parties are "locked into"
their contractual relationships. The problems of any opportunism are not entirely
hypothetical, although, in practice, they are likely to be more subtle and insidious.
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will also seriously damage his commercial reputation." 191 However, the
classical approach does not allow the contract to continue and to adapt its
terms to the changed circumstances or to replace different terms more
appropriate for the drastically changed realities than the terms negotiated in
the original contract. In particular, no relief is available on the ground that
performance of the contract has become unprofitable for the promisor.
Such a draconian approach produces neither fairness nor economic
efficiency.
Undeniably, the present conditions of adjustment-change of
circumstances, adverse effects and causal nexus-as required by the Vienna
Convention and those recommended by the UNCITRAL model are
somewhat restrictive (because of the use of foreseeability and avoidability
language). One should nevertheless applaud their relational flair and also
appreciate the emergent trend of those international arbitral awards which
determine the legal consequences of rebus sic stantibus in terms of
relational standards, overshadowing the doctrine of unforeseen events
(thgorie de l'imp rvision). 92 The remedies granted under the adjustment
model of relationalism have admittedly not been uniform, because what is
equitable in one circumstance may not be necessarily so in others.193 This
trend, still in its nascent stage, has, however, not ripened into a general rule
of law, thereby replacing the dominant and all-pervasive excuse doctrine
where contractual relationships are either terminated or suspended (but not
191. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 220. There is, obviously, a strong trend within the
United States to prefer an adaptation if a dramatic and unpredictable change impacts
severely on the commercial survival of both the contractual project and the contracting
partners. See generally Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy,
1992 Wis. L. REV. 1. The commercial culture of many countries, particularly in Asia,
regards a contractual agreement more as a broad framework of parties' obligations than
as an exhaustive catalog of inflexible and categorical commitments. As such, adaptation
requests are expected to be accommodated in a reasonable way. See generally DOMINIQUE
BLANCO, NEGOCIER ET RtDIGER UN CONTRAT INTERNATIONAL 11-16 (1993) (offers a
valuable comparison of civil and common law jurisdictions). See also Shiela Slocum
Hollis & John W. Berresford, Structuring Legal Relationships in Oil and Gas Exploration
and Development in 'Frontier' Countries, in INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS INVESTMENT:
MOVING EASTWARD? 29, 30-31, 35-36, 52-53 (Thomas W. Walde & George K. Ndi eds.,
1994).
192. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 220-21. See, e.g., LIAMCO Arbitration, supra note 14;
Dutch/Saudi Arabian Pipeline Contractor v. US/Saudi Arabian Oil Company, 14 Y.B.
COM. ARB. 47 (1989); Hungarian State Enter. v. Yugoslav Crude Oil Pipeline, 9 Y.B.
COM. ARB. 69 (1989); Subcontractor v. Main Contractor, 8 INT'L ARB. REP. Al (1993)
(Milan Arbitration Association); Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
272 (1984 II).
193. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 227.
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adjusted) in cases of changed circumstances. 194 In other words, except for
a modest beginning, the principle of the sanctity of contracts has remained
largely unimpregnable, in its application of the doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus, even in the context of LTICTs.
195
3. Arbitral Infusion of Fairness-Related Norms: A Measured or Sub-Rosa
Imperceptible Process?
That fairness-related norms have percolated somewhat imperceptibly
may not be readily apparent to a less attentive reader. However, from a
rereading of some of the awards, one suspects that one major reason may
be that the arbitrators are reluctant to resort to relational norms when the
parties have themselves already provided for a clause, explicitly or
obviously (sinngemass), regulating the consequences of changed
circumstances. 96  Oftentimes, parties do qualify their contractual
obligations by a cancellation clause, giving it a general power of
termination; a force majeure clause, excusing it on the occurrence of
specified types of events; a disclaimer clause, restricting (or exempting) its
liability for breach; a variation clause, allowing it to change the scope of
the work and to pass on additional costs as the work progresses to the other
party; or any such device, restricting its obligations only to use reasonable
efforts. 197
Obviously, in many cases, the presence of such a clause contemplating
a specific risk-distribution could justifiably be seen by many arbitrators as
overriding the effects of changed circumstances, thereby inhibiting their
discretion in readily relieving a party from the burdensome consequences
of unanticipated catastrophes. They very logically conclude that such risks
having already been so meticulously allocated by the contracting parties
should not be reallocated differently by the arbitral tribunals. For otherwise
how could rebus sic stantibus give a party that it would normally not be
entitled under its own contractually-stipulated clause, providing for specific
obstacles to performance? Doing so, that is, requiring a party, for instance,
to pay an amount far in excess than originally agreed upon would be plainly
a much more indefensible arbitral trespass on the sanctity of contract than
merely to relieve them from their remaining obligations. Furthermore, any
arbitral adjustment of loss that travels well beyond the confines of the
194. Id. at 230.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 215.
197. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at 678-79.
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agreement impairs the ex ante bargain and imposes an unjustifiable ex post
adjustment of losses upon the parties. Is it then unreasonable to assume that
in consciously bargaining for their own exculpation or limitation clause the
parties, consistent with their freedom to contract, were only striving for
certainty in delineating the parameters of their liability, thereby intending
it to be the sole and exclusive repository of their understanding? If so,
then, the general principle of rebus sic stantibus should very properly yield
to a specific (albeit, contrary) contractual provision by which the parties
may explicitly assume or assign a greater liability or lesser obligation/risk
allocation than envisioned in the standards set forth in the concept of
commercial impracticability or impossibility arising in the wake of changed
circumstances.
Thus, unless it be concluded that the exculpatory clause was merely
intended to supplement (and not supplant) the legal doctrine, 98 the
arbitrators are highly unlikely to intrude upon the contractual autonomy of
the parties in dealing in advance with the manifold problems of performance
following changed circumstances as they thought it most appropriate. The
focus thus being on the parties' freedom of contract-and depending upon
the value the contracting entities attach to their continuing business
relationship-they may themselves decide whether or not they want to
discharge their respective obligations or to put a renegotiation or contract-
adjustment clause in their agreement. The remedial flexibility of such
clauses offers a significant advantage over the rigidity of the general law.
Thus, indubitably, notwithstanding the increases in transaction costs,
a wide range of "[s]uch provisions[, when agreed upon, leave no doubt as
to the intent of the parties. They clearly reflect that the parties intended to
avoid that the impossibility to perform be considered as the sine qua non
198. In American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Iran, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 170, 184 (1986),
the tribunal found that where the contract provided for allocation of costs on termination
due to force majeure the contract would apply. But, for costs not covered by the contract,
"the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties is subject 'to the Tribunal's
equitable discretion, using the contract as a framework and reference point.'" Id. at 186.
The approach of the tribunal was "to reach a result which as closely as possible
corresponds to the contractual scheme." Id. at 188.
For an examination of the question whether the presence of a force majeure clause
operates to exclude the doctrine of frustration, see Ewan McKendrick, Force Majeure and
Frustration-Their Relationship and a Comparative Assessment, in FORCE MAJEURE AND
FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT, supra note 146, at 33, 34-37. The learned author's
conclusion is in the negative; he further demonstrates the advantages of relying upon a
force majeure clause as "the doctrine of frustration in English law operates within very
narrow confines ..... Id. at 37.
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requirement for force majeure."199 The language of such clauses, drafted
in a multitude of forms, naturally needs to be examined in each case, as
with all contractual terms, in the context of the contract as a whole to
determine the limits of each party's assumption of risk. Naturally, many
arbitrators, steeped in the judicial tradition that a decision-maker should not
commit the blasphemy of making a contract for the parties, sometimes
bridle at undertaking the gratuitous task of interfering with the drafter's
intent through a process of conjecture or ex post speculation as to how the
parties might have allocated the risk of loss had they contemplated that risk
at the time of contracting. 2' They, therefore, defer to individual autonomy
by strictly enforcing express allocations of risk as a matter of construction;
otherwise, the result of the hard bargaining of the informed parties would
be undermined by the hindsight and subjective judgment of an arbitrator.
This sensitivity, as seen earlier, explains that why the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal strictly applied such clauses "regardless of whether they suited the
changed circumstances or produced an equitable solution. "201
Secondly, the consequences of rebus sic stantibus do not always raise
the same ethical issues of unfairness deserving of moral opprobrium as are
normally implicit in situations of, say, unconscientious behavior, duress,
fraud, coercion and misrepresentation. Apparently, arbitrators (and judges)
have been enormously sensitive in condoning egregious conduct which is
outrightly destructive of commercial morality and a sense of fair play.202
This is so, because the principle of sanctity of contract, like many legal
principles, does not embody an absolute value. However, in other
relatively amoral situations, not involving extreme examples of revolting
unfairness-and the doctrine of discharge because of rebus sic stantibus is
certainly one of them-, the arbitrators have been acutely conscious of the
danger that the doctrine could needlessly undermine the time-honored
199. National Oil Corp. (Libya) v. Libyan Sun Oil Co. (US), I.C.C. Award, Case No.
4462/85, 16 Y.B. COM. ARB. 54, 59 (1991) (emphasis added). NASSAR, supra note 68,
at 223. It is understandable that an arbitrator should respect an express contractual
provision which clearly stipulates that performance will not be forthcoming if certain facts
cease to exist during the tenancy of the transaction.
200. See, e.g., Walker v. Keith, 382 S.W. 2d 198, 204 (Ky. 1964); Deadwood Lodge
v. Albert, 319 N.W. 2d 823 (S.D. 1982).
201. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 215. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal thus invariably
followed the rule that the loss must "lie where it falls" regardless of the equities of the
situation. Id. at 214 n.82. Risk allocation (and not loss sharing) is the raison d'Etre of the
classical theory.
202. See, e.g., JOHN BELL, POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 173-82 (1983);
ROY GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 12-14 (1998).
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principle of pacta sunt servanda.
As an illustration, the restrictive nature of the concept is neatly
demonstrated by Mobil Oil Iran v. Iran.20 3 The respondent claimed that the
long-term agreement for the exploitation of oil resources was frustrated by
the dramatic political changes brought about by the Islamic Revolution and
the decision of the new regime to follow a policy radically different from
that of the previous government in the oil industry, thereby discharging it
from further performance of the contract. While recognizing that changes
of such a character and magnitude could not be without significance, the
tribunal rejected the mere fact of the revolution as being a sufficient
"change of circumstances" to justify termination of the contract without
appropriate compensation. Since the case concerned a long-term oil
exploitation compact that is necessarily subject to progressive modification
(reflecting the changing balance of power between the companies and the oil
exporting countries), the tribunal ruled that the legitimate expectations of the
contracting parties in respect of the agreement could not be so easily
defeated by recourse to frustration. Otherwise, the integrity of the
contractual relationship would be seriously undermined. Such an approach
probably explains the arbitral reluctance to apply the theoretically infinite
doctrine of changed circumstances readily as the sole basis of contractual
discharge, thereby indicating that certainty and the sanctity of contract are
values not to be tempered with lightly.
Thirdly, even if arbitrators are favorably inclined, or feel obligated by
the notions of justice and rationality, to adopt a more realistic relational
approach towards LTICTs, they would nevertheless seek to draw support
for their decisions by reference to black-letter law as well. For an astute
arbitrator would be acutely conscious of the practical considerations
affecting the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards. As an
illustration, The Gov't of Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co.2' (popularly known
203. 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 39 (1987 III). The reasoning of this case was
followed in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Iran, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 79, 107-08 (1989
I). Another case, William L. Pereira Assocs. v. Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 198
(1984), also adopts a restrictive approach to the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. However,
such an approach was not followed in QuesTech, Inc. v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
107, 121 (1985 II), and some like cases, which related to secret military intelligence
projects of unique political sensitivity. Iran was however obligated to compensate the
claimant for losses suffered up to and including the termination of the contract. Id. at 123.
204. 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982) [hereinafter AMINOIL Arbitration]. Incidentally, this
seminal arbitration cast grave doubts on the efficacy of the stabilization clauses as a
protective device for the foreign investor over the long term. The tribunal found that the
sovereign rights of the state could be contracted away only for a relatively limited period
of time, id. at 1043 (Fitzmaurice, Arb., dissenting), and that "what that would involve
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as the AMINOIL Arbitration) demonstrates that adherence to pacta sunt
servanda may be the preferred mechanism to bring a fair and equitable
outcome envisioned by the parties and insist that contracts must be
performed in accordance with their terms. Thus, while confirming the
binding force of contracts under international law and ruling that the
stabilization clause did not affect the unquestionable right of a state to
nationalize as an expression of its territorial sovereignty, the arbitral
tribunal, nevertheless, on a construction of the clause, concluded that the
nationalization did not encompass confiscatory "takings" and that the
sovereign's right of nationalization was limited by the respect due for
contractual rights. Such an interstitial infusion of fairness, somewhat
subterranean, leaves no doubt that the rule pacta sunt servanda is
indispensable:
The AMINOIL award represents a balanced holding that
promotes not only the relational aspects of LTICTs, but also the
interests of both parties. At the same time, it achieves these aims
without unduly straining, or destroying the stability of the
contractual relationship. It is relational in character because it
accommodates future, unidentified changes, which are to be dealt
with as they occur over the course of the contract. Such potential
changes are not to be evaluated in light of the parties' original
contractual agreement, but in reference to the relationship as a
whole. The interests of the parties are treated not as competing
with, but as complementing, the contractual goal.2°5
A fourth possible reason may be that the guidelines of the various
international instruments, though designed to encompass relational realities
in contract drafting, have in practice not proved fully effective in furthering
the goals of relationalism and loss sharing. Perhaps, the guidelines relating
to the desirability of hardship clauses (UNCITRAL adopted a far less
ambitious approach because of political differences between developed and
developing countries) need to be significantly revised so as to banish the
would be a particularly serious undertaking which would have to be expressly stipulated
for." Id at 1023. A similar conclusion was reached in BP Exploration Co. (Libya) v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 297 (1979); Liberian E. Timber Corp. (LETCO) v.
Republic of Liberia, 26 I.L.M. 647 (1987). See generally John Crawford and Wesley
Johnson, Arbitrating with Foreign States and Their Instrumentalities, 5 INT'L FIN. L. REv.
11 (1986); Amoco Int'l F. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
189 (1987).
205. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 137.
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requirements of unforeseeability, unpredictability and
nonavoidability-which have been the mainstays of the classical theory of
rebus sic stantibus. Otherwise, the citadel of sanctity will continue to retain
its relative invulnerability from any substantial intrusions of fairness for
years to come. For pacta sunt servanda is so axiomatic a rule that any
doctrine, purporting to encroach upon it and to offer relief from an express
promise, is likely to meet with resistance and often with rejection. Not
unnaturally, oftentimes, varying the contract, or of adapting it to the
changed circumstances, or of suspending its performance are regarded as
sources of undesirable uncertainty, virtually amounting to an undesirable
arbitral usurpation of making a contract for the parties. Thus, though the
doctrine of changed circumstances is potentially a very flexible instrument
to adjust contractual relationships, in actual application, it has advanced
rather slowly, thereby remaining essentially a marginal exception to the
general principle of pacta sunt servanda.2°
HI. THE CONTRACTUAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY: PENUMBRAS AND
EMANATIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PRACTICE?
Is there... any justification for the present generation of [contract] lawyers
holding backfrom the task of deducing new principles of general application
suitable for the new millennium ?2o"
A. Formalism to Prudent Relationalism:
Interpretation of the Contractual Context
Turning to the author's suggested contractual equilibrium theory, it
should be noted, at the outset, that the selection of international arbitral
awards, by no means idiosyncratic-starting from theAMINOIL Arbitration,
ranging from the exceptionally rich output of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
to International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitrations and a potpourri of
many ad hoc disputes-offers the best blend of case histories toward
explaining the obviously developing law of contract governing LTICTs.2 °8
Grounded on prodigious research in thousands of pages of arbitral awards,
the resultant analysis and examination seeks to strike a rapprochement
206. Id. at 230.
207. Ewan McKendrick, English Contract Law: A Rich Past, An Uncertain Future?, 50
CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 25, 64 (1997).
208. Lord Wilberforce, Foreword to NASSAR, supra note 68, at xi.
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between the two extremes of the principle of sanctity on the one hand and
the approach of relationalism on the other toward maintaining the
contractual equilibrium. In this discretionary model of reasonableness,
parties' obligations are not defined slavishly by reference to their originally
agreed-upon terms but by reference to the existing contractual context:
The parties' behavior before and after the conclusion of the
agreement can often give significant clues as to how a contract
should be constructed. For example, the parties' interaction
during the life of a long-term agreement often deviates quite
significantly from the rules of the agreement itself. Parties may,
by explicit or implicit consent and often without complying with
the agreement's pre-established adaptation and ratification
procedures, behave very differently from the contractual
"programme. " There may be board or committee decisions
(minuted perhaps), government declarations (formally accepted
or not), ongoing negotiations (reaching some sort of formal
agreement on all or on parts of the agreement or not). In the
case of most long-term agreements, some sort of continuously
negotiated and implicitly accepted (if only by compliance)
renegotiation has, as a rule, taken place. This tacit adaptation
should certainly guide the arbitrator-interpreter who should not
try to roll back the parties to the original contract and give them
a lesson in how a formal contract adaptation should have been
carried out, but instead, should proceed cautiously and with
respect for the parties' evolving relationship. 2"
Interpretation of context can thus be a basis for finding that the parties
agreed to goals of cooperation, trust and reasonableness not necessarily
reflected in contract documents. For example, the AMINOIL Arbitration
209. Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment
Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 215,
255 (1996). Cf. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.) ("[a] word is
not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is
used"); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 89 (1960) ("[njo language stands
alone. It draws life from its background"). See also Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith,
Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration; Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L. REv. 169, 175 (1989): "The new conception
engineered by Llewellyn presupposes that the meaning of the agreement of the parties does
not depend exclusively or even primarily on the written terms of one or another
document."
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offers a good example of such a situation where actual party behavior, over
an extensive period of time, deviated significantly from the original written
agreement, without a formal renegotiation document ever coming into
existence. The decade-long discussions between the Government of Kuwait
and the American Independent Oil Company gradually led to a tacit (and
thereby de facto) acceptance of some of the renegotiated aspects of the
original agreement, without any formal documentation.
Anxious to promote the values of reasonableness, and in search of
justice, many arbitrators in their discretion have thus oftentimes recognized
the unreality of gathering the intention of the parties within the four comers
of the document. Instead, whenever appropriate, they have ventured to
travel beyond such a restrictive approach and strive to identify a
configuration of commitments patterned not in the words of the contract but
in the underlying relation of the contractual realities itself.2"' Such a
departure, besides highlighting the significance of the Baconian maxim,
"ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur; nam quod ex facto
oritur ambiguum verificationefacti tollitur, "211 emphasizes that contractual
undertakings should be viewed in light of the parties' conduct and
circumstances, whether before or after the writing was executed which form
integral part of the contractual milieu.
B. "Surrounding Circumstances" and Contract Interpretation
The concept of surrounding circumstances, the first major pillar of
the contractual equilibrium theory, owes much, particularly in recent years,
for its marked resuscitation, to the illuminating contribution of Lord
Wilberforce.21 2 For, undeniably, it is well-known amongst lawyers that
210. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 50, 54 nn.31-34, 55 n.35.
211. SIR FRANCIS BACON, A COLLECTION OF SOME PRINCIPALL RULES AND MAXIMES
OF THE COMMON LAWES OF ENGLAND WITH THEIR LATITUDE AND EXTENT (London
1630). The Maxim 23, in the text above and appearing in NASSAR, supra note 68, at 33,
translated here probably conveys the precise legal nuance that Bacon had in mind: "A
latent ambiguity in the language of a written instrument may be explained by evidence;
for it arose on evidence extrinsic to the instrument and it may therefore be removed by
other similar evidence." For an English translation of all the twenty-five maxims compiled
by SIR FRANCIS BACON, supra, which now appear together in English, perhaps, for the
first time, see John C. Hogan & Mortimer D. Schwartz, A Translation of Bacon's Maxims
of the Common Law, 77 L. LIBR. J. 707, 711-18 (1984-85).
212. As a Judge of Appeal, particularly in the House of Lords and the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council (1964-1982), Lord Wilberforce made an outstanding
contribution, inter alia, to the progress and development of the various facets of
international commercial law. See, e.g., Lord Justice Kerr, Commercial Dispute
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disagreement about the meaning of contracts, notably in respect of
international transactions, is one of the most fertile source of contractual
litigation and arbitration. The parol evidence rule, traditionally applied only
to extrinsic evidence that affects to add, delete or vary the terms of a written
contract, has been held to be inapplicable where a party seeks to avoid the
contract, because of illegality, fraud, duress, mistake or failure of
consideration. These defenses are raised without much doctrinal difficulty
since they do not turn on contract terms, but rather on other detestable
circumstances which have virtually nothing to do with the terms of the
agreement itself.
Nevertheless, undeterred by the parol evidence rule (which
embodies the sanctity principle in its most stringent form)-and apparently
not satisfied with its already existing myriad exceptions-, in a series of
landmark cases,213 his Lordship articulated that while the use of prior
negotiations for the purpose of ascertaining the parties' subjective intentions
was not permissible, such an evidence could nevertheless be examined to
determine objectively the "genesis" or "aim" of the transaction.21 4 Such an
Resolution: The Changing Scene, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR LORD WILBERFORCE, supra
note 67, at 111; THE PHILIPPINE BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
SELECTED PRIVY COUNCIL JUDGMENTS OF LORD WILBERFORCE 85-91, 133-41 (1983);
THE PHILIPPINE BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, SELECTED HOUSE
OF LORDS JUDGMENTS OF LORD WILBERFORCE 15-20, 21-42, 100-104, 108-11, 169-81,
188-95, 247-52, 294-97, 305-13, 314-19, 320-31, 386-91, 416-31, 478-81 (1983).
213. See, e.g., Prenn v. Simmonds, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381 (H.L.); F. L. Schuler A.G.
v. Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd., [1974] App. Cas. 235 (H.L. 1973); Reardon Smith
Line, Ltd. v. Vngvar Hansen-Tangen, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989 (H.L.).
214. Prenn, [1971] 1 W.L.R. at 1383-84; Lord Wilberforce restated the notion of the
totality of the circumstances analysis in Reardon Smith Line, [19761 1 W.L.R. at 995-96:
No contracts are made in a vacuum: there is always a setting in which
they have to be placed. The nature of what is legitimate to have
regard to is usually described as "the surrounding circumstances" ....
In a commercial contract it is certainly right that the court should
know the commercial purpose of the contract and this in turn
presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the transaction, the
background, the context, the market in which the parties are operating.
After discussing Utica City Nat. Bank v. Gunn, 222 N.Y. 204, 118 N.E. 607 (1918),
Prenn, [1971] 1 W.L.R. at 1383-84, and F. L. SchulerA.G., [1974] App. Cas. at 261-63,
his Lordship continued:
It is often said that, in order to be admissible in aid of
construction, these extrinsic facts must be within the knowledge of
both parties to the contract, but this requirement should not be stated
in too narrow a sense. When one speaks of the intention of the parties
to the contract, one is speaking objectively-the parties cannot
themselves give direct evidence of what their intention was-and what
1999]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
iconoclastic approach (also espoused in Australia215), which, in our
respectful submission, amounts to no more than effectively engrafting yet
another cleverly-disguised exception to the controversial parol evidence
rule 216 (and thereby causing another major chink in the Prometheus of the
must be ascertained is what is to be taken as the intention which
reasonable people would have had if placed in the situation of the
parties. Similarly when one is speaking of aim, or object, or
commercial purpose, one is speaking objectively of what reasonable
persons would have in mind in the situation of the parties.
Reardon Smith Line, [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 996.
215. Codelfa Construction Pty. Ltd. v. State Rail Authority of New South Wales, 149
C.L.R. 337, 352 (1982) (Mason, J.). Apart from its own earlier decisional law on the
subject, the High Court of Australia drew additional support from the views of Lord
Wilberforce. J.W. CARTER & D. J. HARLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACT
LAW IN AUSTRALIA 281 (3d ed. 1998), would have perhaps welcomed greater "discussion
of earlier cases" on the subject by the High Court than attempted in Codelfa.
216. Classical theorist and judges, expressing strong faith in the objectivity of language,
extolled the prudence of the parol evidence rule as a valuable incentive to reduce
agreements to writing and, equally as an important safeguard against dissemblers. By
contrast, modem scholars and judges have been critical both of the parol evidence rule and
the classical interpretive maxims. See generally Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule,
The Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 533, 554-61 (1998). In fact, in F. L. SchulerA.G., [1974] App. Cas. at 268, Lord
Simon of Glaisdale advocated the adoption of an expanded concept of "surrounding
circumstances" as a new evidentiary rule for modem contractual relationships (which
would have led to the full demise of the sanctity of the written contract):
[T]he distinction between the admissibility of direct and circumstantial
evidence of intention seems to me to be quite unjustifiable in these
days. And the distinction between patent ambiguities, latent
ambiguities and equivocations as regards admissibility of extrinsic
evidence are based on outmoded and highly technical and artificial
rules and introduce absurd refinements.
Id. The House however did not fully embrace the expansive approach of Lord Simon of
Glaisdale and ruled that evidence of subsequent conduct should be excluded. Lord Reid,
who agreed with Lord Wilberforce, was persuaded by the floodgates argument made by
the plaintiff's attorney that "such a policy [of making subsequent conduct admissible]
would entail the law embarking on a slippery slope on which there is no halting place [and
that it] would be the end of certainty in relation to the construction of documents." Id at
241. Further, it did not find any "substantial support in the [existing] authorities for any
general principle permitting subsequent actings of the parties to a contract to be used as
throwing light on its meaning." Id. at 252.
Similarly, the "present authority of the High Court of Australia [also] appears to be
against the use of post-contract conduct in aid of the construction of a written contract."
Hide & Skin Trading Pty. Ltd. v. Oceanic Meat Traders Ltd., 20 N.S.W.L.R. 310, 315
(Ct. App. 1990) (Austl.) (Kirby, P.); FAI Traders Co. Ltd. v. Savoy Plaza Pty. Ltd.,
[1993] 2 V.R. 343 (App. Div.) (Austl.); contra Spunwell Pty. Ltd. v. BAB Pty. Ltd., 36
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principle of sanctity), does recognize with considerable pragmatism that
contractual obligations (particularly commercial) are not formed on a tabula
rasa or in a vacuum, but are very much a product of an operational factual
context. They cannot be viewed in isolation from their natural habitat, lest
they wilt and lose their flavor:
The time has long passed when agreements ... were isolated
from the matrix of facts in which they were set and
interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations ....
We must ... enquire beyond the language and see what the
circumstances were with reference to which the words were
used, and the object, appearing from those circumstances,
which the person using them had in view.217
According to his Lordship, the formalist edifice of the parol evidence
rule no longer reflected actual business practices and bore little relation to
existing commercial realities, for parties' actual agreement often resided
outside of the four comers of the written contract. As such, it is only
appropriate that a decision-maker should "know the commercial purpose of
the contract [which] in turn presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the
transaction, the background, the context, [and] the market in which the
parties are operating."218 Thus, in arbitral awards, a vast array of facts (all
of the surrounding circumstances), existing at the time of agreement, have
been relied upon to remove ambiguities (patent or latent),29 but, those
arising later (after the initial phase of contracting), have been looked at only
in "delimit[ing] the boundaries of ambiguous clauses. 220  The relevant
N.S.W.L.R. 290 (S. Ct. 1994) (Austl.) (Santow, J.). See generally Stephen Charles,
Interpretation of Ambiguous Contracts by Reference to Subsequent Conduct, 4 J. CONT.
L. 16 (1991).
217. Prenn, [1971] 1 W.L.R. at 1383-84. Often the meaning attached to a word by the
parties must be gleaned from its context, including all the circumstances of the transaction.
Sometimes the context may reveal that the contract was made with reference to a
specialized vocabulary of technical terms or other words of art, or that the parties
contracted with respect to a usage in their trade or even with respect to a restricted private
convention or understanding. Id.
218. Reardon Smith Line, [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 995-96.
219. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 53-54, 57, 69. See, e.g., First Travel Corp. v. Iran,
9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 360, 367 (1985); Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Iran, 10 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 319, 326 (1986).
220. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 69; SEDCO, Inc. v. Iranian Oil Co., 10 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 207, 218 (1986-I).
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circumstances surrounding the transaction include all writings, oral
statements, and other conduct by which the parties manifested their assent,
together with any prior negotiations between them and any applicable course
of dealing, course of performance, or pertinent custom and trade usage.22'
In particular, prior dealings often help determine if the contracting parties
have developed a common understanding unique to their relationship,
including an assessment of their comparative sophistication, knowledge, and
experience to make informed judgments.
In this respect, three generalizations may be advanced. First, since
the purpose of this inquiry is to ascertain the meaning to be given to the
language, depending on the nature of ambiguity, arbitrators have often used
surrounding circumstances into implying terms and duties where the parties'
expectations cannot be ascertained (but not to override express terms).
222
In this exercise, particularly in situations of complex ambiguity,
surrounding circumstances occupy a primordial place and become the
primary source of the parties' contractual obligations. In other instances,
where the ambiguity is relatively less complex, such circumstances usually
occupy only a secondary source in supplementing the parties' agreement.223
This somewhat charneleonic character of ambiguity determines the
varying role attached to surrounding circumstances in establishing broader
grounds for judicial intervention, as is evident from a perusal of the various
arbitral awards, say, in AMINOIL Arbitration,22 4 Main Contractor v. Sub-
221. See, e.g., Lischem Corp. v. Atomic Energy Org. of Iran, 7 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 18, 23 (1984-IlI); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 149,
161 (1984-I).
222. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 81.
223. Id. at 87, 187-88.
224. 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982). In this arbitration, the parties' subsequent conduct was
found to have resulted in a de facto modification of their contractual undertakings:
While attributing its full value to the fundamental principle of pacta
sunt servanda, the Tribunal has felt obliged to recognize that the
contract ... has undergone great changes since 1948 .... These
changes have not been the consequence of accidental or special
factors, but .... took place progressively [and] brought about a
metamorphosis in the whole character of the .... contract .... The
Tribunal wishes ... to stress ... that [this] case is not one of a
fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) .... It is not
a case of a change involving a departure from a contract, but of a
change in the nature of the contract itself, brought about by time, and
the acquiescence or conduct of the Parties.
NASSAR, supra note 68, at 135, quoting AMINOIL Arbitration, supra note 204, at 1023-
24.
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Contractor, 225 and First Travel Corp. v. Iran.226 However, if a written
contract has been expressed in clear and facially unambiguous language,
then, the words are not subject to interpretation or construction; they have
to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. For the purpose of a written
agreement is to give the contracting parties some measure of certainty as to
their rights and obligations both in performance and in the event of a
dispute. This is particularly so in the changeable world of international
business transactions.
Secondly, most arbitral tribunals resolve the question of surrounding
circumstances-that is, prior negotiations, trade usage, subsequent conduct
and paralegal norms-on an ad hoc basis and thus, understandably, treat
them as of equal significance.2 2 ' Again, a careful scrutiny of the awards in
Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v. Iran,221 Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran,229 Lischem
Corp. v. Atomic Energy Org. of Iran,230 Establishment of Middle East
Country X v. South Asian Constr. Co. ,231 SEDCO, Inc. v. National Iranian
Oil Co. (NIOC)232 and Iran v. United States, Case B- ,233 despite
understandable difficulties involved in stating a general rule on this issue,
reveals that most arbitrators regard surrounding circumstances (stemming
from prior dealings, precontractual negotiations, and course of
performance) as a principal source of contractual obligations if they are
"coherent and clear enough to represent voluntarily accepted and settled
practice. ,23 4 Otherwise, either these acquire only a subservient position or
are even ignored altogether.235
Thirdly, the duties to cooperate, to inform and disclose, and to
negotiate a modification or adjustment, and the consequence of their
nonobservance can be best evaluated in light of the surrounding
225. I.C.C. Award, Case No. 4975/88, 14 Y.B. COM. ARB. 122 (1989).
226. 9 Iran-U.S. Ci. Trib. Rep. 360 (1985).
227. See infra notes 228-35.
228. 13 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 199 (1986 IV).
229. 6 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 149 (1984 II).
230. 7 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 18 (1984 III).
231. 12 Y.B. COM. AR. 97 (1987).
232. 15 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 23 (1987 II).
233. 10 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 207 (1986 1).
234. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 239.
235. Id.
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circumstances.236 For one cannot assert dogmatically, say, that every
nondisclosure237 amounts to a misrepresentation or absence of cooperation
necessarily connotes a breach of contract. It may very well be so in a given
context, but the universality of such a proposition sits oddly with
commercial realities.238 Hence, to prevent absurd and unreasonable results,
international arbitral awards have recognized that since contracts do not
operate in a framework devoid of dynamic context of evolving facts
appropriate allowance ought to be made for them.239
Furthermore, many contractual provisions are honored, ensuring
contract performance and limiting disputes, even when there is no powerful
sanction for their breach .2 1 This is, presumably, because of the existence
of informal and extra-legal sanctions, including a sensitivity of commercial
righteousness, and the preservation of a reputation of business morality and
236. Id.
237. The law, in most legal systems, does not generally mandate disclosure of all
information in commercial dealings, unless the parties in the contractual transaction had
operated under such different circumstances that the information was not equally available
to their efforts. Since information is oftentimes costly to produce, the assignment of
property rights in information (copyright, patented inventions and trade secrets) is a
familiar feature of most legal systems. See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A.
Krauthaus, Information as a Commodity: New Imperatives of Commercial Law, 55 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (1992). Imposing a carte blanche duty to disclose upon the
knowledgeable and dexterous information-gatherer would be antithetical to the notion of
a property right as it would deprive its holder of an economic advantage which the
information would otherwise entail.
238. On the normative question of determining the appropriate rule (of disclosure or
nondisclosure) for a particular class of cases, and what the law ought to be, from the
standpoint of economics and of moral philosophy, extensive literature exists. See, e.g.,
Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978); Sanford Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and
Private Disclosure of Product Quality, 24 J. L. & ECON. 461 (1981); KIM LANE
SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 31-42
(1988); Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargain Theory Approach to Default Provisions and
Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARv. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 639 (1989); Randy E.
Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent,
the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 783 (1992); Steven
Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. ECON. 20
(1994); ANTHONY DUGGAN ET AL., CONTRACTUAL NON-DISCLOSURE: AN APPLIED
STUDY IN MODERN CONTRACT THEORY 198-208 (1994).
239. NissAR, supra note 68, at 239.
240. Commercial contractors often act in a spirit of cooperative endeavor instead of
choosing combative alternatives with a view to preserving their long-term relationships.
See ADAMS & BROWNSWORD, supra note 98, at 295-329.
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its effects on other potential trading partners in the market. 24' In some
societies, as experience counsels, recourse to litigation is attended by a
particular opprobrium, and, unless the dispute is unusual, such resort in
most cases would inevitably ruin any future business and private dealings
between the parties.2 42  Relational culture particularly recognizes that
business people, anxious to preserve their business associations, do not
insist upon a rigid Shylockian application of contract rules, thereby paving
way for a prudential accommodation of their relational contract practices.
Most commercial enterprises are generally concerned with preserving than
with discontinuing their contractual commitments notwithstanding any
performance disruptions.243
C. "Reasonableness": Informed Behavior, Knowledge of the
Contractual Context, and Implication of "Good Faith" Norms
"Reasonableness" is the second pillar of the contractual equilibrium
theory. 2 " The circumstances of the individual case, rather than the
formalistic principles, have been relied upon by the arbitral tribunals in
determining whether or not a particular practice or conduct is improper or
unreasonable. In particular, whether there is any justification for imposing
upon the parties noncontractual duties like that of good faith and fair
dealing, rooted in established practices or general legal standards, 2 45 with
a view to nurturing an environment of honesty, fairness, and decency in
commercial dealings. Most arbitral awards seem to equate reasonableness
241. Id. at 299-311.
242. See, e.g., Jane K. Winn, Relational Practices and the Marginalization of Law:
Informal Financial Practices of Small Business in Taiwan, 28 L. & Soc'Y REv. 193 (1994).
243. ADAMS & BROWNSWORD, supra note 98, at 297-303.
244. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 239.
245. The good faith obligation dates to Cicero's dialogue, De Officiis (On the Nature
of Duties), but its definition remains elusive largely because it is situational rather than
unitary. Yet, according to received doctrine, a party has a duty to avoid conduct
unnecessary to realizing that party's reasonable expectations if that conduct would impair
a counterparty's reasonable expectations. For a discussion of the good-faith doctrine in
relational contracts, see William W. Bratton, Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the
Structure of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REv.. 1084, 1122-24 (1993);
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Relational Contracts, in GOOD FAiTH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT
LAW, supra note 66, at 291.
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with what is rational and informed behavior,2 46 given all available
"knowledge" and the "intended purpose" of the agreement. It thus seems
logical to treat one party's concurrence to the agreement with knowledge of
the other party's general purposes as a ground for resolving doubts in favor
of a meaning that will further those ends, rather than a meaning that will
frustrate them.
Knowledge of the extra-contractual context, actual or presumed, helps
define whether or not the parties have voluntarily undertaken the changes.
For a rational individual who, armed with knowledge of the changes in the
contractual content, chooses nevertheless not to demur and assail
expeditiously as it could or should have been done, is deemed to have
voluntarily (that is, knowingly and freely) accepted-or acquiesced in-such
changes.247 For, on learning the truth, the innocent party is expected to
resile from the contractual undertaking and render no further performance.
Not doing so results in de facto modification of contractual obligations by
subsequent conduct which, though not willful in terms of the classical
theory, is appropriately regarded voluntary. 248  For not to regard it so
would be plainly irrational and unreasonable, especially when the parties
had full knowledge of the contextual elements. 249 Thus, the reasonableness
test in part guards against manufactured subjective differences in intention,
and prohibits opportunistic behavior that may occur because of a change of
conditions not anticipated by the parties.250 Undoubtedly, this shift from
classical model's "willfulness" to "voluntariness" as the criterion for
246. Cf. Michael D. Bayles, Legally Enforceable Commitments, 4 L. & PHIL. 311, 313
(1985): "A rational person uses logical reasoning and all relevant available information
in ... deciding what to do, and [in] accepting legal principles."
247. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 240.
248. Id.
249. Cf. Timothy J. Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The
Relevance of Subjective Value, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 383-84 (1983):
Not only must the subjective value exist, it must also be foreseeable....
A defendant cannot be held to an unusual loss of the plaintiff unless, at
the very least, he has, or should have, knowledge of the loss. Within
the context of subjective value, the foresight requirement means that the
party in breach must have some knowledge of the circumstances
(usually from communication with the innocent party) that make it
likely that breach will cause subjective losses. Only if courts apply the
foresight reqirement will the party with knowledge of the special
circumstances have the proper incentive to guard against the loss,
including disclosing the problem to the other party, which may then be
paid a premium to assume the additional risks. (Footnote omitted.)
250. Cf. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 218-19.
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admitting contextual elements-prior negotiations, subsequent conduct,
trade usage, etc. -greatly weakens the sanctity principle of the autonomous
will of the contracting parties.25
Knowledge plays an equally decisive role in appraising the
consequences of informational changes.252 For example, those who
advocate the validity and enforceability of stabilization guarantees for
LTICTs define knowledge in reference to a fixed time, whereas, those who
favor full recognition of the effects of informational changes and acquired
knowledge on the parties' relationship, oppose any form of stabilization or
freezing of contractual terms.253 In cases of rebus sic stantibus knowledge
helps define foreseeability and the occurrence of the nondisruptive changes
of circumstances; the party seeking suspension or cessation of
performance, based on force majeure, must prove that it had no knowledge
of the event. 254 Knowledge is thus used as a relevant factor for evaluating
the change of circumstances against which the contract was initially
formed. 25' Also, where the newly-acquired knowledge renders the old
contractual terms otiose and unsatisfactory to respond to the requirements
of the newly-acquired information, the duty to negotiate is imposed upon the
parties.256 Similarly, if the defaulting party possessed the knowledge, real
or constructive, that certain acts would expose the contract to unbearable
tensions and thereby collide with the "intended purpose" of the contractual
undertaking, or that the cost of performance might be disproportionate to
the value or the benefits received by the plaintiff for the performance, then,
a failure to communicate such information would constitute a breach of the
duties to inform and to cooperate.257
The second element of reasonableness, the intended purpose of the
transaction, has involved an interplay of subjective and objective
approaches.258 Modern arbitral practice veers in favor of the approach that
the likely intent of the contracting parties should be gleaned from the
agreement "as written," unless there be cogent evidence that the intended
251. Id. at 240.
252. Id. at 240-41.
253. Id. at 240. For an examination of the various issues associated with the use of
stabilization clauses, see Waelde & Ndi, supra note 209, at 255.
254. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 240.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 240-41.
258. Id. at 241.
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purpose has changed over the passage of time. 259 Nonetheless, the original
intended purpose formula is not entirely subjective, primarily reflecting the
will theory, for, like Humpty Dumpty, parties may use language as they
like, but the secret meaning entertained by only one party may not be relied
upon to change the ordinary denotation of a word in its natural and plain
sense. 21 In those relatively rare cases in which the parties attached the
same meaning to the language in question, the arbitrators have carried out
their intentions. But if the parties attached different meanings to that
language, the arbitrators' task became the more complex one of applying a
standard of reasonableness to determine which party's intention is to be
preferred at the expense of the other's.
261
Therefore, in many arbitrations, involving economic projects
comprised of a number of independent but indivisible contracts, under the
rubric of interpreting the original intended contractual purpose, arbitrators
have looked to the extra-contractual context either as a primary or
secondary source in deciphering the contractual content or the goal the
parties might reasonably be deemed to have sought. For instance, in
Establishment of Middle East Country X v. South Asian Constr. Co.,262 both
prior negotiations and subsequent conduct were examined to ascertain the
real purpose of a consulting agreement, which was assailed as allegedly
encompassing a bribery contract. Such noncontractual obligations, as are
necessary for the successful execution of the original intended purpose of
the transaction, are thus regarded as part of the parties' relationship. 63
Thus, while the arbitrators have declined to impose an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, they have nevertheless recognized
that these duties may arise as a result of a special relationship between the
parties governed or created by a contract. 264 Even under the guise of
259. Id.
260. LEwis CARROLL, THROUGH THELOOKING-GLAss AND WHAT ALICE FOuND THERE
124 (1871):
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone,
"it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"'The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so
many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
master-that's all."
261. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 55, 57.
262. 12 Y.B. COM. ARB. 97 (1987).
263. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 144-45.
264. Id. at 142 nn.4 & 9.
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revision, gap-filling, and modification arbitral tribunals adhere to the
intended purpose standard-a standard which sets the outer limits of the
duties of good faith and fair dealing.2 65 These and other fairness-oriented
good faith duties to inform and to cooperate are imposed as higher ethical
standards in contract dealing only where the successful pursuit of the
contractual project would otherwise be jeopardized or would tend to
eviscerate the intended purpose of the transaction. 2"
In other words, contractual terms may be implied and modified only
if it would not emasculate the ultimate nature and goal of the original
agreement and would help restore its original equilibrium.2 67 Such a
prudential approach could greatly change parties' rights and duties by
focusing on their relationship and dealings rather than on their presentiated
consent to these obligations. Otherwise, as arbitrators have explained
repeatedly, "(a]n arbitrator's role is not to make a contract for the
parties. "268
The sacrosance of the original intended purpose is thus preserved
zealously, unless it is demonstrated that the planning-processes for
conducting exchanges and other aspects of performance in an indefinite
future have so markedly changed over the life span of a given long-term
relationship as to amount to a radical "change in the nature of the contract
itself, brought about by time, and the acquiescence or conduct of the
parties."2 69 Such content, under the yardstick of reasonableness, is then
articulated by recourse to available knowledge and the intended purpose of
the contractual undertaking.27o The arbitral tribunals have increasingly
recognized that, unlike the discrete transactions (where specificity and
measurement result in very certain and complete planning), in relational
contracts, particularly when the planning processes involve protracted long
periods, flexibility must be the norm.271  For, in light of available
knowledge and the intended purpose, in increasingly complex relational
transactions, it may not appear reasonable for the law to expect the parties
to spell out all their obligations with greater precision in advance-as some
265. Id. at 146-67.
266. Id. at 241.
267. Id. at 242.
268. Id. at 173.
269. Id. at 242 (quoting AMINOIL Arbitration, supra note 204, at 1024).
270. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 242.
271. Id. at 21-24.
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nonroutine contingencies are effectively noncontractable.272  In a
commercial world of relational contracts, trust and cooperation are
essential, and resort to such general terms like "reasonable," "best efforts,"
"fairness" or "good faith" is often a method of allowing for adjustments to
future contingencies.273 Such duties require a party to make such efforts as
are reasonable in the light of that party's ability and the means at its disposal
and of the other party's justifiable expectations.274
The notion of "reasonableness" is also central to many of the
UNIDROIT Principles-for example, articles 4.1 (2) (contract
interpretation), 5.3 (duty of cooperation), and 7.4.12 (assessment of
damages)-which encourages a reorientation toward what constitutes proper
conduct in the international marketplace.2 75  As that market becomes
increasingly unified, reasonableness or commercial reasonableness may also
acquire an increasingly identifiable content. Furthermore, "good faith and
fair dealing" is also a fundamental norm underlying the UNIDROIT
Principles.
276
D. Contractual Equilibrium Theory:
A Prudential Framework for LTICTs
It is, however, important to recognize that the contractual equilibrium
272. Id. at 22, 23, 24.
273. Id. at 24-25.
274. Id.
275. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994) [hereinafter UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES]. These are also reproduced in an annex in MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN
INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW-THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 271 (2d enl. ed. 1997).
276. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 275, arts 1.7, 2.15, 3.5, 3.10, 4.8, 7.1.6.
This duty is based on fundamental notions of fairness and its scope necessarily varies
according to the nature of the agreement. See also John Klein & Carla Bachechi,
Precontractual Liability and the Duty of Good Faith Negotiation in International
Transactions, 17 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1 (1994); E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing Under the UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant International Conventions,
and National Laws, 3 TuL. J. INT'L COMP. L. 47 (1995); BONELL, supra note 275, at 136-
50. Moreover, contrary to other international instruments that do not address the
questions of substantive validity, the UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 275, provide a
variety of means for policing the contract for its individual terms against both procedural
and substantive unfairness. See Michael Joachim Bonell, Policing the International
Commercial Contract Against Unfairness Under the UNIDROITPrinciples, 3 TUL. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 73 (1995).
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theory, as gleaned from the international arbitral practice, does not regard
LTICTs as creating disguised form of status relationships.2 " But, since
agreed-upon terms are no longer the exclusive reservoir of contractual
undertakings and contractual obligations are no longer absolute, the
contractual equilibrium theory, in its legitimate search for a mutually-
beneficial adaptation of the parties' interests, allows arbitral tribunals to
invoke "surrounding circumstances" and "reasonableness" and thus base
their decisions not on abstract rules alone, but on the pragmatic evaluation
of the context.278 This may not always operate in immaculate form like
Alighieri Dante's Paradiso, 279 but influences the determination that extra-
contractual contexts are sources of norms as well as rules.2 °
The new model thus understandably accords consent a relatively
diminished role and recognizes that contextual norms of fairness and
reciprocity, positive law, and usages will significantly qualify obligations
assumed by contracting parties in regard to LTICTs, and will even impose
277. The development of private law from status to contract has shown sign in recent
years of going into reverse. Instead of being formed by contract freely reached, the legal
relations between individuals are becoming more and more fixed as status-relations. The
contract of marriage is governed by rules of a status kind from which the parties cannot
escape by private agreement, and by rules of testamentary disposition certain types of
beneficiaries simply cannot be disinherited completely. The relationships of landlord and
tenant, and employer and employee, are increasingly regulated by similar rules of a status
kind, governing the right to enter into and remain in such a relationship, and governing
its terms. Company law and the special rules on partnership also show the willingness of
the law to provide special regimes for recurrent forms of long-term relationship. Whether
one classifies such relationships as special contracts or noncontractual relationships, it is
noteworthy that the ordinary rules of contract law may well not be the way in which many
LTICTs are handled by the current international arbitral practice. The truth is that
contract, seen as a social institution, is being readjusted so as to make it more just. The
phenomena which are seen as examples of retrogression into status are in fact instances
of the degeneration of contract. Its regeneration is possible and has already started. It
falls to us to advance it. For an illustration of such a phenomenon in the area of family
law, see Stephen Cretney, From Status to Contract?, in CONSENSUS AD IDEM, supra note
141, at 251.
278. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 237-38.
279. For example, in 2 DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY: PARADISO, CANTO
II (Charles S. Singleton trans. & ed., 1975), when Dante and his celestial guide (Beatrice)
enter the Moon, part of Paradise, the cause of the spots or shadows (which appear in that
body) is explained to him. Beatrice explains that the Moon does not really have dark
patches, or blemishes, as perceived from Earth. Rather, the variation of its luminosity
owes much to the light that falls upon it from other levels of Paradise.
280. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 22, 28-29.
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obligations beyond those assumed by the parties. 28' But, nonetheless, these
contracts are initially the result of individually negotiated bargains and thus
are not subject ex post to certain status obligations.2 2 Absent opportunistic
behavior, contract terms in LTICTs are enforced as the parties have
agreed.2" 3 In any event, the contractual equilibrium theory provides a
framework for LTICTs within which individuals or commercial entities can
plan and monitor the future course of their business activities, secure in the
confidence that the premise on which they began (that the law would
indicate the extent to which it would support and implement their intent)
was well justified. 284 This should help promote the values of flexibility and
rational processes of contract revision in accordance with the economic
changes at the global level. Otherwise, the doctrines of pacta sunt
servanda and sanctity of contract reinforced in their widest possible extent
by such rigid devices as unlimited stabilization and freezing clauses would
seriously collide with the concepts of fairness or economic equilibrium in
global developments.
That the current patterns in the arbitral awards reveal such a trend
where contract law is no longer an artificial ivory tower "abstraction" 2M is
not only convincingly demonstrated by the author in the context of LTICTs,
but she has further performed the daunting task of encapsulating these
oftentimes irreconcilable (and not readily amenable to sweeping
generalizations) patterns of arbitral case law and international practice,
from a comparative lawyer's perspective, in the ornamental cast of a
coherent theoretical framework, which is intensely thought-provoking.28 6
The book's theoretical sophistication is impressive, and the author's
conclusion is persuasive that the contractual equilibrium theory does not
purport to demolish individual self-determination and laissez-faire theory
as a regulatory mechanism but, contrary to the relational or contextual
model, merely endeavors, albeit not unsuccessfully, to rectify the
shortcomings of the promise principle and thereby recognize that
"[o]ccasions often arise when ... it becomes just to set aside ... the carrying
281. Id. at 237.
282. Id. at 242. See supra note 277.
283. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 219-20.
284. Id. at 242.
285. GILMORE, supra note 3, at 14.
286. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 237-43. One who has not followed through the
exposition of the author carefully right from the beginning may find it difficult to
appreciate the real thrust of the contractual equilibrium theory so tersely described in the
concluding chapter of the book.
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out of a promise '.... 287 And, in so doing, the contractual equilibrium
theory recognizes that it is high time not only to transcend the methodology
that once treated judicial contract doctrine (an autonomous body of law) as
the apotheosis of legal theory, but also to emphasize that the parties to
international commercial arbitrations realize that the limits of the reach of
the law of contract have been significantly changed.288 It is in this context
that often there have been many reasons to impose nonconsensual notions
like good faith, unconscionability, promissory estoppel, and presumptions
against the drafter (contra proferentum) that, however described, reflect
social judgments and involve an attempt to reach the result the parties
would have desired in LTICTs. 289 The author's thorough and compelling
analyses are instructive about how arbitral tribunals apply relational ideas
in practice, while, at the same time, fully appreciating that the consensual
freedom of contracting parties to make choices is still the raison d'8tre of
modern law.2"3 As such, a large number of awards reverberate the
language of sanctity of contracts, 291 although some awards have played
287. MARcus TULLIUS CICERO, ON DUTIES 13 (M.T. Griffin & E.M. Atkins eds.,
1991); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, 331B.
288. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 237.
289. Id. at 113, 141-43, 170.
290. Id. at 234.
291. See, e.g., Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35
I.L.R. 136, 181 (1967) ("[t]he rule pacta sunt servanda is the basis of every contractual
relationship [and agreement]"); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 20 I.L.M.
1, 54, 6 Y.B. COM. ARB. 89, 101 (1981) (the "right to conclude contracts .... is protected
and characterized by two important propositions ... that 'the contract is the law of the
parties,' and ... that 'pacta sunt servanda' (pacts are to be observed).... [T]he principle
of the sanctity of contracts ... has always constituted an integral part of most legal systems
.... based on Roman law, the Napoleonic Code ... and other European civil codes, as well
as Anglo-Saxon Common Law and Islamic Jurisprudence (sharia)"); I.C.C. Award, Case
No. 5485/87, Bermudian Co. v. Spanish Co., 14 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 156, 168 (1989) ("the
rule pacta sunt servanda implies that the contract is the law of the parties"); I.C.S.I.D.
Award, Case No. ARB/81/1, AMCO Asia Corp. Pan American Development Ltd. and PT
AMCO Indonesia (US) v. Republic of Indonesia, 23 I.L.M. 351, 359, 10 Y.B. COM. ARB.
61, 62 (1985) (a contract "is to be construed in a way which leads to find out and to
respect the common will of the parties: such a method of interpretation is but the
application of the fundamental principle pacta sunt servanda, a principle common, indeed,
to all systems of internal law and to international law"). See also Klaus Peter Berger, The
Lex Mercatoria Doctrine and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 943, 983 (1997) (referring to the I.C.C. Award
No. 8486, dealing with a dispute between a Dutch and a Turkish party, which pointed out
"the dominance of the principle of pacta sunt servanda expressed in the hardship provision
of article 6.2.1 of the [UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 275]").
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down its spirit.2"
IV. CONTINUING DEMISE OR RESURGENCE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT: MYTH OR REALITY?
Freedom of contract has been conclusively labeled a naive myth, but the
forms of that mythology still bind.2 93
A. Changing Horizons of Contract Law and Fairness
One may legitimately wonder if the arbitral trend described
heretofore might not be equally noticeable in a much wider area of
transactions (commercial or noncommercial), strictly outside the ambit of
LTICTs, given the somewhat cyclical nature of the principle of sanctity of
contract, that is, the promisor's absolute liability within a bargain.294
Instead of an artificial aberration, many key concepts, or old natural law
notions, such as promises, reliance, privity, interdependence, exchange and
unconscionability, have steadily undergone considerable transformation
and change, appropriate to the needs of the modem societal transition from
laissez-faire to welfare state economies, and have been used to overcome
295the formal contract law requirements.
For instance, classical contract theory, epitomizing the ascendance of
sanctity of contract, has been significantly replaced by case law (and
statutory provisions) that expanded liability for unfulfilled promises,
brought the law into conformity with modern commercial practice, and
thereby provided greater judicial flexibility in adjudicating disputes to
292. See, e.g., Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 199, 233 (1986
IV) (the "doctrine of pacta sunt servanda is not a rule which, per se, suffices to resolve
[the pertinent choice of law] issues in this [c]ase"); Lischem Corp. v. Atomic Energy Org.
of Iran, 7 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 18 (1984-I1l) (the arbitration, despite the clarity of the
wording of the contract, ignored the application of the sanctity principle and, contrary to
the classical theory, relied upon precontractual negotiations as evidence to negate the plain
and unambiguous meaning of the text); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 149 (1984-1I) (the arbitrator looked to surrounding circumstances as a primary
source of contractual obligations).
293. Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 754
(1981) (book review).
294. See, e.g., Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR.
L. REV. 1131, 1187-1204 (1995).
295. See, e.g., ADAMS & BROWNSWORD, supra note 98, at 1-13, 123-24, 160-61, 196-
97, 253-54, 328-29, 362 (1993).
[Vol. 18
FROM "SANCTITY" TO "FAIRNESS"
achieve equitable and fair results in individual cases.296 Undeniably, the
emergent contours of good faith and related concepts do constitute the very
real chinks in the cold armor of individualism, freedom of contract, caveat
contractor and any other laissez-faire notions in that the contracting parties
are not regarded any longer the autonomous individuals who are the
exclusive masters of their bargains capable of safeguarding their own
interests. 297
Whether one describes the departure from the classical contract's
monolithic reverence for freedom of contract as an aspect of "social
conceptualism," 298 or as emphasizing "social control," 219 or as "mixed
contract,"3°° or as "cooperative contract," 30 1 their overall object is to deal
with the perceived infirmities in the concept of unbridled individualism.302
Absent the development of suitable alternatives to formalism, judges and
legal thinkers have increasingly looked to natural law notions of fairness
and justice in response to deeply felt social ideals. These rationales can be
distilled from the varying fact patterns of the cases, involving an intermix
of subjective-objective norms: "[Slubjective principles should be employed
where they serve both fairness and policy, and when they do not ... the
principles employed will ... typically depend on objective variables that
provide a reliable surrogate for state of mind. ",303 In any event, the search
296. Id. at 257-91.
297. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in
Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401
(1964); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982).
298. Karl Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook, 54 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 876, 880-81 (1979) (reviewing CHARLES L. KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (1976)).
299. FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (3d ed. 1986).
300. Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829,
834-36 (1983).
301. See generally Douglas K. Newell, Will Kindness Kill Contract?, 24 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 455 (1995); Roger Brownsword, From Co-operative Contracting to a Contract of
Co-operation, in CONTRACT AND ECONOMIC ORGANISATION: SOCIO-LEGAL INITIATIVES,
supra note 108, at 14, 37-38.
302. Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J.
472, 477-83 (1980). See also Kennedy, supra note 8, at 580-83.
303. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1107, 1111-12 (1984); see generally MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE
COMMON LAW 8-10, 14-16 (1988); Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay
in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 750-51 (1931).
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for fairness or reasonableness in contracts is not new, although often the
courts recoil from espousing such solutions, because adherence to a rigid
formal rule offers them a convenient, though harsher, answer.
Nevertheless, the growing willingness of many twentieth century
courts to (1) excuse performance (for example, because of a mistake of fact
or of unforeseen circumstances and thereby apply principles far removed
from the parties' bargain), (2) encourage expansion of the protean doctrine
of promissory estoppel (significantly eclipsing bargain theory's dominant
role in imposing absolute liability), (3) liberalize the concept of "privity"
(giving right to the third party to claim relief independently), and (4) invoke
the concept of "unconscionability" in a diverse range of situations
(outlawing unacceptably exploitative abuse of superior bargaining power)
can be neatly illustrated by many examples drawn from the recent
American," Australian3 5 (particularly of the last two decades 306) and, to
304. See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry
and the "Law of Satisfaction "-A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 379-94
(1995); Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L. REV. 253
(1991).
305. It has been increasingly accepted both by the Australian courts and the legislatures
that, because of the changing commercial reality of the contemporary marketplace,
contracting parties today are not often all equal or free to negotiate their bargains. In no
small measure, the abolition of appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council in 1975
has also contributed to the development of a distinctively Australian judge-made contract
law after a "long slumber." Sir Anthony Mason, Book Review, 1 J. CONT. L. 265 (1989).
See also Sir Anthony Mason, Australian Contract Law, 1 J. CONT. L. 1 (1988); P.
Ellinghaus, An Australian Contract Law?, 2 J. CONT. L. 13 (1989); Sir Anthony Mason,
Australian Law for Australia, 26 AusTL. L. NEWS, No. 10, Nov. 1991, at 14.
306. Over a span of approximately two decades, various High Court decisions, in
conjunction with legislative initiatives, suggest that concepts of fairness have eroded the
principle of sanctity of contract. Prior to this Australian courts were generally disinclined
to review contracts and liberally find an abuse of bargaining power to justify relieving a
party from a harsh transaction. See, e.g., South Australian Railways Commissioner v.
Egan, 130 C.L.R. 506 (1973). In this case, the Court, while noting the exceedingly
unbalanced nature of the standard form contract, nevertheless declined to infer from the
form and circumstances of the contract any abuse of bargaining power. Only when
established principles of law or equity were available was justice done.
Now not only have the courts, particularly the High Court, shown themselves to be
willing to refashion old doctrines to produce more evenhanded solutions but have also
displayed the juristic determination to be innovative in their judgments. For example, the
High Court was prepared to read, in Commercial Bank of Australia v. Amadio, 151 C.L.R.
447 (1987), notions of unconscionable behavior and unequal bargaining power widely.
It has been equally innovative in the areas of restitution (Pavey & Matthews Pty. Ltd. v.
Paul, 162 C.L.R. 221 (1987)), unjust enrichment (ANZ Bank v. Westpac, 164 C.L.R. 673
(1987), David Securities Pry. Ltd. v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 175 C.L.R. 353
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a lesser extent, English3 7 experience, as well as from some civil law
(1992), permitting recovery of sums paid under mistakes of fact and of law, respectively),
privity of contract (Trident General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. McNeice Bros. Pty. Ltd., 165
C.L.R. 107 (1988)), and damages for late payment of money (Hungerfords v. Walker, 171
C.L.R. 125 (1989)). The doctrine of promissory estoppel, as recognized in Legione v.
Hateley, 152 C.L.R. 406 (1983), has been upheld and extended in Waltons Stores
(Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher, 164 C.L.R. 307 (1988), and in Commonwealth v. Verwayen,
170 C.L.R. 394 (1990). Similarly, the concepts of unilateral mistake (Taylor v. Johnson,
151 C.L.R. 422 (1980)) and of economic duress (Crescendo Management Ply. Ltd. v.
Westpac Banking Corp., 19 N.S.W.L.R. 40 (Ct. App. 1988) (Austl.)), have been accorded
extensive judicial recognition.
These developments provide valuable evidence that the Australian High Court has
been prepared to make significant changes to the law as it has come down from the past
in order to make it more relevant to modern-day conditions and commercial realities. See
generally Paul Finn, Commerce, The Common Law and Morality, 17 MELB. U. L. REV.
87 (1989); Derek Davies, Restitution and Equitable Wrongs: An Australian Analogue, in
CONSENSUS AD IDEM, supra note 141, at 158, 159-61; Nicholas Seddon, Australian
Contract Law: Maelstrom or Measured Mutation, 7 J. CONT. L. 93 (1994); John Gava
& Peter Kincaid, Contract and Conventionalism: Professional Attitudes to Changes in
Contract Law in Australia, 10 J. CONT. L. 141, 142 (1996) ("[c]ontemporary [Australian]
law has moved a significant way from will-based contract towards a regime where
contractual obligations are better understood as imposed by the courts according to notions
of fairness and community expectations").
307. English judges, stubbornly wedded to classical contract doctrine, have been
relatively less solicitous of consumers (with the notable exception of Lord Denning) than
their American and Australian counterparts, and have been slow to advance the doctrines
of good faith, estoppel and unconscionability. Instead, it has been mostly left to
Parliament to make necessary reforms. See, e.g., Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, ch.
50 (Eng.). This measured inertia is largely attributable to the fact that English courts
follow a positivist approach to the law, basing their decisions (and their reasoning) upon
the formalism of the doctrine of stare decisis rather than upon any broad policy-oriented
ideas. See, e.g., Andrew Phang, Positivism in the English Law of Contract, 55 MOD. L.
REV. 102 (1992). This accounts for the traditional dogma that there is no inquiry
permissible into the fairness of a bargain by reference to the adequacy or otherwise of
consideration.
Nevertheless, English courts have often concerned themselves with fact-specific
cases of substantive fairness (for example, illusory contracts, option contracts, requirement
and output contracts, defenses of mistake, misrepresentation, fraud, duress and undue
influence, and even frustration and penalty clauses) through the devices of implication,
construction, and interpretation and other means. P.S. ATIYAH, Contract and Fair
Exchange, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 329 (1986), originally published in 35 U. TORONTO
L.J. 1 (1985); COLLINS, supra note 58, at 18-32 (while many of the doctrines of English
law are in fact concerned with promoting fairness to some extent, Professor Collins'
account, unlike Professor Atiyah's, seems somewhat exaggerated). In essence, English
law's preference has been to respond to perceived cases of unfairness by devising
piecemeal solutions. McKendrick, supra note 207, at 33-37, 46-47, 63-63; Johan Steyn,
Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men, 113 L.Q. REV. 433,
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 18
systems. 308
B. "Sanctity" vis-d-vis "Fairness ": An Uneasy Transition
from Reverence to Realism in the Law of Contracts?
Whether this approach of judicial solicitude for fairness and
commercial morality is superior or inferior to the fact-centered specificity,
case law particularism, and anticonceptualism of the legal realist is not the
issue. However, these transformative developments in the law of contracts
do reveal a vision of incomparable magnitude as a revolutionary process
through which the Holmesian "felt necessities of the time" 3" manifest
themselves. The law suitably adapts itself to those exigencies, either
through judicial innovations or legislative intrusions, toward softening the
asperities of freedom of contract. In particular, the gradual emergence of
detrimental reliance as an independent and potentially exclusive criterion of
promissory obligation is a significant development in the modern evolution
of contract law in England, United States and Australia.31°
Dr. Nassar's study obviously does not explore all these broad issues
of sanctity vis-A-vis fairness outside the ambit of LTICTs. But faulting her
438, 442 (1997). This explains its refusal to adopt an explicit overriding requirement of
good faith. See, e.g., Walford v. Miles, [1992] 2 App. Cas. 128.
308. See, e.g., Camille Jauffret-Spinosi, The Domain of Contract: French Report, in
CONTRACT LAW TODAY: ANGLO-FRENCH COMPARISONS 113-44 (Donald Harris & Denis
Tallon eds., 1989); MICHAEL H. WI-IINCUP, CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE: THE
ENGLISH SYSTEM AND CONTINENTAL COMPARISONS (1990); BLANCO, supra note 191;
Norbert Reich, From Contract to Trade Practices Law: Protection of Consumers'
Economic Interests by the EC, in PERSPECTIVES OF CRITICAL CONTRACT LAW 55 (Thomas
Wilhelmsson ed., 1993); COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, THE PRINCIPLES
OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PART I: PERFORMANCE, NON-PERFORMANCE AND
REMEDIES (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 1995) (further parts are expected); Hugh Beale,
The "Europeanisation" of Contract Law, in EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF CONTRACT
23 (Roger Halson ed., 1996); MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL
TRADITIONS 306-39 (2d ed. 1994).
309. HOLMES, supra note 40, at 1.
310. See, e.g., LORD DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW 197-222 (1979) (English
developments); FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at 453-60 (American law); Patrick
Parkinson, Equitable Estoppel: Developments After Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v.
Maher, 3 J. CONT. L. 50 (1990), Sir Anthony Mason, The Place of Equity and Equitable
Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law World, 110 L. Q. REv. 238, 253-56 (1994)
(Australian initiatives). The precise relation between reliance and detriment is still a
matter of considerable debate in Australia. See, e.g., Foran v. Wight, 168 C.L.R. 385,
413 (1989); Jacobs v. Platt Nominees Pty. Ltd., [1990] V.R. 146, 153; Commonwealth
v. Verwayen, 170 C.L.R. 394, 413-16, 429, 454 (1990).
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painstaking study on that score would not only be gratuitous but also
amount to criticizing her for not writing a book that she had never intended
to undertake. Nevertheless, happily, the transfiguration of the concept of
sanctity in the context of LTICTs has been so commendably conceptualized
in the contractual equilibrium theory that it can, from a vantage point,
significantly contribute to our understanding of many contractual problems
in new contexts. More specifically, such studies should help develop what
some call international commercial custom, that is, model clauses and
contracts, which are appropriate for transnational trade, on the basis of
current trade practices relating to specific types of transactions or particular
aspects thereof.31' This is, however, not to dispute that although the
principle of freedom of contract is of fundamental importance in
international global economy, with or without trade barriers, it is not an
absolute principle.3" 2  Rather, the principle has been correctly
circumscribed by extra-contractual norms of good faith, fair dealing and
justice in the wake of "a startling move away from the dominance of the
will theory and the principle of pacta sunt servanda."3' 3
In the same vein, in the realm of contract law in general, perhaps, it
may not be unreasonable to say that fairness is equally gaining widespread
acceptance as the more important element. But, despite being continually
eroded at the edges, the twin doctrines of freedom of contract and sanctity
of contract are nonetheless destined to have a tantalizing place in the
judicial universe of contract law as their recent suggested resurgence in
England" 4 and in the United States3" 5 indicates. One plausible explanation
311. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Uniform Law and Its Impact on Business Circles
(General Report), in INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW IN PRACTICE, ACTS AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD CONGRESS ON PRIVATE LAW 547, in UNIDROIT (1988); Peter
Winship, Changing Contract Practice in the Light of the United Nations Sales Convention:
A Guide for Practitioners, 29 INT'L LAW. 525 (1995); Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and A Review,
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 281 (1994); Klaus Peter Berger, International Arbitral Practice and
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 129
(1998).
312. NASSAR, supra note 68, at 64-65, 80-81.
313. Id. at 152.
314. ATIYAH, supra note 5, surveying the genesis of the concept of "freedom of
contract" against the backdrop of political, economic, social and legal influences,
concluded that it was in decline towards the end of the 1970s. But, in the last decade,
there has been a strong resurgence of free-market ideology, of the individual's right to
make one's own free choices, concomitantly accompanied by a growing distrust of
bureaucratic and state-controlled decisionmaking. Thus, freedom of contract's star has
been rising in the 1980s and the inevitable tension between legal paternalism and an
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for this phenomenon may be that, since effective economic activity is not
possible without reliable promises, a party to a contract must execute its
part of the bargain if justice so demands.316 After all, contract law involves
individual's right to make her or his own contract have come into prominence yet again.
For example, in the much-criticized decision, Walford v. Miles, 119921 2 App. Cas. 128,
the House of Lords strongly emphasized the parties' freedom to pursue their own self-
interest unrestrained by any notion to negotiate in good faith.
315. That over the past dozen or so years, American courts have also retreated
significantly toward the classical conceptualist position of freedom of contract in
interpreting arbitration clauses, standardized releases, insurance exclusions, and warranty
disclaimers is explored in Mooney, supra note 294, at 1187-1204. A similar pattern is
noted in the realm of securities regulation in Margaret V. Sachs, Freedom of Contract:
The Trojan Horse of Rule lOb-5, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 879 (1994); Symposium,
Securities Arbitration: A Decade After McMahon: Contract Theory and Social Securities
Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1335 (1996). See also Carnival
Cruise Lines Inc.v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); L. Gordon Grovitz, Rescuing Contracts
from High Weirdness, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 3, 1988, at 16, reprinted in A CONTRACTS
ANTHOLOGY 423, 423-25 (Peter Linzer ed., 2d ed. 1995); C. M. A. McCauliff, Freedom
of Contract Revisited: Johnson Controls, 9 J. CONT. L. 226 (1995); RICHARD A. POSNER,
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 60-61 (1996). See supra notes 8,
36.
316. Apparently, this view of the sacrosance of the contractual terms influenced Oliver,
J., in Radford v. De Froberville, [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262 (Ch. D.), in assessing damages
for the guilty party's failure to construct a wall as stipulated in a contract for sale of land
between the plaintiff (Radford) and the defendant (De Froberville). If the damages were
assessed by the diminution in market value measure, then, they would have been nominal.
However, the cost of erecting a wall in accordance with the appropriate contractual
specification was, at the date of trial, approximately £3,400.00. In discussing as to which
would be the correct measure of damages, diminution in market value or the cost of
reinstatement value, Oliver, J., observed:
Now, it may be that, viewed objectively, it is not to the
plaintiff's financial advantage to be supplied with the article or service
which he has stipulated. It may be that another person might say that
what the plaintiff has stipulated for will not serve his commercial
interests so well as some other scheme or course of action. And that
may be quite right. But that, surely, must be for the plaintiff to judge.
Pacta sunt servanda. If he contracts for the supply of that which he
thinks serves his interests-be they commercial, aesthetic or merely
eccentric-then if that which is contracted for is not supplied by the
other contracting party I do not see why, in principle, he should not be
compensated by being provided with the cost of supplying it through
someone else or in a different way ....
Id. at 1270. Cf. Kupfersmith v. Delaware Ins. Co., 84 N.J.L. 271,275, 86 A. 399, 401
(1913):
The law will not make a better contract for the parties than they
themselves have seen fit to enter into, or alter it for the benefit of one
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the duties individuals impose on themselves as a result of the reciprocity of
promises that they make to one another. Thus, the terms expressly agreed
to should not arbitrarily be replaced with different ones simply because, in
hindsight, these would yield a more reasonable or efficient outcome than
actually envisioned by the parties.
The recent trends in contract law do not question this aspect 1 7 but
rather place the doctrine of sanctity of contract (which is certainly not a
naive myth) within the ambit of principles of fairness, having regard to the
fact that it has little relevance to modern society as a doctrine of privileged
status in its own right. It is considered preferable to sacrifice some of the
values of the twin pillars of classical contract doctrine, certainty and
predictability, in exchange for what are more relevant rationales and just
results.319 Thus, the principle of the fidelity to the given word and an
unswerving allegiance to pacta sunt servanda must admit of some
reasonable limits.
Any expansive meaning of the value of freedom of contract (though
the notions of individualism are enormously powerful) is now subject to
attenuated protection. Not unsurprisingly, competing social values with
fluid notions of justice, equity, and fairness can no longer be used to gain
party and to the detriment of the other. The judicial function of a
court of law is to enforce a contract as it is written.
317. The will of the parties (and its expression) being the bedrock of individualism, it
is therefore understandable to claim, in a comparative perspective, that the "notion of
private autonomy still has some validity today, in the sense that the expressed will of the
parties serves as the impetus to the formation of contract and as the justification for its
legal enforcement." ZWEIGERT & KoTZ, supra note 65, at 8. Cf. P.S. ATIYAH, FREEDOM
OFr CONTRACT AND TilE NEW RIGi-T 406 (1989). "lElven the modern [Englishi lawyer,
accustomed as he is to the many derogations from freedom of contract today, still takes
it for granted that contractual obligations are created by the will or the intention of the
parties."
318. If courts can set aside contracts too easily, then, the commercial world will not be
able to rely on any promises. This is, of course, criticized by lawyers and business people
as lack of certainty and predictability would give rise to increased litigation. See, e.g.,
Donovan W.M. Waters, Equitable Doctrines: Canadian Experience, in EQUITY,
TRUSTEES AND FIDUCIARIES 432 (Timothy G. Youdan ed., 1989). For, without certainty
and predictability, business people will be unable to exercise their free choice in choosing
or avoiding the rules of contract that are implied by the courts.
319. E.g., Commonwealth v. Amann Aviation Pty. Ltd., 174 C.L.R. 64, 102 1991:
"In evaluating a plaintiff's benefits ... , the court does not look solely at the express terms
of the contract but evaluates the plaintiffs rights to benefits of any kind, whether those
benefits are expressed by the terms of the contract or are ascertainable by reference to
circumstances extrinsic to those terms." (Brennan, J.)
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undue advantage or avoid obligations in contractual relationship.32 ° As
Lord Wilberforce candidly noted: "I think that the movement of the law
of contract is away from a rigid theory of autonomy towards the
discovery-or I do not hesitate to say imposition-by the courts of just
solutions, which can be ascribed to reasonable men in the position of the
parties. '  Thus, undeniably, deviating from traditional laissez-faire
concepts (and adopting more generalized ethical norms), modern contract
law is increasingly moving towards more open-ended, collective values of
320. This is, for instance, evident in the provisions of the Contracts Review Act, 1980,
§ 9(2) (N.S.W.) (Austl.) under which a contract may be declared unjust if it is a "product
of both procedural and substantive injustice" and that the enactment may have even
signalled "the end of much of classical contract theory in New South Wales." West v.
AGC (Advances) Ltd., 5 N.S.W.L.R. 610, 620, 621 (Ct. App. 1986) (Austl.) (McHugh,
J.A.). But note the views of another judge:
[Tihe steadily increasing use in Australia this century of expansive
definitions of unconscionability in both state and Commonwealth in a
way almost scandalous to adherents of nineteenth century Anglo-
Australian doctrine and have caused both lawyers and people regularly
encountering contract law to become much more comfortable with the
court's potential presence as a contract alterer and fixer.
Mr. Justice L.J. Priestley, A Guide to a Comparison of Australian and United States
Contract Law, 12 U. NEW S.WALES L.J. 4, 10 (1989) (footnote omitted). The ambiguity
of the legislation has, however, not escaped criticism both in academic and judicial
writings. See, e.g., A.L. Terry, Unconscionable Contracts in New South Wales: The
Contracts Review Act 1980, 10 AUSTL. Bus. L. REv. 311 (1982). The observations of Mr.
Justice Michael McHugh, the author of the West decision, and now a justice of the High
Court of Australia, are particularly noteworthy:
Civil litigation has ... increased because courts are increasingly
directed by legislatures to re-arrange people's legal rights by reference
to vague standards which sound attractive but which are so indefinite
that they are extremely difficult to apply to everyday disputes....
The difficulties in applying such vague criteria [as those
contained in the Contracts Review Act, 1980 (N.S.W.)] mean that
parties to contracts have difficulty in knowing what their rights are.
Litigation is forced upon them. When courts have to apply vague
standards, consistency of decision-making-which is one of the
primary benefits of the rule of law-is difficult to achieve. Moreover,
the decision of a court applying such vague criteria often seems
arbitrary. Dissatisfaction with the decision-maker in particular cases
is often the result. In time, confidence in the judicial system is
undermined.
Justice M. H. McHugh, The Growth of Legislation and Litigation, 69 AUSTL. L.J. 37, 43
(1995). See also Luke R. Nottage, Form and Substance in US, English, New Zealand and
Japanese Law: A Framework for Better Comparisons of Developments in the Law of
Unfair Contracts, 26 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 247 (1996).
321. National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd., [1981] App. Cas. 675, 696.
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welfare, fairness, and social justice, both in the realm of consumer cases
and commercial transactions, in securing the protection and implementation
of the legitimate expectation of the contracting parties. Holmes' timeworn
aphorism that "[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV"322 could have been
written with the Benthamite law of freedom of contract in mind.
Is contract then dead or en renaissance? Perhaps, in the ultimate
analysis, it is appropriate not to overlook the Rawlsian notion that "all
obligations arise from the principle of fairness, "323 and, at the same time,
recognize that a judge "is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of
his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. "324 The tension that exists between
the notions of "sanctity" of contract and "fairness" of the
transaction-perhaps, a perennial one-may be recalled in the eloquent
words of Mr. Justice Cardozo: "Something, doubtless, may be said on the
score of consistency and certainty in favor of ... stricter standard. The
courts have balanced such considerations against those of equity and
fairness, and found the latter to be the weightier." '325 One should then
realize that "freedom of contract" is today perhaps not among the most
sacrosanct Western legal constructs and the ringing phrase it once was.326
322. Holmes, supra note 45, at 469.
323. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 342 (1971). Analyzing a range of difficult
and controversial cases involving normative judgments, such as blood donation, organ
transplantation, pornography, free trade, immigration, prostitution, surrogacy, and racial
discrimination, some limits of freedom of contract are perceptively explored in
TREBILCOCK, supra note 8.
324. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921), in
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 107, 164 (Margaret E. Hall ed.,
1947). For a thorough and imaginative examination of Cardozo's views on the role of
judges against the backdrop of logic, history, custom, and public policy considerations,
see ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 199-222 (1998).
325. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921); KAUFMAN, supra
note 324, at 350-56, 446, 449.
326. But see Arthur Chrenkoff, Freedom of Contract: A New Look at the History and
Future of the Idea, 21 AUST. J. LEGAL PHIL. 36, 54-55 (1996).
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